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Preface
This book started its journey on Friday 14 August 2015, in the Springbank 
Room of the Crawford Building at The Australian National University 
(ANU). Much earlier, Hilary Charlesworth had been the Director of the 
Centre for International and Public Law (CIPL) at ANU when Deborah 
was one of its academic members. By 2015 I was the Director of CIPL, 
and Hilary and I decided to organise a day-long symposium, under 
CIPL’s auspices, to honour the work of our friend and colleague Deborah 
Cass, 15 February 1960 – 4 June 2013.
Deborah’s parents Moss and Shirley Cass, her husband Gerry Simpson and 
their daughters Hannah and Rosa, her brother Dan, as well as extended 
family from Sydney, were moved by the presentations that all included 
a personal and professional dimension.
Deborah was a brilliant Australian constitutional and international 
lawyer  who had studied at the University of Melbourne and Harvard 
Law School, and taught at Melbourne Law School, ANU and the London 
School of Economics. As a member of CIPL from 1993 to 2000, her work 
offered illuminating new perspectives in a range of fields, from the right 
to self-determination, critical international legal theory and feminist legal 
theory to the international trade law system.
The symposium drew together academics from around the globe to 
reflect on Deborah’s scholarship and contributions to public law and 
international law, and how they might influence current controversies. 
Beyond the contributors to this collection, both Jennifer Clarke and 
Kristen Walker also presented illuminating papers on the day.
It is six years since that event, but the material in this collection, including 
some of Deborah’s original law review pieces, are testament to the foresight 




Thank you to all the people who have been involved in ensuring the 
outcomes of that workshop have resulted in this book being available for 
more people to benefit from Deborah’s work. I would also like to thank 
the journals in which Deborah’s articles first appeared for permission to 
reproduce them in this book, so readers can go straight to the source that 
inspired each contribution. I also thank the ANU Publication Subsidy 
Committee for the financial contribution supporting the editing. Finally, 
I would like to thank ANU Law student Ella Beniamini, who undertook 
a CIPL internship, for her role in ensuring this book has seen the light 




Traversing the Divides: 
Remembering Deborah Cass
Hilary Charlesworth
This collection celebrates the life and work of Deborah Cass (1960–2013).1 
Both an international and public lawyer, Deborah2 studied and/or taught at 
the University of Melbourne, Harvard Law School, The Australian National 
University (ANU) and the London School of Economics. Deborah was a 
significant presence in all the institutions with which she was connected, 
as well as being a wonderful spirit in the lives of her family and friends.
I encountered Deborah when she was an undergraduate law student at 
Melbourne University. I recall our first meeting vividly. I turned up for 
work on my first day as a junior lecturer in 1987, rather nervous and 
uncertain about where I should report for duty. Deborah greeted me on 
the steep Law Faculty staircase, saying, ‘You must be the new lecturer, let 
me show you your room’. She marched me to my rather dingy office and 
counselled that I might think of asking for something better. Deborah 
then introduced me to the Law Faculty office staff and left me with them, 
saying she would call in again to see how I was settling in. I assumed that 
she was a very friendly colleague and looked forward to her continuing 
advice on navigating the Law Faculty. Deborah dropped in a few days 
1  There is strong feminist philosophical reasoning for referring to femme-identifying academics by 
their full names, and this collection uses Deborah Cass’s full name in referring to her academic work. 
This enforces an acknowledgement of the unique standpoint from which femme-identifying academics 
are thinking and writing from, and complements the sort of work Deborah was trying to achieve in her 
work on gender equality throughout her career. See Ulrike Schultz, Gisela Shaw, Margaret Thornton 
and Rosemary Auchmuty (eds), Gender and Careers in the Legal Academy (Hart, 2020).
2  Conversely, when referring to Deborah in a personal capacity, this collection will refer to her by 
her first name alone. This acknowledges the constant traversing of this book between the public and 
the private sphere, as well as Deborah’s vibrancy in both of them.
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later with a draft of her article in the Melbourne University Law Review, 
which Margaret Young’s chapter in this collection discusses, and it was 
only then I realised she was a student.
Deborah’s generosity of spirit and eagerness to steer people in the right 
direction was a hallmark of her personality. From that first meeting on, 
I was the beneficiary of her advice, support, insight, her friendship, her 
loyalty and her love. A highlight for me was moving her admission to legal 
practice in the Supreme Court of Victoria: I felt proud to be introducing 
a candidate of such integrity and creativity into the legal profession. 
We  overlapped later at ANU in Canberra, where Deborah taught for 
almost four years. She was not only a superb colleague, a dedicated 
teacher and a great catalyst for ideas, but she also greatly improved the 
Law Faculty’s fashion sense. Deborah indeed took me in hand in the style 
stakes, once observing that she could not determine whether my outfit 
was cool and retro or just plain frumpy.
Deborah was always practical – not for her woolly expressions of emotion; 
she would rather knit, bake or cook to show her interest and concern. 
Even when she was very ill, Deborah would turn the conversational tables 
around to check up on me, my parents and my family, and to offer insights 
and advice, or to recommend recipes and readings.
While devoting fine attention to the stuff of everyday life, Deborah 
Cass was also a brilliant scholar. Although the deep sense of loss and 
sadness at Deborah’s death remains, it is wonderful to have her writings 
as a  continuing source of inspiration and consolation. In them, we 
continue to hear Deborah’s firm, clear voice, her appreciation of language, 
her seriousness, her curiosity, her sensitivity and her wry humour.
Reading her work, and recalling seminars and talks I heard Deborah Cass 
give over the years, I am reminded again of her penetrating, inquiring 
mind. She was not one for intellectual short cuts, and would reprimand me 
kindly but firmly when she found me doing this. As this collection shows, 
Deborah had broad academic interests. She was a gifted constitutional 
lawyer, a path-breaking international lawyer and a shrewd critic of legal 
theory. Within the field of international law, unlike many of us, Deborah 
Cass ranged over many areas, becoming an internationally recognised 
expert on areas as diverse as natural resources, self-determination, 
international institutions and international trade law.
3
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Deborah Cass had a rare capacity to analyse the trajectories of legal ideas 
and movements. She could discern trends and contradictions without 
getting bogged down in the conventional legal fascination with particular 
instances. This talent is on elegant display in an article published in 1996, 
‘Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International 
Law’.3 The article is a sympathetic but rigorous study of the critical 
school in international law – pioneered by David Kennedy at Harvard 
and Martti Koskenniemi at the University of Helsinki. Deborah Cass 
had encountered the ‘New Approaches to International Law’ (NAIL) 
school while a graduate student at Harvard and was friendly with many 
of its proponents. Her intellectual fearlessness did not allow her to pull 
her punches, however.
NAIL scholars positioned themselves as a Newstream challenging the 
mainstream of international law, primarily concerned with rules and 
institutions. The traditional account was that international law could deliver 
an objective answer to any international dispute through the application 
of legal rules. NAIL scholars challenged this claim in a variety of ways. 
Koskenniemi, for example, identified two contradictory tendencies in 
international legal practice. First, the understanding of legal practitioners 
that the doctrines of international law do not have a stable meaning, with 
the result that the prevailing rule or principle in any particular dispute is 
dependent on the preferences of the arbiter.4 Second, the power of the 
utopian sensibility in international legal thinking, enshrined in concepts 
such as ‘global justice’. Koskenniemi regarded international law as an 
essentially argumentative practice, and reasoned that the function of 
legal advisers to decision-makers in this context was ‘to enable the retreat 
of the decision-maker from the existential Angst of the decision to the 
comforting structures of the law’.5
Deborah Cass took on the role of a supportive critic of NAIL in her 
article, explaining the movement’s significance, but calling also on 
‘Newstreamers’ to lift their game. Her article remains a valuable description 
of three techniques favoured by the Newstream: using polarities to 
construct arguments; invoking the device of a personal quest to explain 
3  Deborah Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law’ 
(1996) 65 Nordic Journal of International Law 341, doi.org/10.1163/15718109620294924.
4  Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press, reissue, 2005) Epilogue, doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511493713.011.
5  Koskenniemi (n 4) Preface. See also David Kennedy, ‘A New Stream of International Legal 
scholarship’ (1988) 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal 1, 6.
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a disenchantment with international law; and a specific focus on language.6 
Deborah Cass observed the ‘stultifying’ nature of the disdain for critical 
approaches expressed by the international legal mainstream, and warned 
that it was preventing ‘the development of a more nuanced and responsive 
international legal theory’.7 At the same time, she castigated Newstream 
scholars for failing to exploit the potential of their critique by ducking out 
of ‘explicit evaluative choices’, and for conceiving of international law as 
nothing more than ‘a variable set of argumentative possibilities’. A further 
critique was of the ‘condescending and reductive tone’ of Newstream 
writings, and ‘its occasionally derivative and abstract theorizing’.8
Deborah Cass argued that the critical call for the integration of politics 
with law was not ‘sufficiently problematised’. ‘The call’, she wrote 
reprovingly,
is a commendable ambition but doubts remain. There is a tendency 
in some Newstream work for an apparently radical critique to 
conclude with a facile or reductive call for a move to politics, 
yet the political is as contested and enigmatic as the legal. While 
concepts such as sovereignty are being denigrated as too incoherent 
to underpin the legal system, a radically pluralistic politics seems 
an inauspicious place to find a new normative consensus.9
Deborah Cass placed her own critique at the borderline between the 
mainstream and the Newstream, ‘in the hope that it will enable both 
sides to explore each other’s territory’.10 Over 20 years later, this article 
remains an astute account of NAIL: prescient about its journeys and 
current in its identification of the movement’s strengths and weaknesses. 
The article highlights Deborah Cass’s distinctive academic characteristics 
as a  translator and communicator of legal thought, a bridge-builder 
between intellectual traditions, a generator of reconstructive ideas and 
a confident and generous traverser of divides.
This collection explores some of Deborah Cass’s contributions to the fields 
of international and public law. It also includes reflections on Deborah, 
the person rather than the scholar, by family, friends and colleagues. 
As you will find, the range of topics covered in the book signal just how 
6  Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream’ (n 1) 362–77.
7  Ibid 343.
8  Ibid.
9  Ibid 379.
10  Ibid 343.
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broad her interests were. The collection is also a cartography of Deborah’s 
scholarly style and preoccupations. The pieces illustrate her interest in legal 
doctrine and her insightful and critical eye, celebrating her extraordinary 
ability to experiment with ideas in order to present a fresh perspective 
on familiar debates. These meditations on Deborah Cass’s work remind 
us what a path-breaking scholar she was: everything she wrote helped 
shape an intellectual field. The title of this collection captures a particular 
quality of Deborah Cass’s scholarship – her capacity to cross disciplinary 
and subject boundaries. Indeed, the title is borrowed from an article by 
Deborah Cass on the vexed relationship between international law and 
Australian constitutional law.11
Part 1 of the book deals with some of Deborah Cass’s work in constitutional 
law. Kim Rubenstein revisits an article she and Deborah wrote jointly in 
1995 on the representation of women in the Australian Constitution.12 
Deborah was passionate about equality for women and she addressed it 
in all aspects of her life, personally, politically and professionally. Kim 
recounts how the writing project came about and the way that the article 
was later used in advocacy about the representation of women in the 1998 
Australian Constitutional Convention. Kim’s chapter extends the analysis 
of the earlier article by considering how job-sharing for parliamentarians 
could enhance the system of representative democracy. She argues that 
this is a practical way in which the work of care could be made more 
equal, further enhancing the quality of our democracy.
Part 2 covers natural resources and the principle of self-determination, 
areas of international law in which Deborah Cass made important 
interventions. Margaret Young considers Deborah’s first published 
academic article, on the impact in the Pacific of provisions of the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) relating to fisheries.13 
In that article, Deborah Cass had applauded what she saw as UNCLOS’ 
grant of complete discretion to coastal states with respect to foreign access 
to fisheries, in what were termed their ‘exclusive economic zones’. She 
suggested that this would be particularly significant in the Pacific, where 
predatory fishing practices by foreign fleets had diminished the fisheries 
11  Deborah Cass, ‘Traversing the Divide: International Law and Australian Constitutional Law’ 
(1998) 20 Adelaide Law Review 73.
12  Deborah Cass and Kim Rubenstein, ‘Representation/s of Women: Towards a Feminist Analysis 
of the Australian Constitutional System’ (1995) 17 Adelaide Law Review 3.
13  Deborah Cass, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The Exclusive Economic Zone and Foreign Fishing Access 
in the Pacific’ (1987) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 83.
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of island states. Margaret compares Deborah Cass’s arguments about the 
likely impact of the exclusive economic zone provisions of the Convention 
with later judicial interpretations. She notes the prescience of Deborah 
Cass’s observation of the significance of coastal states’ rights, but suggests 
that she may have placed too much faith in the capacity and willingness 
of coastal states to achieve sustainable fisheries.
Deborah Cass worked with Tony Anghie on an international commission 
of inquiry into the worked-out phosphate lands of Nauru in the late 1980s. 
The government of Nauru had established this commission to investigate 
liability and compensation for the devastation of Nauru’s environment 
by the states that had administered Nauru as a mandated territory under 
the League of Nations, and then as a trust territory under the United 
Nations, these states being Australia, New Zealand and the UK. The chair 
of the commission was a distinguished international lawyer, Professor 
Christopher Weeramantry, then at Monash University, and later a member 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The report of the commission 
laid the foundation for a case Nauru brought against Australia in the ICJ. 
Tony’s chapter in the book reflects on the principle of self-determination at 
the heart of Nauru’s claim, and the subject of an article of Deborah Cass’s, 
published in 1992.14 He examines the legacy of the Nauru case both in 
international law and in Australia’s complex imperial history. In Australia’s 
understanding of Nauru as part of an Australian Empire, Tony examines 
the way that it deflected claims of self-determination. He also points to 
the situation of Nauru in 2018, perceptively observing how Australia is 
reproducing its own colonial origins as a penal colony there.
Part 3 turns to Deborah Cass’s work on the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the subject of her prize-winning book, The Constitutionalization 
of the World Trade Organization (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Deborah challenged the prevailing wisdom that the WTO was engaged in 
constitutionalisation, or a process of developing structured constraints on 
institutional activity, through the separation of powers. While rejecting 
claims that traditional forms of constitutionalisation were emerging in 
the WTO, Deborah Cass did not want to give up on the notion itself. 
She ended the book calling for a  radical rethinking of the concept of 
constitutionalisation to encompass ‘trading democracy’, which would 
entail economic development and redistribution. Kerry Rittich’s chapter in 
14  Deborah Z Cass, ‘Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International 
Law Theories’ (1992) 18 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 31.
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this book lucidly provides a context to appreciate the richness of Deborah 
Cass’s work. Kerry emphasises in particular Deborah Cass’s imaginative 
analysis and her focus on the network of beliefs and commitments that 
structured the WTO.
The book continues in Part 4 (before concluding with reproductions of 
Deborah Cass’s original articles in Part 5) with reflections on Deborah by 
her brother, Daniel, and husband, Gerry Simpson. They remind us that, 
apart from being a brilliant academic, Deborah was a warm, funny, wise 
and compassionate person. She did not do anything by halves and forged 
an unconventional path into the law and academia. It is unsurprising 
that her and Gerry’s two daughters, Hannah and Rosa, have inherited 









Hilary and Kim have entitled the symposium ‘Traversing Divides’, and 
on re-reading the pieces that are to be discussed, or at least inspire the 
discussion in this coming session, I can see why.
Glancing at the papers to be examined by Jennifer Clarke, we see 
a traversing of the law–politics divide. In her work with Kim, and related 
work (and indeed in much of Deborah Cass’s work), we see the law–
feminism divide traversed. And in her work on campaign financing, we 
see a close and fascinating reading of the history of campaign financing 
law, crossing the law–history divide.
And I think what this particular part of Deborah Cass’s work which is 
to be discussed in this session demonstrates is that the divide is not a 
divide: law cannot be read without politics, history and, I would say, 
feminism – or at least asking the ‘woman question’. So I wonder whether 
it is traversing divides, or rejecting divides … However, I will leave that 
to my expert panel.
All three of our speakers were both colleagues and friends of Deborah’s, 
as indeed was I. And thinking about chairing this session led me to reflect 
both on my own experience with constitutional law, and of course on 
Deborah Cass. I was taught constitutional law by Michael Coper, and it 
is terrific that he was able to join us for today’s reflections. Michael used 
to share with us not only the reflections of others on the constitution – 
for example, PP McGuinness’s quizzical suggestion that if section 92 was 
so fundamental why wasn’t it section 1 – but also the errors of previous 
students. The one that sticks in my mind was the student who, Michael 
insisted, had referred in an exam context, to the founding fathers as 
TRAvERSING THE DIvIDE
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the ‘pounding panthers’. And the pounding panthers made me think 
of Deborah. You might well ask why. I mused that one might describe 
Deborah’s work as pounding – as insistent, as persistent, as resolute. 
And a panther is always sleekly elegant – and Deborah was always elegant 
in her presentation to the world.
Jennifer Clarke, in an aside, suggested that such a comment could only 
be made by someone who had not shared a house with Deborah. This 
is a  comment that illustrates what was so very special about the day 
Hilary  and Kim organised in celebration of Deborah and Deborah’s 
work, and again consistent with the title of the symposium: the constant 
traversing of the public–private divide. The day gave us an opportunity to 
reflect on our personal and our intellectual relationships with Deborah; 
it allowed the personal into the intellectual, and the scholarly into the 
intimate in a way that academia rarely encourages.
13
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of Women’: Feminist analysis 




I first met Deborah Cass when I began my undergraduate law studies at 
the University of Melbourne in 1984, after spending a ‘gap year’ overseas 
straight after high school, gathering ‘worldly’ experiences. We were fellow 
law students, although she had many more worldly experiences under 
her belt1 and, more significantly through my eyes then, she became well 
known as one of the editors of the university student newspaper Farrago 
the following year. When I later became President of the Melbourne 
University Jewish Students’ Society I didn’t have much luck enticing 
Deborah to regular events but we enjoyed stimulating conversations, and 
1  Deborah’s path to university was different to many at Melbourne law school at that time. 
She ‘attended an experimental school and found its artistic chaos both intoxicating and disturbing. 
In her mid-teens she rebelled against her upbringing in an unusual way, leaving home to become 
a secretary and a sales representative living in the outer suburbs. As a result, she got to university 
five years later than her peers, but determined not to waste any time’. See James Button, ‘Writer and 
Educator Saw Law as a Means to Better the World’, Obituary, The Age (Melbourne, 2 August 2013), 
then published online: James Button, ‘Writer and Educator Saw Law as a Means to Better the World’, 
The Sydney Morning Herald (online, 2 August 2013) <https://www.smh.com.au/national/writer-and-
educator-saw-law-as-a-means-to-better-the-world-20130801-2r1oj.html>. See a little more about 
Deborah at: Helen Irving, ‘Vale: Deborah Zipporah Cass 15 February 1960’, A Woman’s Constitution 




I have clear memories of talking with her while checking out books from 
the Law library back in the days when it was housed in the University of 
Melbourne’s Old Quadrangle.
We followed similar styled paths to academia – the same year of articles 
in different law firms with practical work experience added in, before 
setting upon a professional life in academia. Mine with my graduate work 
first at Harvard before returning to the University of Melbourne, and 
Deborah starting at the University of Melbourne sooner and then moving 
to The Australian National University (ANU) before embarking on her 
graduate work at Harvard. It was during those early academic years that 
I reconnected with Deborah through her partnership with Gerry, who 
became my colleague at the University of Melbourne when Deborah 
was already up at ANU, and it was when Deborah was at Harvard that 
our academic collaboration emerged.
Deborah contacted me about joining her to write an article she had begun, 
as she had too much on her research plate to continue with it on her own. 
Indeed, it is a theme to which this chapter returns – the importance of 
shared work as a key to constitutional and societal strength. Deborah sent 
me a skeleton draft, with a clear structure and premise, of what became 
‘Representations of Women: Towards a Feminist Analysis of the Australian 
Constitutional System’, and it is around that piece this contribution is 
based. The article was published in the Adelaide Law Review,2 and then 
later reproduced in a modified manner as a chapter in Helen Irving’s 
edited collection, A Woman’s Constitution?,3 and then further updated for 
a comparative constitutional law collection.4 I am particularly grateful 
that Deborah invited me to collaborate with her on that article as it was 
important to my own public law scholarship around the relationship 
between the individual and the state. Some of that early thinking and our 
discussions have been central, too, to my work on citizenship, which grew 
alongside my work on gender and constitutional issues.
2  Deborah Cass and Kim Rubenstein, ‘Representations of Women: Towards a Feminist Analysis 
of the Australian Constitutional System’ (1995) 17 Adelaide Law Review 3.
3  Deborah Cass and Kim Rubenstein, ‘From Federation Forward: The Representation of Women 
in the Australian Constitutional System’ in Helen Irving (ed), A Woman’s Constitution? Gender 
and History in the Australian Commonwealth (Hale and Iremonger, 1996) 108. The piece was also 
extracted in one of the early editions of T Blackshield and G Williams, Australian Constitutional Law 
and Theory (Federation Press, 1996) 98.
4  Kim Rubenstein and Christabel Richards Neville, ‘Australia’s Gendered Constitutional History 
and Future’ in Susan H Williams (ed), Social Difference and Constitutionalism in Pan-Asia (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139567312.015.
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This chapter draws out some of the history around the article itself and the 
central aspects of that article’s thesis. It then extends the discussion about 
the nature of representation, and the concept of shared representation 
as a  means of improving representative democracy in Australia’s 
constitutional system, by examining the court challenge in the UK in 2015 
around their elections when two women, Sarah Cope and Claire Phipps, 
nominated for election to the UK Parliament on a joint job-sharing basis. 
Their nomination was declined by the acting returning officer and her 
decision was ultimately upheld by Justice Wilkie in R (Cope) v Returning 
Officer for the Basingstoke Parliamentary Constituency (‘Cope’).5
The issue has remained on the UK Green Party’s agenda and has been 
discussed in a scholarly and practical way in the UK since that time.6 It is 
time for it to be discussed more in Australian constitutional circles too, 
given the continued low numbers of women in the Parliament, and it is 
a discussion I am sure Deborah would have enjoyed engaging with.
Representations of Women in the 
Australian Constitutional System
History Around the Writing of and Impact 
of the Piece
Deborah had already begun writing our 1995 article when she approached 
me to continue working with her on it. Susan Marks wrote in her 
reflections, ‘In Memoriam: Deborah Cass’, that Deborah’s ‘writing was 
fresh and forthright and full of luminous, funny phrases’.7 Deborah’s 
attention to the ironic is seen beautifully in the opening of our piece, 
which she had already designed, with an extract from Sir Owen Dixon’s 
judgment in Re Foreman & Sons Pty Ltd; Uther v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation:
5  [2015] EWHC 3958 (Admin) (‘Cope’).
6  See Sarah Childs, The Good Parliament (Report to UK Parliament, July 2016) <https://www.
bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/news/2016/july/20%20Jul%20Prof%20Sarah%20Childs%20
The%20Good%20Parliament%20report.pdf>. See also Rosa Curling, ‘The High Court Case’ in Open 
House? Reflections on the Possibility and Practice of MPs Job-Sharing (Pamphlet, The Fawcett Society, 
5 September 2017) 17.
7  See Susan Marks, ‘In Memoriam: Deborah Cass’ (2014) September LSE Ratio: The Magazine 
of LSE Law 22, 23.
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Like the goddess of wisdom the Commonwealth uno ictu sprang 
from the brain of its begetters armed and of full stature.8
She wrote: ‘According to Sir Owen Dixon, the Commonwealth of Australia 
sprang, like the Goddess Athena, fully armed from the head of the States. 
Whether or not this is an apt metaphor from a classical perspective’ (and here 
we cited some literature around that metaphor),9 we continued:
from the perspective of Australian women, it is a strange choice. 
Athena is one of the strongest female images of the Western 
literary tradition. In contrast, Australian women have not been 
represented with such vigour in Australian constitutional law. They 
appear rarely as litigants, occasionally as members of Parliament, 
sometimes as part of the Executive, and virtually never as judicial 
decision makers. Their presence in the Australian system could 
never be described as ‘armed’ or ‘of full stature’. To this extent, the 
ascription of feminine strength to the entity which represented 
Australian nationhood is at odds with the reality; the historical 
exclusion of women from the constitutional arena.10
As for questions of choice, the idea behind placing our joint article into the 
Adelaide Law Review was timely and topical. Volume 17, 1995, included 
articles relevant to commemorating the centenary of the passing of the 
Constitution Amendment Act 1894 in March 1895.11 That Act was the final 
legal step in extending suffrage to women on equal terms with men in the 
state of South Australia. Much has been written around those steps and 
where it fits in the overall history of women’s right to vote in the British 
Empire and internationally,12 and it was also important ultimately to the 
development of section 41 of the Australian Constitution (which expresses 
a guarantee to the right to vote), given section 41 was inserted thanks to 
8  (1947) 74 CLR 508, at 530.
9  Cass and Rubenstein, ‘Representations of Women’ (n 2) 3.
10  Ibid 4, footnotes omitted.
11  See ‘Editorial’ (1995) 17 Adelaide Law Review 1.
12  This was discussed in the article itself, and since then there has been further work. Dr Clare Wright 
has also made a film about this period of history, see Utopia Girls (2011) <https://www.clare wright.
com.au/broadcaster>, in which she highlights how Adelaide was the first place where women got both 
the right to vote and to stand for office concurrently. There is some uncertainty about that latter claim, 
according to the introduction in the Adelaide Law Review where it is stated that ‘up until 1916 when the 
Parliamentary Qualifications (Women) Bill was passed there was some doubt that women could stand 
for election despite having the vote. It was not until 1959 that two female candidates endorsed by the 
Liberal Country League were elected to the South Australian Parliament’ (‘Editorial’ (1995) 17 Adelaide 
Law Review 1). Interestingly, Catherine Helen Spence stood for election to the 1897 Constitutional 
Convention, but some argue her failure to get sufficient votes was due to the uncertainty raised by her 
opponents of her eligibility to stand in a national arena.
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those South Australian women’s insistence that they did not want to lose 
their existing right to vote in the state when they were able to participate 
in Commonwealth elections after Federation occurred.13
Indeed, those women who had been campaigning their representatives 
to the Convention about the creation of a Commonwealth Constitution 
inspired me, with Deborah’s support, to use the article not only in 
academic circles (where it was one of the first academic constitutional law 
pieces that had gender as a central focus) but practically also, and in 1998 
I relied on our piece as a trigger to lobby government directly around the 
proposed 1998 Constitutional Convention.
The Howard Government had determined to hold a Constitutional 
Convention, 100 years on from the 1898 People’s Convention, to discuss 
whether Australia should become a republic. It had been determined there 
were to be 152 delegates, drawn from each state and territory. Seventy-six 
of the delegates were to be elected by a voluntary postal ballot, held after 
the first 76 were appointed by the federal government.
The campaign I began with Susan Brennan (then Joint President of 
YWCA (Young Women’s Christian Association) Australia and now Senior 
Counsel at the Victorian Bar) was to ensure that the 1998 Convention, 
100 years on from the founding Convention, would involve equal numbers 
of men and women, given no women had been present at the 1890s 
Convention. Susan and I prepared a petition, which supporters around 
the country signed electronically, with many women’s organisations also 
distributing it through their memberships and beyond. This was followed 
by a trip to Canberra to meet personally with Senator Nick Minchin, 
who had carriage of organising and running the Convention. We also met 
other members of Parliament. Deborah met us at Parliament House in 
advance of our meetings (then pregnant with Rosa), and she contributed 
to our presentation in Senator Minchin’s office with her powerful and 
intellectually striking manner.
One can only imagine how few women might have been appointed 
without our campaign, for in spite of it, of the 76 appointed delegates, 
the government appointed 23 women (30  per cent). When the final 
composition of the complete 1998 Constitutional Convention (following 
13  I have written about that separately in my ‘Feminist Judgment’ in E Arcioni and K Rubenstein, 
‘R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka: Feminism and the Franchise’ in Heather Douglas et al (eds), Australian 
Feminist Judgments (Hart Publishing, 2014) 55, doi.org/10.5040/9781474201292.ch-004.
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the postal voting for the other half )14 did not represent ‘equal’ numbers 
of women (there were ultimately 49 women out of 152 delegates – 
32 per cent), a concerted effort to involve more women in the discussion 
around the move to a republic led to the organising of a dedicated 
Women’s Constitutional Convention held in Parliament House itself, on 
the 29 and 30 January 1998 in advance of the Government’s Convention. 
The slogan for the Women’s Convention, highlighted on the website for 
the event, stated:
One hundred years ago men gathered to draft the Australian 
Constitution. Now, for the first time, women from all sections of 
society will have the opportunity to contribute their perspective.15
Several women’s organisations were instrumental in organising the 
Women’s Convention with a Convening Committee including 
representatives from Australian Women Lawyers, the Constitutional 
Centenary Foundation (ACT Chapter), the National Women’s Justice 
Coalition, the Women’s Electoral Lobby, Women Into Politics and YWCA 
of Australia. Over 300 women, including all those appointed or elected to 
the Government’s Convention, together with women as representatives of 
a range of organisations and individual women (all listed on the archived 
website)16 participated, culminating in a communique delivered to the 
Constitutional Convention17 held in Old Parliament House from 2 to 
13 February 1998.
14  I was also involved in ‘running’ as an elected delegate in Victoria on a ‘Women’s Ticket’ supported 
by the Victorian Women’s Trust and a range of women’s organisations, to make the point that more 
women needed to be elected in the elected section to ensure there were equal numbers, given only 
30 per cent of the appointed delegates were women. That experience is worthy of its own article and 
while not being directly elected, I did attend the Convention as an ‘adviser’ to Misha Schubert who 
was elected on a Youth Ticket ‘Republic4U’. Her biography at the time stated: ‘at 24 years old she is 
the youngest elected delegate to the Constitutional Convention’. Misha is now the CEO of Science 
& Technology Australia, see ‘STA Board and Executive’, Science & Technology Australia (Web Page) 
<https://scienceandtechnologyaustralia.org.au/board-and-executive/>.
15  See the archived website from the event at ‘Future Directions’, Women’s Constitutional 
Convention (Web Page, 1 October 1997) <http://purl.nla.gov.au/nla/pandora/womconv>, archived at: 
<http://pandora. nla.gov.au/nph-wb/19980901130000/http://www.womensconv.dynamite.com.au/
index.html>.
16  ‘Attendees’, Women’s Constitutional Convention (Web Page, 26 May 1998) <http://pandora.nla.
gov.au/nph-wb/19980901130000/http://www.womensconv.dynamite.com.au/dels.htm>.
17  ‘Outcomes’, Women’s Constitutional Convention (Web Page, 6 April 1998) <http://pandora.nla.
gov.au/nph-wb/19980901130000/http://www.womensconv.dynamite.com.au/outcomes.htm>.
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Before the communique was developed, many individuals delivered 
papers,18 including Deborah Cass. Her paper was titled ‘The Last Bastion: 
Does One Woman on the High Court Equal “Gender Balance”?’,19 and 
she provocatively began:
Today I want to speak about an issue which is not on the agenda 
of the Constitutional Convention but which has a more frequent 
impact upon Australian democratic life than the identity of our 
head of state. I am talking about the composition of the High 
Court. I want to suggest to you that the health of the entire 
Australian constitutional democracy (regardless of whether we 
become a republic or not) is undermined by gender imbalance at 
the High Court.
In her paper, Deborah Cass developed an idea that she had stated in a 
different context in our original piece. In the context of the High Court 
and appointments she explained:
I want to clarify something. Everything I am about to say operates 
regardless of whether one thinks that women judges would decide 
cases in a particular way, which is different to the way men judges 
decide. The jury is still out on that one. And I am not entirely 
sure of the answer myself. But what I am saying, is that regardless 
of whether women judges decide cases differently to men judges, 
they should be on the High Court. My argument is about equality 
of representation, nothing else. Women should be there because 
they comprise over 50 per cent of the population, are active in 
law, are affected by it, and because the absurdity of the current 
imbalance is illustrated by the fact that the reverse situation would 
never be tolerated by men. Imagine six women and one man. The 
mind boggles.20
18  ‘Programs and Papers’, Women’s Constitutional Convention (Web Page, 7  April 1998) <http://
pandora. nla.gov.au/nph-wb/19980901130000/http://www.womensconv.dynamite.com.au/program5.
htm>.
19  ‘The Last Bastion: Does One Woman on the High Court Equal “Gender Balance”?’, 
Women’s Constitutional Convention (Web Page, 7  April 1998) <http://pandora.nla.gov.au/nph-wb/ 
19980901130000/ http://www.womensconv.dynamite.com.au/cass.htm>. I might add, that Deborah 
was ‘very’ pregnant when she delivered this paper in Parliament House, as she delivered Rosa the 
following week!
20  This point reminds me of Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s answer to the question, How many women 
should be on the US Supreme court? Ryan Lovelace, ‘Ruth Bader Ginsburg: There will be Enough 





This is one aspect of our discussion about representation raised in our 
1995 article to which I will now turn – does it matter whether women act 
or represent their electorate ‘differently’ to men?
Themes of the Piece
The central focus of our 1995 piece was around the concept of representation. 
It examined women as representatives in government, women as they are 
represented by government and women in representations of government. 
The argument in the article was that, in 1995, at the level of doctrine, the 
High Court was moving to a position that emphasised the participatory 
aspect of representation, which we argued was consistent with a feminist 
critique of representative democracy. Our point, which is still important, 
is that low levels of participation by women undermines the representative 
nature of that concept.21
Moreover, we were of the view that in light of Australia’s history and in 
light of Australia’s practice at 1995, Australia’s system lagged behind the 
theoretical insights suggested by feminist argument, and the conclusions 
which followed from High Court doctrine at that time. Our aim was 
to demonstrate the need for a synthesis of constitutional practice with 
theory and doctrine, by suggesting that increased participation of women 
is essential for Australia’s constitutional system to conform with evolving 
standards of representative democracy.22 The piece was structured 
around the following sections: ‘Representative Democracy as a principle 
which underpins the Australian Constitutional system’, ‘Representative 
Democracy and the relevance of gender’, ‘The representation of women 
in the Australian Constitutional system’, and ‘Becoming a more 
Representative Democracy’. The first section’s content, examining 
representative democracy as seen through the High Court analysis, 
was framed naturally around the jurisprudence at that point, and since 
that time, there is more to ‘add’ and ‘subtract’ to the Court’s views on 
representative democracy. Some of that newer material was touched upon 
in my subsequent piece with Christabel Richards Neville,23 and is further 
extended by Katrina Hall in her research in this area.24 The points about 
21  Cass and Rubenstein, ‘Representations of Women’ (n 2) 5–6.
22  Ibid.
23  Rubenstein and Neville, ‘Australia’s Gendered Constitutional History’ (n 4).
24  Katrina Hall, ‘A Case For Allowing MP Job-Sharing’ (JD Paper, ANU Law School, 2018) on file 
with the author.
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the relevance of gender are ongoing. One of the significant points in that 
section that still resonates in so many ways with my thinking about these 
issues more broadly was first made by our colleague Hilary Charlesworth, 
in the context of the United Nations (UN):
How or whether women’s equal participation in decision making 
would affect the quality of UN decisions is not yet certain. But 
whatever the evidence of a distinctive woman’s influence in political 
decision-making, it is at least clear that the realities of women’s 
lives under the present unbalanced system do not contribute in 
any significant way to the shaping of UN policy.25
We continued arguing that:
the central insight suggested by the justification remains 
compelling, namely that women experience the world differently 
to men as an undeniable matter of practical reality. Moreover, 
regardless of how many different voices women may have, it does 
not mean that men can properly represent those different voices. 
The personal experience of some women representatives suggests 
that men cannot listen to women’s views.26
Sadly, this is still a common problem.27
There have also been changes since 1995 to the issues we identified 
in ‘The  representation of women in the Australian Constitutional 
system’: on  one hand, the growth of women on the High Court has 
been positive;28 on the other, there has not been significant change in 
relation to the proportion of women in Parliament in those 20-plus 
25  Cass and Rubenstein, ‘Representations of Women’ (n 2) 22, quoting Hilary Charlesworth, 
‘Transforming the United Men’s Club: Feminist Futures of the United Nations’ (1994) 4 Transnational 
Law and Contemporary Problems 420.
26  Cass and Rubenstein, ‘Representations of Women’ (n 2) 22.
27  This is an issue that is not only related to democratic representation in Parliament, but in society 
more broadly, as seen through the ‘“me too” campaign’ and the need for men to listen to women’s 
experiences.
28  In 2018, there are three women on the High Court bench with the first woman as Chief Justice 
appointed in January 2017. See ‘Susan Kiefel Sworn in as Australia’s first Chief Justice of the High Court’, 
ABC News (online, 30 January 2017) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-30/susan-kiefel-sworn-in-
as-first-female-high-court-chief-justice/8222868>. See also my commentary on her appointment, Kim 
Rubenstein, ‘Kiefel Appointment is Refreshing, But Greater Diversity is an Ongoing Task’, The Sydney 




years.29 The seesawing that has occurred of women in high office, which 
reached a high in 2011 when Australia had a woman as Governor-General 
(Quentin Bryce), Prime Minister (Julia Gillard) and Attorney-General 
(Nicola Roxon) concurrently,30 has ultimately led to the result that within 
two years, none of those positions were still held by women, and only one 
woman was a member of Cabinet.31 There are also further disappointing 
examples of the point we made around how women are represented in 
visual and textual descriptions of aspects of the constitutional process. 
As we wrote:
historically, representations of women in the Australian 
constitutional system have been characterised by trivialisation, 
ambiguity, or complete absence. Women were either not there at 
all; there in the guise of men in drag; or there to be ridiculed.32
The experiences of Julia Gillard as prime minister provide further data to 
be included as an update to this issue.33
Returning to the point of having more women in Parliament to better 
reflect the diversity of life experiences of the community, it is relevant also 
to the broader argument and final part of our 1995 article, of how best to 
become a more representative democracy. For men and women are not, 
respectively, monolithic groups, and within those groups we need to also 
acknowledge the diversity of experience that impacts the way we each 
29  As at May 2018, female members comprised just under 32 per cent of all parliamentarians at the 
federal level, and just under 35 per cent in the states and territories. See Anna Hough, ‘Composition 
of Australian Parliaments by Party and Gender: A Quick Guide’ (Research Paper Series 2018–19, 
Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2018) Table 1.
30  A great visual image of women in public office is at ‘Women of the New Gillard Ministry’, ABC 
News (online, 14  December 2011) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-12-14/women-of-the-new-
gillard-ministry/3731528>, showing Julie Collins, Kate Ellis, Nicola Roxon, Julia Gillard, Quentin 
Bryce, Jenny Macklin and Tanya Plibersek after the swearing in, 2011.
31  See commentary available at Jonathan Pearlman, ‘Tony Abbott Under Fire for Having Only 
One Woman in Cabinet’, The Telegraph (online, 16 September 2013) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/10311885/Tony-Abbott-under-fire-for-having-
only-one-woman-in-cabinet.html>.
32  Cass and Rubenstein, ‘Representations of Women’ (n 2) 42.
33  See Marian Sawer, ‘Misogyny and Misrepresentation’ (2013) 65(1) Political Science 105, doi.org/ 
10.1177/0032318713488316; Marian Woodward, ‘Ditch The Witch: Julia Gillard and Gender in 
Australian Public Discourse’ (Honours Thesis, Sydney University, 18 October 2013) <https://ses.library.
usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/9554/1/Woodward%2C%20M_GCST_HonoursThesis_2013.pdf>.
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experience the world. This relates both to gender, and how gender impacts 
on one’s life experience, as well as a range of other factors that influence 
how each person sees, views and experiences the world.34
It is that idea of intersectionality and diversity of experiences that becomes 
especially relevant to the next section on job-sharing, both in Parliament 
and beyond. But, to complete this section, which focuses on our joint 
article as a foundation to the next part of the paper, woven into the 
actual intellectual underpinning of the piece was the practical fact that 
we job-shared the writing of that 1995 article. The practice itself reflects 
an appreciation of shared work as an important and positive step around 
academic/work ‘practice’ and about our lived experiences, which is also 
relevant to becoming a more representative democracy.
My memory is that Deborah approached me to collaborate with her, 
knowing her own commitments to a balanced workload (she had been 
successful in receiving some research grants that extended her research 
work beyond this research), balancing her other academic responsibilities 
of teaching and university service, together with her personal life (starting 
a family, as Hannah was born in 1995). This meant she could not and 
should not have done everything on her own. Moreover, the practice of 
collaboration meant that we could engage with each other’s ideas directly 
(and I could contribute from my life experience and thinking and research 
perspective at that point) and from that interaction we came to what 
I believe was a richer piece than if either of us had written it on our own.
These are principles that also apply to representative democracy and it 
is around the ideas and value of joint ‘shared’ work, in a constitutional 
setting, that I now turn.
34  This is often referred to as ‘intersectionality’, a term first coined by law professor Kimberlé 
Crenshaw and her work in the US around gender and race. See ‘Kimberlé Crenshaw on Intersectionality, 
More than Two Decades Later’, Columbia Law School (Web Page, 8 June 2017) <https://www.law.
columbia.edu/pt-br/news/2017/06/kimberle-crenshaw-intersectionality>. The simple point from the 
idea behind it is that there are many aspects of our life experiences that influence how we engage with 
issues and how power is exercised, and they may be fluid and context-dependent.
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Job‑sharing as a Feminist 
Constitutional Contribution: The Queen 
on the application of Sarah Cope and 
Clare Phipps35
This volume developed from the series of ‘evergreen’ papers presented 
at the Centre for International and Public Law conference, ‘Traversing 
Divides – A Symposium in Honour of Deborah Cass’, at ANU on 
14 August 2015, two years after Deborah’s death. In the same year as the 
conference, on 9 April 2015, Sarah Cope and Clare Phipps had applied 
to the returning officer for Basingstoke to stand as joint candidates for 
the UK general election on 7 May 2015. Sarah Cope, a single mother of 
two young children, was unable to work full-time as she was the principal 
carer for her children, one of whom has an autistic spectrum disorder.36 
Clare Phipps could not work full-time due to suffering from idiopathic 
hypersomnia.37 They had determined they wanted to represent the 
constituency of Basingstoke in a job-sharing arrangement and submitted 
a nomination paper naming them both as a single candidate for the Green 
Party. The returning officer determined their nomination was invalid 
because the particulars of the ‘candidate’ were not ‘as required by law’ 
and the paper not subscribed as required.38 Sarah Cope and Clare Phipps 
were therefore unable to stand for election and the Green Party had no 
candidate for the Basingstoke constituency.39 On application for judicial 
review of the returning officer’s decision, they received a written refusal 
before renewing their request and seeking an oral hearing of the matter. 
Their application was ultimately heard before Justice Wilkie at the High 
Court in London on 28 July 2015.
35  I am grateful for the work of ANU Law student, Katrina Hall, around her graduate research 
under my supervision linked to this case and her insights on the decision. Her excellent 2018 
ANU graduate paper, ‘A Case For Allowing MP Job-Sharing’, has contributed to my thinking and 
I have drawn from her descriptions around the case in this section. Her paper also discusses the 
earlier Scottish case, Secretary of State for Scotland and the Advocate General for Scotland v Mann 
[2000] EAT/56/00, discussed in Alice Belcher and Andrea Ross, ‘The Case for Job-Sharing Elected 
Representatives’ (2001) Edinburgh Law Review 380, 384, doi.org/10.3366/elr.2001.5.3.380.
36  Cope (n 5) [1].
37  This is a chronic condition resulting in her sleeping for approximately 12 hours per day. While 
the judgment explained the ‘reasons’ for their application to share, more about their situation is set 
out in Rosa Curling, ‘The High Court Case’ (n 6) 17.
38  Cope (n 5) [5].
39  Ibid [5].
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In that hearing, they applied for a declaration that the returning officer’s 
rejection of their joint nomination was unlawful. Their arguments drew 
from their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
including their right to stand for election,40 their right to be free from 
discrimination on the grounds of gender and disability,41 and their right to 
respect for private and family life.42 In their view, the refusal was inconsistent 
with the Convention, and in order to be consistent with the Convention 
the term ‘member’ in section  1 of the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 
1986 (UK) should be interpreted as including ‘two or more members 
together representing the constituency carrying one vote’. Moreover, 
they argued the term ‘candidate’ in schedule 1 of the Representation of the 
People Act 1983 (UK) should encompass a scenario in which two or more 
elected candidates would together represent a constituency and carry one 
vote.43 Given section 6(c) of the Interpretation Act 1968 (UK), entitled 
‘Gender and Number’, indicates that ‘words in the singular include the 
plural and words in the plural include the singular’, they argued that if 
that interpretation is not permitted, the Court should make a declaration 
that the provisions of the 1983 and 1986 Acts are incompatible with the 
Convention by its powers under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK).44 While this latter approach would not affect the validity, operation 
or enforcement of the laws,45 this would then be a trigger for Parliament 
to then decide whether it wished to amend the law so as to be compatible 
with the Convention.46
Justice Wilkie did not accept their arguments, and determined that the 
1983 and 1986 Acts did not permit the nomination of two or more people 
as representative of single candidate:47
[T]he language respectively of schedule 1 of the Representation 
of the People Act 1983, which sets out Parliamentary election 
rules, and the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, on the face 
of it, describe a situation which parliamentary constituencies are 
represented by a single member and that the arrangements set out 
40  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 
4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953), art 3, protocol 1.
41  Ibid art 14.
42  Ibid art 8; see Cope (n 5) [3], [6].
43  Cope (n 5) [6].
44  Ibid [8].
45  Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) section 4(6).
46  Curling, ‘The High Court Case’ (n 6) 20.
47  Cope (n 5) [12].
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in the rules envisage one person standing as a single candidate and, 
on the face of it, give no more room to there being a job share 
in which two or more people put themselves forward as a single 
candidate.48
In his view, this conclusion was self-evident on the face of the legislation.49 
Under section 1(1) of the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986 (UK), 
the Parliament provides:
There shall for the purpose of parliamentary elections by the 
county and borough constituencies (or in Scotland and the county 
and borough constituencies), each returning a single member, 
which are described in Orders in Council made under this Act.
That did not stop him, however, from commenting on the principle 
of shared representation.
There can be no doubt about the seriousness of the issue or the fact 
that the job share is, in many fields, a means whereby diversity may 
be increased in the makeup of particular professions or roles … In 
my judgment the issue which the claimants raise is a fundamental 
one in relation to our parliamentary democracy.50
Yet, these were not issues for a judge to grapple with, because they raised
a range of complex practical and conceptual questions with 
which the court is not remotely equipped to deal with and, in 
my judgment, insofar as the supposed amendment would require 
the court to consider those issues as germane to the issue of 
incompatibility, these are not proper issues for the court to debate 
and determine.51
As a judge, he was concerned that the decision would involve ‘important 
practical repercussions’ which the Court was not equipped to handle,52 
such as how job-sharing would work in practice regarding voting and 
provisions that would be made in the event of the death of a member.53
48  Ibid.
49  Ibid [13].
50  Ibid [26]–[27].
51  Ibid [30].
52  Cope (n 5) [20] (Wilkie J).
53  Ibid [23].
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The idea that Parliament should take this issue on had been emphasised 
in the final report of the Speaker’s Conference on Parliamentary 
Representation in 2010, which stated:
Justice requires that there should be a place within the House of 
Commons for individuals from all sections of society. If anyone is 
prevented from standing for Parliament by reason of their gender, 
background, sexual orientation or a perceived disability, this is 
an injustice. The democratic right to stand for Parliament exists 
separately from any debate about the intellectual and behavioural 
merits of [individuals] as parliamentarians.54
Justice Wilkie’s decision therefore squarely placed the issue back into the 
hands of the Parliament,55 and it has been part of public discourse since, 
with no concrete changes at this point.
If job-sharing in Parliament is promoted, it could be a straightforward 
means to ‘improve’ systems of representative democracy, as hoped for in 
our 1995 article. For the same reasons raised by Sarah Cope and Clare 
Phipps, and as outlined further in Sarah Childs’ report56 and Rosa Curling’s 
analysis,57 job-sharing would enhance our system of representative 
democracy, both in terms of gender but also in terms of a diversity of 
life experiences of men and women that would be better accommodated 
through shared work frameworks.
There are various means for thinking through this approach in Australia, 
and Katrina Hall has outlined some of these in the Australian context. 
She has argued that the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) 
(‘Electoral Act’) could be interpreted to allow joint representation in the 
Commonwealth Parliament and that this approach is supported by the 
existing legal frameworks in the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and 
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). She explains that if section 163 of the Electoral 
Act was interpreted in a manner that would disallow joint nomination 
for election to Parliament, this would discriminate against women and 
all potential candidates who are unable to work full-time due to caring 
54  Cope (n 5) [11].
55  Cope (n 5) [23].
56  Childs, The Good Parliament (n 6).
57  Curling, ‘The High Court Case’ (n 6) 17.
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responsibilities or health requirements.58 She also makes the argument 
that an interpretation disallowing joint representation would breach the 
constitutionally implied freedom of political communication.59
Beyond fulfilling the principles of representative democracy, there is 
also an argument that providing for job-sharing in Parliament would 
also provide a better foundation and institutional role model to society 
more broadly. Encouraging job-sharing more universally would enhance 
not only representative democracy, but the health and wellbeing of the 
community. This point is made by Professor Jennifer Nedelsky’s work 
with Tom Malleson in their book, Part Time for All.60 As Nedelsky and 
Malleson powerfully argue:
Western societies face three critical problems that arise out of 
dysfunctional norms of work and care: unsustainable stress on 
families, persistent inequality for women and others who do care 
work, and policy makers who are ignorant about the care work 
that life requires.61
Rather than ‘allowing’ parliamentarians to choose to job share, their 
proposal in effect mandates it for everyone. Their proposal seeks to ensure 
that society comes to a position (whether legislatively or through changed 
norm expectations that would compel it) so that
mature, competent adults are expected to be employed part 
time (what we now call part-time); no less than between 12 and 
30 hours a week, and to do unpaid care work part time – also 
somewhere between 12 and 30 hours a week.62
The arguments in support of this proposal are extensive and significant 
around several issues, yet there is one argument that is particularly relevant 
to this article’s proposition. Nedelsky and Malleson note, in thinking 
broadly about problems associated with care management in society, 
that ‘the third problem is the least commented on in the now extensive 
literature on care’.63 They call this ‘the policy/care divide’.64 This means 
58  Hall (n 36).
59  Ibid.
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‘that those in top policy making positions’ (which of course includes 
lawmakers) ‘are almost always people with very little experience of the 
demands, or satisfactions, or importance of care taking’.65 In Nedelsky and 
Malleson’s view, this means policymakers on the most part are ‘ignorant 
of a core dimension of human life’66 rendering them ‘unfit for the job’.67 
They further argue:
we should no more consider electing someone without substantial 
experience in caregiving to public office, or appointing them CEO 
of a corporation, than we would someone who had never held 
a job.68
Their claim is supported by the argument that ‘knowledge of care is 
essential to good policy making, and the necessary knowledge can only 
be acquired by hands-on experience’.69 In other words, caring for others 
is relevant and essential to being a good representative in Parliament in 
fulfilling one’s role as a policy and lawmaker. Job-sharing (which may 
be necessary if more than the 12–30 hours of work are needed for 
what is recognised as one position), and a responsibility to undertake 
compulsory care work, is therefore fundamental to a society’s fulfilment 
of representative democracy.
Regardless of whether one is as persuaded as I am by the universal 
expectation of Nedelsky and Malleson, the central point about policy 
and representation sits comfortably and powerfully with the concept of 
shared representation in Parliament, and introducing it and encouraging 
it would indeed provide a sound role model for job-sharing and could 
be helpful on the road to the more universal expectation around it, to 
enhance society more broadly.
Conclusion
In Deborah and my 1995 article, we identified a range of ideas that 









Some aim to alter the composition of parliament and the 
executive directly. These include: the introduction of voluntary or 
mandatory gender quotas for the party preselection of candidates, 
in major political parties; double sex parliamentary representation 
whereby the size of each electorate would be doubled and each 
would elect a male and a female representative; the introduction of 
constitutional quotas guaranteeing a certain percentage of seats to 
women; and the inclusion in Cabinet of the Minister responsible 
for women’s affairs. A petition presented to a select committee 
of the New Zealand parliament calls for alteration of electoral 
legislation to ensure equality and parity of gender representation. 
Other methods of group representation include the use of 
functional constituencies in Hong Kong representing groups such 
as unions and industry within the Legislative Council. Other 
proposals aim to alter the political and legal culture in which the 
under-representation has occurred. ‘Schooling’ in parliamentary 
skills for women; using the Upper House to ‘experiment’ with 
representation for particular groups; reforming parliamentary 
working hours; and regular government reporting to international 
review bodies such as the CEDAW [Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women] committee about 
percentages of women in parliamentary institutions, have all 
been suggested.70
None of those suggestions specifically identified job-sharing – although 
the idea of each electorate being doubled to elect a male and female 
representative has a sense of ‘shared’ representation, although that 
proposal would lead to two full-time individuals elected to a larger 
seat. The point behind that proposal, originally identified by the retired 
member of Parliament Jim Carlton and affirmed by his political adversary 
Robert Macklin, was, as Macklin wrote in the Canberra Times, not about 
affirmative action; ‘it was about getting a more accurate reflection of society 
into Parliament’.71 Shared representation, which enables an even more 
accurate reflection of society by including more people– those whose lives 
do not enable full-time work to be entertained – is another important way 
of achieving a more accurate reflection of society in Parliament.
70  Cass and Rubenstein, ‘Representations of Women’ (n 2) 45–46, footnotes omitted.
71  Robert Macklin, ‘An Idea Whose Time has Come’, Canberra Times (online, 22 October 1993) 
11[2] <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article127513054>.
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Is shared representation an idea we should be thinking about more 
seriously in Australia, to ensure true democratic representation in our 
Parliaments, and as a positive constitutional change? Will it be one way 
to ensuring a more effective and diverse representative body, to better 
reflect the Australian people? Moreover, might constitutional change also 
encourage a broader societal change to accepting and encouraging shared 
work as step towards a commitment legislatively, socially and normatively 
to the creation of a more balanced, healthy and fairer society (with shared 
work in many areas) for all?
I think so.
We will never know for sure, but I feel confident this is an idea that 
Deborah would have supported. She was certainly my first role model for 
job-sharing, and both the ideas and the practice have been part of my own 
scholarship since. Her inspiration for so many of us therefore continues 
strongly, in many and varied ways.

PART 2







Good afternoon. I’d like to acknowledge the traditional owners of the 
land on which we meet, and pay my respects to their elders, past, present 
and emerging.
I acknowledge Deborah’s family: her parents, Moss and Shirley, her 
brother Daniel, Gerry, her cousin Gina and her lovely daughters, Hannah 
and my fairy goddaughter Rosa.
I’d like to thank Kim, Hilary and all the organisers for putting this 
day together.
We are very lucky to have Professor Tony Anghie here to talk to us this 
afternoon all the way from the University of Utah. Tony crossed paths 
with Deborah way back in the days of the Nauru Commission of Inquiry. 
Their high-flying paths crossed again later in Harvard and other esteemed 
locales.
Tony has had a distinguished career. He has scored an academic Daily 
Double, to use a racing term. He has been honoured by his university 
both as Outstanding Teacher of the Year and Outstanding Scholar of the 
Year. In a room of academics that will resonate as a particularly impressive 
double act.
One usually starts such sessions noting that it is a pleasure to be here. 




In reading Deborah Cass’s piece on rethinking self-determination in 
preparation to chair this session, all I wanted to do was engage in a spirited 
discussion with her about her piece and the ideas in it. I’ve been picturing 
that spirited conversation with Deborah nestled in a comfy, sunny corner 
of her beach house in Somers.
But, of course, that is not to be.
So. This is a tough day to engage with the divides Deborah traversed 
without having her here to debate them with us.
I must say that when Kim and Hilary mentioned the plans for today, 
I did wonder whether Deborah would have been aghast at the very idea 
of  today’s symposium. I can hear Deborah modestly telling us with 
a slightly dismissive shake of her head and her hand that her academic 
legal work was really nothing special and there were plenty of other people 
who were doing more significant work.
But Deborah did significant academic legal work in her public sphere days, 
and I am glad that we’re here today to remember that aspect of her life.
I met Deborah as she was on the up in her career as a scholar. I had come 
to Canberra in 1993 to take up a graduate role in Attorney-General’s 
Department. In 1993 she had of course just been awarded her Caltex 
scholarship. It was around then that I had the amazing good fortune to 
meet Deborah. And where did I meet her? Over the back fence in Nimbin 
Street, Narrabundah, where we both lived.
Throughout the late 1980s and early 90s at university I had been boring 
senseless all my family and many extended friends with my constant 
undergrad barrages about structural inequality in our society.
So. I could not believe my good luck when I met Deborah over 
the back fence. Being from Sydney, and therefore not as familiar with the 
Melbourne core of the Cass clan, my first overexcited question to Deborah 
was whether she was related to Bettina. I’d been imbibing Bettina Cass’s 
work for feminist papers I’d written at uni. ‘Get out. You’re her niece?’ 
And so our friendship began.
How lucky was I to meet a friend like Deborah. Someone with whom 
I could seamlessly move from Catharine McKinnon and Andrea Dworkin’s 
work through to discussing, almost as energetically, important matters 
of fashion, arts and literature. Thank you, Nimbin Street, Narrabundah.
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For me, Deborah’s crowning achievements were not her public sphere 
academic works, important though they were.
For me, Deborah’s crowning achievements were her friendship – one that 
I continue to treasure – and the gorgeous girls she brought in to this 
world: Hannah and my fairy goddaughter, Rosa.
So, personal reflections aside, let’s get stuck in to the topic of this 
session: Deborah Cass’s research contribution to Nauru and beyond. 
To self-determination.
The concept is of course complex and contested. But given the spoils of 
statehood: use of force, taxing and spending, shaping society for good 
and ill (and hopefully for more good than ill), it is no surprise that in the 
hallowed arena of international law, the concept of self-determination – 
who gets to be a state – is such a contested arena.
Deborah’s paper asks whether the ‘penumbra of uncertainty’ surrounding 
the concept of self-determination is so pronounced that it obscures the 
term’s settled meaning.
I’m not so convinced. But I’m no scholar. And the fact that Deborah was 
made me love our conversations all the more. My starting point is my 
position as a lawyer in the executive government. I work on international 
crime cooperation, where in international work we deal with grey concepts 
on a daily basis, but things work out. Yes, there is grey, but it works.
Maybe I’m too used to dealing in pragmatic outcomes. At the negotiations 
on the new Sustainable Development Goals – which will replace the 
Millennium Development Goals at Leaders Week in the UN New York in 
September 2015 – it was the wording on self-determination that was still 
being negotiated right down to the wire in an exceedingly long document, 
with 17 goals and 169 targets.
The enduring debate about the scope of self-determination shows us that 
Deborah was of course right in her focus on drilling in to this important 
concept, and to exhort us to make it make more sense.
So, Professor, please take the conch from me and share with us your 




Beyond: Reflections on the 
Aftermath of the Nauru Case
Antony Anghie1
Introduction
I first met Deborah sometime in 1987, on the 49th or 50th floor of what 
was then known as Nauru House. Located in Collins Street, Nauru House 
was one of the tallest buildings in Melbourne at that time, a prominent 
symbol of the almost legendary affluence of the people of Nauru. Deborah 
was a Research Officer to Barry Connell, Counsel Assisting the Nauru 
Commission of Inquiry.2 The broad task of the Commission of Inquiry 
was to explore the history of the phosphate mining that had taken place 
on the island during the time it was administered by Australia, first under 
the Mandate System of the League of Nations, and then subsequently the 
Trusteeship System of the United Nations. The mining had devastated 
the island, and the commission was charged with the task of inquiring 
into two major issues. First, the feasibility of rehabilitating the island, 
and, second, the legal question of the responsibility of the three partner 
governments: Australia, the UK and New Zealand, who had been granted 
the Mandate and Trusteeship over Nauru, for the environmental damage 
suffered by the island during the relevant period.
1  My thanks to Kim Rubenstein and the other participants at the symposium ‘Traversing Divides’ 
held in memory of Deborah’s work, at The Australian National University, Canberra, August 2015. 
My thanks also to Liz Thomas for her superb research assistance.
2  CG Weeramantry, Commission of Inquiry into the Rehabilitation of the Worked-Out Phosphate Lands 
in Nauru (Report, 1988) <http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/pambu/catalogue/index.php/commission-of-
inquiry-into-rehabilitation-of-worked-out-phosphate-lands-in-nauru;isaar> (‘Commission of Inquiry’).
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Deborah had completed the massive task of scouring the archives in various 
places including London, Geneva, New York, New Zealand, Melbourne 
and Fiji, to gather and organise all the documents that were essential for 
the work of the commission. Deborah also had to initiate several Freedom 
of Information Actions in an effort to get access to documents that the 
Australian Government refused to provide, despite the fact that these were 
surely the property of Nauru. Australia had declined to participate in the 
commission. My own work consisted of serving as a research assistant to 
CG Weeramantry, the chair of the commission, who was responsible for 
writing up that part of the report which dealt with the history and complex 
legal issues relating to the phosphate mining.3 The scientific part of the 
report which examined the feasibility of rehabilitation was completed by 
another commissioner, an engineer, Mr RH Challen. The final report ran 
to something like 10 volumes of text and documents. The commission 
felt under some pressure to provide a comprehensive and detailed report 
precisely because none of the partner governments involved had appeared 
before the commission.
We relied completely on the several filing cabinets full of documents 
that Deborah had so carefully compiled and catalogued – I should say, 
in a manner that demonstrated a clear and precise awareness of the legal 
issues that had to be addressed. It is a testament to the thoroughness and 
precision of Deborah’s work that the case that was later argued in the 
International Court of Justice was based on the foundations that she had 
laid;4 I am still unaware of any documents that were later added to Nauru’s 
case. Deborah had provided all that was needed. It was not always easy 
working for the government of Nauru. It is a myth to believe that those 
who have somehow been at the receiving end of colonialism, however 
benevolently administered, would be ennobled by the experience. Despite 
all this, Deborah remain undeterred, driven on by her powerful sense of 
injustice to do all the work that was needed to give the people of Nauru 
a chance to articulate their grievance.
The theme of self-determination was central to Nauru’s claims. Article 22 
of the League of Nations, which created the Mandate System of the 
League, stipulated that the mandate power was to ensure the ‘well being 
and development’ of the native peoples unable to look after their own 
3  Ibid.




interests.5 The System in this way purported to prevent the colonial 
exploitation that had been such a prominent feature of international 
relations up to that time. In legal terms, the Nauru mandate was 
granted by the League of Nations to Australia, New Zealand and the 
UK; however, Australia administered Nauru on behalf of all the partner 
governments, a result of an internal arrangement among them.6 It was 
unclear at this stage what the League envisaged as the ultimate status of 
Nauru and other territories placed under the Mandate System. The theme 
of self-determination, expressed somewhat uncertainly, tentatively and 
controversially in the time of the drafting of the League, had assumed 
a far more detailed character by the time Nauru was placed under the 
Trusteeship System of the United Nations. Under the Charter, Nauru was 
recognised as possessing the right to self-determination. Consequently, 
Nauru claimed that Australia had failed to meet its obligations to preserve 
the interests of the people of Nauru, by failing to facilitate their transition 
to a functioning and sustainable sovereign statehood, and thereby not 
protecting their right to self-determination.7 Most immediately, the very 
physical territory of Nauru had been devastated by the mining and the 
partner governments were responsible for the rehabilitation of the lands.
Self-determination was a topic that Deborah Cass explored later in 
a far more wide-ranging and theoretically ambitious work, one of her 
first: ‘Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current 
International Law Theories’, which was published in 1992. Surveying 
all the claims to self-determination made in the late 1980s and early 
1990s: the break-up of the Balkans, the war in Iraq, claims being made 
in Palestine, Moldava and Ukraine, Deborah Cass argued that what 
she termed the ‘conventional’ approach to self-determination – which 
stipulated that colonised peoples could exercise this right only once and 
within pre-existing boundaries – was outmoded, and that the right of 
self-determination should be reconceptualised to permit minorities and 
indigenous peoples to exercise it. As she puts it:
5  The Covenant of the League of Nations, League of Nations Members, opened for signature 28 June 
1919 (entered into force 10 January 1920) art 22 (‘Covenant’).
6  League of Nations [including Australia, New Zealand and the UK], Mandate for Nauru 
(Miscellaneous No. 6, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1921) <https://dl.wdl.org/468/service/ 
468.pdf>.
7  See, eg, Mary Nazzal, ‘Nauru: An Environment Destroyed and International Law’ (Paper, 
lawanddevelopment.org, April 2005) <http://www.lawanddevelopment.org/docs/nauru.pdf>; 
M Rafiqul Islam, ‘The Dispute between Nauru and Australia over Rehabilitation: A Test Case for 




The challenge for international law is therefore not to exclude the 
ever-increasing list of claimants because they do not match precisely 
with an outmoded theory, but to find methods for assessing and 
evaluating the validity of claims according to realistic, functional 
and humanitarian measures.8
Self-determination is a topic that has haunted international law ever since 
the concept was first articulated, in different forms, by Lenin and Wilson. 
A massive amount of literature has focused on the subject. Deborah Cass’s 
article remains a valuable contribution to this literature not only because 
the problems she discusses remain with us – who should be able to claim 
this right, and what is its content – but because of the incisive manner 
in which she sets out the problem and the many different analytic tools 
she employs to explore the problem. Such tools include classic positivist 
textualist analysis, leavened by a more critical jurisprudential approach 
which suggests how a new paradigm must be developed to accommodate 
developments in state practice and expectations. It is a striking feature of 
Deborah’s brilliance that she made contributions to so many areas of law: 
international, domestic, constitutional, theoretical. She did not, as far as 
I know, return to the theme of self-determination. She proceeded instead 
to author one of the first analyses of ‘New Approaches to International 
Law’,9 before then writing her pioneering book on constitutionalism 
and the World Trade Organization.10 And yet, the Nauru experience 
had not completely disappeared from her thinking. She believed that 
the topic of trusteeship in international law required further exploration 
and was considering writing on this topic for her Doctor of Juridical 
Science (SJD) at Harvard. Her intuition, again, proved to be correct, as 
trusteeship, broadly conceived, is now being studied in far greater detail 
by numerous scholars whose works illuminate how this broad idea has 
engaged the discipline.
My purpose in this essay is not only to review Deborah Cass’s important 
work for the Nauru Commission and her prescient thinking on self-
determination, but to consider, in a reflective rather than analytic way, 
almost 25 years after the International Court of Justice handed down its 
8  Deborah Z Cass, ‘Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International 
Law Theories’ (1992) 18 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 31.
9  Deborah Z Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law’ 
(1996) 65 Nordic Journal of International Law 341, doi.org/10.1163/15718109620294924.
10  Deborah Z  Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, 
Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System (Oxford University Press, 2005).
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decision on ‘Certain Phosphate Lands of Nauru’,11 the aftermath of self-
determination, and the subsequent history of Nauru and its relationship 
with Australia. I try then to suggest some of the more immediate legacies 
and possible reverberations of the Nauru case and the ways in which the 
Nauru experience might be considered within the broader context of both 
international law and Australia’s foreign relations and engagement with 
international law. For these purposes, I sketch the outlines of a concept 
that has featured only occasionally and unevenly in Australian history: 
‘Australian Empire’, and I consider Nauru as an example of that empire 
in operation.
The Aftermath of Self‑Determination
Nauru is now, as a result of bipartisan policy of Liberal and Labor 
governments, a detention facility for people seeking asylum in Australia. 
Considerable controversy has followed. The Guardian reported on leaked 
documents which revealed that considerable violence was taking place in 
Nauru.12 Detainees were being sexually and physically abused by guards. 
Many had attempted suicide. The Australian Minister of Immigration, 
Peter Dutton, accused detainees of sewing up their own lips and setting 
themselves on fire in an outrageous and flagrantly manipulative attempt 
to enter Australia.13 However, thousands of Australians protested against 
their government’s policies, and called for the closing of the camps and 
the transfer of all detainees to Australia.14
11  Certain Phosphate Lands (n 4). See also Antony Anghie, ‘The Heart of My Home: Colonialism, 
Environmental Damage and the Nauru Case’ (1993) 34(2) Harvard International Law Journal 445.
12  Paul Farrell, Nick Evershed and Helen Davidson, ‘The Nauru Files: Cache of 2,000 Leaked 
Reports Reveal Scale of Abuse of Children in Australia Offshore Detention’, The Guardian (online, 
10 August 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/aug/10/the-nauru-files-2000-
leaked-reports-reveal-scale-of-abuse-of-children-in-australian-offshore-detention>.
13  Ben Doherty and Paul Farrell, ‘“People have Self-Immolated to Get to Australia” – Immigration 
Minister’s Response to Nauru Files’, The Guardian (online, 10 August 2016) <https://www.theguardian.
com/news/2016/aug/11/labor-will-reintroduce-bill-to-force-mandatory-reporting-of-child-abuse-after-
nauru-files>.
14  Isabella Kwai, ‘Australia Revokes Medical Evacuations for Offshore Detainees’, The New York Times 
(online, 4 December 2019) <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/world/australia/medevac-refugees-
repeal.html>; on the Australian public’s reaction to off-shore detention see further Helen Davidson, 
‘Thousands Call for Nauru and Manus Camps to Close in Rallies across Australia’, The Guardian 




Whereas previously Nauru had supplied Australia with the phosphate 
it had so strenuously sought for its agricultural needs, it now serves 
a  different function within the scheme of Australian foreign relations. 
In his book, based on the Nauru Report, Christopher Weeramantry wrote, 
‘Nauru presents in a microcosm an unusual variety of the great historical 
currents that have shaped the course of human affairs’.15 He refers to the 
settlement of the Pacific, the emergence of a distinctive culture and way of 
life in Nauru, and the gradual expansion of the European presence in the 
remotest parts of the Pacific in search of land and minerals. The history 
of the European Empire in the Pacific could be told through the story of 
Nauru. It is, as these histories tend to be, marked by a strange dissonance; 
decisions made in Berlin and in Versailles have profound consequences 
for people living thousands of miles away who have very little idea of the 
people and factors deciding their fate. For instance, Nauru was placed 
in the German sphere of influence,16 whereas the neighbouring island of 
Banaba (part of the Gilbert and Ellis chain of islands) was placed in the 
British sphere of influence, thanks to the Anglo–German Treaty of 1886. 
This agreement was reached during the aftermath of Berlin Conference 
of 1885, which had focused on European empires in Africa and that led 
to the Berlin Act of 1885, which regulated commerce in the Congo.17 
The Nauru case dealt with international legal doctrines relating to the 
exploitation of resources and the content of self-determination, and it also 
offered in its own way a graphic illustration of how entrenched systems of 
political economy are fundamentally inimical to environmental wellbeing 
and how environmental devastation could result in the destruction of 
sovereignty itself. Now of course, Nauru and the events occurring there 
are enmeshed in yet another set of international legal controversies and 
doctrines – relating not only to environmental damage, but refugee and 
asylum law and human rights. It is taken as exemplary of how environmental 
devastation – now caused by climate change – may endanger the existence 
of states,18 and create ‘environmental refugees’. The plight of Nauru also 
parallels in some ways the fate of the Chagos Islanders who were displaced 
from their land, and whose failed struggles for self-determination also 
15  Christopher Weeramantry, Nauru: Environmental Damage Under International Trusteeship 
(Oxford University Press, 1994) 1.
16  The Commonwealth, Nauru: History (Web Page, 2019) <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-
member-countries/nauru/history>.
17  See especially Katerina Martina Teaiwa, Consuming Ocean Island: Stories of People and Phosphate 
from Banaba (Indiana University Press, 2014).




raised complex issues about the legacies of colonialism.19 Further, the 
Nauru case is rich for reconsideration in the context of new developments 
in the history and theory of international law promise, which scrutinise 
the relationship, for instance, between colonialism, political economy and 
the environment.20
The Nauru case raises enduring questions about the meaning and content 
of self-determination. At the time art 22 of the League of Nations was 
drafted, self-determination was still a vague principle: its legal status was 
uncertain and its political ramifications worrying and unclear. The former 
Ottoman territories in the Middle East designated countries such as Iraq 
and Syria as mandate territories, which were classified as ‘A’ mandates that 
were developed to the point ‘where their existence as independent nations 
can be provisionally recognized’.21 Nauru, however, was characterised as 
a ‘C’ mandate that was to be administered ‘under the laws of the Mandatory 
as integral portions of its territory’.22 Crucially, such administration was 
to be ‘subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the 
indigenous population’.23 Clearly then, Nauru was to be administered in 
accordance with basic principles of trusteeship which ensured that all the 
19  Stephen Allen, The Chagos Islanders and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015); 
David Vine, Island of Shame: The Secret History of the US Military Base on Diego Garcia (Princeton 
University Press, 2009), doi.org/10.1515/9781400838509.
20  Stephen Humphreys and Yoriko Otomo, ‘Theorizing International Environmental Law’ in Anne 
Orford and Florian Hoffmann (eds), Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2016), doi.org/10.1515/9781400838509. As Stephen Humphreys and Yoriko 
Otomo point out, ‘European colonialism was premised on the exploitation of natural resources 
and on the maintenance of conditions of global trade in raw materials’. For recent scholarship on 
the issues that arise, see generally Ileana Porras, ‘Binge Development in the Age of Fear: Scarcity, 
Consumption, Inequality, and the Environmental Crisis’ (doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107239357.002) 
and Karin Mickelson, ‘International Law as a War Against Nature? Reflections on the Ambivalence 
of International Environmental Law’ (doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107239357.003) both in Barbara 
Stark (ed), International Law and Its Discontents: Confronting Crises (Cambridge University Press, 
2015); Usha Natarajan and Kishan Khoday, ‘Locating Nature: Making and Unmaking International 
Law’ (2014) 27(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 573, doi.org/10.1017/s0922156514000211; 
Usha Natarajan and Kishan Khoday, ‘Fairness and International Environmental Law from Below: 
Social Movements and Legal Transformation in India’ (2012) 25(2) Leiden Journal of International 
Law 415, doi.org/10.1017/s0922156512000118. For particular studies of Nauru and the legacies of 
the phosphate mining see Katerina Teaiwa, ‘Ruining Pacific Islands: Australia’s Phosphate Imperialism’ 
(2015) 46(3) Australian Historical Studies 374, doi.org/10.1080/1031461x.2015.1082609; Cait Storr, 
‘Islands and the South: Framing the Relationship between International Law and Environmental 
Crisis’ (2016) 27(2) European Journal of International Law 519, doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chw026.
21  Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey, opened for signature 
10 August 1920, art 94 <https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I,_Articles_1_-_260>.




resources of the island were utilised or preserved for the benefit of its 
people. At the very least, the obligations of art 22 of the League of Nations 
Charter prohibited the destruction of the physical territory of Nauru.
The Mandate System was replaced by the Trusteeship System of the United 
Nations. The obligations undertaken by the Australia and the partner 
governments under that system were far more specific and detailed than 
those included in art  22. Article  76(b) of the United Nations Charter 
stipulated the purpose of the Trusteeship System:
to promote the political, economic, social and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories and their 
progressive development towards self-government or independence 
as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each 
territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the 
peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each 
trusteeship agreement.24
The people of Nauru were desperate to continue their existence as an 
independent people, and art 76(b) in effect protected their right to self-
determination, to emerge as a sovereign nation-state. It was clear however, 
from the beginning of the Australian Administration in 1919, that 
Australia wanted to mine out the island and then resettle the remaining 
Nauruans in Australia. The management of the island was effectively left 
in the hands of the British Phosphate Commissioners (BPC), the body 
which was established to conduct the mining operations. The Nauru Island 
Agreement between the partner governments which created this entity 
included the startling provision that prevented the administrator of the 
island from interfering with the mining operation.25 The commissioners 
and the mining operation they were charged with managing governed the 
island, as many outsiders observed.26 The Australian officials who were 
concerned about the impact of phosphate mining on the territory and 
people were thus legally disabled from controlling a system of governance 
essentially based on the exploitation of the phosphates.
24  Charter of the United Nations art 76(b).
25  The Nauru Island Agreement Act (No 8) 1919 (Cth) art 13, ‘There shall be no interference by any 
of the three Governments with the direction, management, or control of the business of working, 
shipping or selling the phosphates …’.
26  See Weeramantry, Commission of Inquiry (n 2) 128. Mr Rolz Bennett of Guatemala stated that 
‘every aspect of life on Nauru depended on a single activity, the exploitation of the phosphate deposits’: 
Trusteeship Council, 18th Session: Verbatim Record of the 741st Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, 
on Thursday, 9 August 1956, UN Doc T/PV.741 (9 August 1956) 153 <https://digitallibrary.un.org/
record/3844199?ln=en> (‘Trusteeship Council, 18th session’).
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The Nauru Case was settled in 1993 by Australia’s payment (the other 
partner government later contributed) of something like A$107 million for 
the rehabilitation of the phosphate lands damaged by the mining.27 Since 
then, Nauru has lurched from crisis to crisis as it struggles to survive: it 
suffers major financial problems and most its major assets have been sold, 
and it has practiced all the manoeuvres available to ‘bare sovereignty’, for 
Nauru’s resources do not seem to amount to very much more than its legal 
status as a sovereign state.28 It extended recognition to entities seeking 
statehood and was compensated for doing so, and defended Australia’s 
infamous ‘Pacific Solution’, which provides Nauru with the millions of 
dollars it desperately needs from the Australian Government.29 Previously 
Australia’s policies were effectively destroying the sovereignty of Nauru 
– not out of any particular malice towards its people, whom it viewed 
generally with affectionate but devastating condescension – but because 
it was intent on exploiting all the phosphates available. Now, however, 
Australia would prefer to insist on Nauru’s sovereignty: it is Nauru that 
must protect the human rights of the many unfortunate people housed on 
the island. Nauru represents a complex and anomalous sort of sovereignty. 
Nauru, like Guantanamo – another product of a colonial relationship – 
has been termed a ‘legal black hole’.30
For those who are somewhat familiar with the history of Nauru, it was 
apparent from the outset that even the success of the Nauruan campaign 
for compensation was a decidedly ambivalent victory. Nauru itself should 
not be exonerated of the consequences of the many bad decisions it made 
following independence. But given the history of the relationship between 
Australia and Nauru, it was obvious that the odds were very much against 
the people of the tiny island. Indeed, it was astonishing that Nauru was 
able to achieve independence at all, given implacable Australian policies 
concerning Nauru, and the unrelenting determination of Australia to 
27  US Department of State, ‘Nauru (04/08)’ (Background Note), archived at <https://2009-2017.
state.gov/outofdate/bgn/nauru/111187.htm>: ‘Australia settled the case out of court in 1993, 
agreeing to pay a lump sum settlement of A$107 million (U.S.$85.6 million) and an annual stipend 
of the equivalent of A$2.5 million in 1993 dollars toward environmental rehabilitation’.
28  ‘Nauru: Paradise Well and Truly Lost’, The Economist (online, 20 December 2001) <https://
www.economist.com/christmas-specials/2001/12/20/paradise-well-and-truly-lost>.
29  Ariane Rummery, ‘Australia’s “Pacific Solution” Draws to a Close’, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (Web Page, 11  February 2008) <https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/
latest/2008/2/47b04d074/australias-pacific-solution-draws-close.html>.
30  See George Williams, ‘Asylum Seekers on Nauru are in a Legal Black Hole’, Sydney Morning 




exploit a completely unequal relationship. It is telling for instance, that 
Australia prevented the Nauruans access to expert advice when it came to 
the extraordinarily complex and crucial negotiations with the BPC and 
government prior to independence.31 Australia on the other hand, was 
able to draw on the brilliance of eminent lawyers to justify its position. 
It was only through the courage and determination of the Nauruan leader, 
the heroic Hammer DeRoburt, and the supervision of the Trusteeship 
Council in continuously questioning Australia’s policies in Nauru, that 
the island survived.32
Self-determination, as granted by Australia, consisted in handing over 
a devastated landscape to a people that were deliberately neglected 
and subordinated, whatever the funds supposedly available to them. 
Mining was the only industry that Australia fostered on the island, 
and so Nauru was faced with the predicament whereby its only means 
of economic development was the continuation of the mining that was 
so damaging to the island. Further, intent on protecting the phosphate 
industry, the Australian Government made little effort to educate the 
Nauruans and prepare them for self-government, despite the talent the 
Nauruans demonstrated. Dedicated Australian officials sought to make 
good on Australia’s obligations under the mandate, but these initiatives 
were defeated by the imperatives of the mining operation. As far back as 
1928, the first Australian administrator of Nauru had planned to educate 
Nauruans to manage their own affairs and had instituted a training 
program for Nauruans in Geelong. As a result, a group of concerned 
citizens from Geelong became involved in the development of the island, 
and arranged for Nauruans to be trained in Geelong in various trades. 
The program was a great success, and both the organisers and sympathetic 
Australian administrators believed that the ‘Geelong Boys’, as they came 
to be known, could gradually assume responsibility for many aspects of 
the administration of the island. This did not occur. Trained Nauruans 
were a threat to the continuing operation of the phosphate industry and 
the Geelong program was condemned for producing ‘malcontents’.33
31  See generally Teaiwa, ‘Ruining Pacific Islands’ (n 20), speaking to the inequality of the Australia–
Nauru relationship especially in relation to phosphate.
32  ‘Hammer DeRoburt: Nauruan Politician’, Encyclopaedia Britannica (online, last updated 
21 September 2019) <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hammer-DeRoburt>.
33  Weeramantry, Nauru: Environmental Damage (n 15) 113.
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Over time, the Australians who took an interest in the welfare of the 
Nauruans and became familiar with their affairs were greatly disturbed 
by Australian policies in Nauru. They formed an organisation, based in 
Geelong, the Pacific Island Natives Welfare Association (PINWA) which 
took up the Nauruan cause, for by the 1940s, it was obvious that the 
continuation of phosphate mining would have completely devastated 
the island. Several members of PINWA were very well acquainted with 
the plight of the Nauruans as they had worked on Nauru and had also 
supported the ‘Geelong Boys’. PINWA, after much effort, met with 
the Minister of External Territories to express their concerns, but were 
disappointed in the government’s response. Many years later, HE Hurst, 
a member of PINWA who had also earlier been involved in the Geelong 
training program, set out what he saw as the desperate plight of the 
Nauruans in an article titled, ‘Australia Seeks to Destroy Nauruans as 
a People’.34 Much earlier, William Groves, who had served as a Director of 
Education in Nauru, noted the failure of Australia to promote education 
for self-governance, pleading that the Nauruans should not become ‘what 
I fear our Australian aborigines have become, a despised and dying race’.35 
The Trusteeship Council too, continuously questioned Australia and its 
failure to promote self-government. Australia had responded that no 
Nauruans were capable of assuming real responsibilities.36 Thus, having 
deprived the Nauruans of a proper education system, the Australian 
Government then proclaimed them to be incapable of assuming any 
administrative responsibilities. It seemed that Australia was intent on 
keeping Nauruans in a permanently subordinate position. It was not until 
1965, three years before independence, that Nauruans were given even 
limited legislative powers, and even then, they never exercised any sort 
of powers with respect to the phosphate mining, despite their protests. 
It is uncertain how meaningful self-determination could have followed, or 
how Nauru could have sustained itself politically and economically, given 
this history. Article 76(b) of the UN Charter outlines self-determination 
as ensuring, not simply political independence, but the promotion of 
the economic, social and cultural advancement of the peoples under 
trusteeship. Australia, in its efforts to protect the mining of phosphates, 
failed in all these areas.
34  Ibid 390.
35  Ibid 113.
36  Ibid 141, citing Trusteeship Council, 18th session UN Doc T/PV.741 (n 26) 151.
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The people of Nauru, almost from the beginning of their relationship 
with Australia, have been treated with a level of condescension that was 
entirely demeaning and ignorant, even if supposedly benevolent. In the 
course of the pre-independence talks, the Nauruan representatives made 
this point:
We feel the Australian people have an image of Nauruans which is 
quite wrong … Australians seem to have a picture of an absurdly 
small people who want too much from Australia, who want 
complete sovereign independence, and who are not as grateful as 
they should be for what Australia is generously offering them.37
Nauru continues, of course, to be the subject of Australian belittlement and 
derision. Most infamously Alexander Downer described Nauru as being 
the worst place he had ever visited.38 Given Australia’s responsibility for 
the situation of Nauru, and indeed, the actions of Downer’s predecessors 
as Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, the denunciation is ironic 
and tragic while reflecting an unfortunate ignorance of Australia’s role 
in creating the dereliction that the Minister now condemns. Phosphate 
was crucial for Australian agriculture, and Nauru had supplied thousands 
of tons of the fertiliser to Australian farmers at cost price.39 Apart from 
the environmental damage it caused, Australia had benefited enormously 
from the whole relationship: the Commission of Inquiry provided some 
plausible figures suggesting the extent of the massive sums involved.40 
What is also perhaps most telling is that the people who presciently saw, 
warned against, and protested the destruction of the island of Nauru 
and its effects on its people were conscientious Australian administrators 
and citizens, people such as Griffith and HE  Hurst who had a deep 
knowledge of the situation in Nauru, and who sincerely attempted to 
ensure that Australia fulfilled its obligations under the Mandate and 
Trusteeship arrangements.
37  Weeramantry, Nauru: Environmental Damage (n 15) 290.
38  See Tony Wheeler, ‘Letter From … Nauru: The Worst Place in the World?’, Crikey (Online, 5 April 
2011) <https://www.crikey.com.au/2011/04/05/letter-from-nauru-the-worst-place-in-the-world/>.
39  ‘Nauru – Overview of Economy’, Nations Encyclopedia (Web Page, 2019) <http://www.nations 
encyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Nauru-OVERVIEW-OF-ECONOMY.html# 
ixzz 4N7Wqx948>: ‘Phosphate has been exported mainly to Australia and New Zealand, where it 
improved the poor soils in those countries’.
40  Certain Phosphate Lands (n 4) [233].
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Papua New Guinea: Mining and the 
Postcolonial state
We might consider the Nauru case not just in terms of its legacy for the 
people of Nauru, but as exemplifying a set of practices and policies that 
Australia chose to adopt more widely in the Pacific.
In her important article, Katerina Teaiwa analyses Nauru in the context of 
what she terms ‘Australia’s Phosphate Imperialism’, an imperialism which 
extended to other Pacific islands, such as Banaba, which were equally 
devastated.41 Here I focus on another territory that was under Australian 
Mandate and later Trusteeship administration: Papua New Guinea (PNG). 
The situation in the two territories was somewhat different. Whereas in 
the case of Nauru, the phosphates were mined by the BPC as explicit 
representatives of the partner governments, the resources of PNG that 
were discovered in the 1960s were handed over to private entities. In the 
case of the massive Bougainville mine, these included the Australian 
mining company Rio Tinto.42 In the 1960s, it was hardly acceptable, under 
trusteeship, for the partner governments discharging that trusteeship to 
follow the procedures that were more redolent of the nineteenth century 
and establish a monopoly over the phosphates, even if indirectly, to 
a body which it effectively controlled. Private rights, however, were better 
protected from any sort of governmental or international interference.43
A cursory glance at some of the Trusteeship Council proceedings regarding 
the mining concessions in PNG raise various questions. The ‘development 
discourse’, which had begun at the time of the League of Nations itself, 
had reached a further stage and the Special Representative for Australia 
noted that, ‘[l]ike all developing countries, the Territory needed an 
established policy on outside investment to ensure that the interests of 
the people were safeguarded’.44 The World Bank had visited PNG and 
written an influential report on how development was to be achieved, 
and mining became crucial for this project. Various local bodies had been 
consulted about the need for such investment, and the House of Assembly 
41  See Teaiwa, ‘Ruining Pacific Islands’ (n 20).
42  See, eg, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia 
and Papua New Guinea 1966–1969, ed Stuart Dora (Commonwealth of Australia, 2006) (‘Australia and 
Papua New Guinea’), detailing the interactions of Rio Tinto in Papua New Guinea during the 1960s.
43  See James Gathii, War, Commerce and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010).
44  Report of the Trusteeship Council, UN TCOR, 24th sess, UN Doc A/7604 (2 June – 6 August 
1969) [170] (‘Report of the Trusteeship Council’).
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had ‘adopted a formal declaration on development capital, providing for 
various guarantees for investors: that declaration had been reaffirmed 
on 3  September 1968’.45 Information was given about the benefits 
that would accrue to the local population, and how the processing of 
raw materials within the territory could add value. Furthermore, plans 
were made to provide the local populations with equity in the mining 
operations. The  Trusteeship Council monitored these arrangements, 
which were lauded by the representatives of the UK and France. The Soviet 
representative, however, demurred and stated:
[T]he Bougainville Copper Company would be set up in such 
a  way that two thirds of the shares would belong to Riotinto 
Zinc, a company known for its activities in the southern part of 
Africa, which was an international monopoly. One third of the 
shares would belong to the New Broken Hill Company which had 
its headquarters in London. They would exploit the extremely rich 
deposits of copper of Bougainville Island. He said that from the 
statement of the Special Representative it was quite obvious that 
the lion’s share of this project would go to Bougainville Copper 
and not to the indigenous population. And there was no reason to 
doubt that if the project went forward Bougainville island would 
really become the patrimony of the company’.46
The Russian response might be interpreted as a predictable and ideologically 
motivated criticism in the context of the ongoing Cold War. Notably, 
for instance, a detailed study of the conflict in Bougainville conflict 
states that ‘[b]y the standards of the time, Bougainville Copper Limited 
(BCL), whose principal investor was Conzinc Riotinto Australia (CRA), 
had a comparatively advanced sense of corporate social responsibility’.47 
This policy was based on enlightened self-interest: BCL provided 
scholarships to indigenous students, funded agricultural extensions and 
paid for all the infrastructure needed to operate the mine, such as roads, 
electricity, water, telecommunications, ports, airstrips and housing.48 
The Australian Administration of PNG exercised its right to acquire 
20 per cent of the equity of the mine, and many shares were purchased 
by indigenous individuals. The mining companies paid very high taxes on 
their profits, and these increased even further after independence when 
45  Ibid.
46  Ibid [246].
47  See John Braithwaite et al, Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Sequencing Peace in 




the new government of PNG entered into negotiations.49 The Australian 
Government believed that the exploitation of the mine was central to the 
development of PNG, in doubling the territory’s export income:
The Administration believes that the Bougainville Copper 
project offers a most important opportunity for the Territory to 
take a  significant step forward toward economic self-reliance. 
Because of this the project is seen as of national rather than local 
importance, and it is seen as a unit in the mining industry rather 
than a single mine.50
However generous the mining companies were according to the standards 
of the time, the Russian warning in this sense became a reality. The mine 
was central to achieving not merely political sovereignty, but ‘economic 
self-reliance’, and thus the mine became one of the central institutions of 
the political life of PNG.
The conflict in Bougainville has been the subject of study for many 
institutions, and enormous effort and resources have been devoted to peace 
building and conflict resolution in the island.51 It is unclear as to how the 
history and origins of the conflict have been understood, or even whether 
these things matter. Perhaps the most important issue is to address the 
immediate demand of the parties involved: put simply, to stop the violence.
What is absolutely clear to me, however, is that Australian officials 
would have been aware that mining, without adequate regulations, could 
cause massive environmental damage which would have catastrophic 
consequences for the welfare of the indigenous population, the 
native peoples whose interests were to be protected by the trusteeship 
arrangement. It was in the early 1960s, precisely, that the desperate 
Nauruans were making this very point, and the scarred landscape of 
49  Braithwaite et al, Reconciliation and Architectures (n 47) 12.
50  See Australia and Papua New Guinea (n 42) xxxix, this is a statement by Newman to the House 
of Assembly, Port Moresby Memorandum of 16 June 1969, ‘White Paper on Bougainville’. This 
was an attempt to persuade the Papuan House of Assembly of the benefits of the mining. But it 
seemed that the administration was prepared to do whatever was necessary in Bougainville, including 
use force ‘subject to humanity and standing field orders’, if the administration’s explanations were 
rejected. There had been fierce local opposition to CRA’s activities by the locals in Bougainville, and 
as early as 1969 there were dangers of Bougainville seceding.
51  See, eg, Anthony Regan, ‘Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict’ (1998) 33(3) The Journal 
of Pacific History 269; Volker Boege, Bougainville and the Discovery of Slowness: An Unhurried Approach to 
State-Building in the Pacific (Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2006); Benjamin Reilly, 




the island offered its own eloquent story. The Australian Department of 
Territories – under the Ministership of Sir Paul Hasluck at the time – was 
busy battling the Nauru protests and claims arising from mining, while 
at the same time formalising the Bougainville concession agreements to 
two major Australian mining companies.52 There was, however, at least 
one significant difference between the two situations. In the case of 
PNG, the community that suffered most as a result of the mining, the 
people of Bougainville, were not the community that had been able to 
engage directly and decisively with the Australian Administration, even if 
local communities were paid royalties. The government of PNG and its 
antecedent had no particular concern for the wellbeing of the people of 
Bougainville, who it seems had always seen themselves and been viewed as 
a different community. The situation is a familiar one in postcolonial states. 
The Nigerian government was indifferent to the wellbeing and concerns 
of the Ogoni people – namely that their lands were being destroyed by oil 
drilling – as this activity benefited both the Nigerian state and the different 
ethnic group that were dominant within it.53 Secessionist wars have been 
fuelled by the volatile combination of ethnic differences, which have been 
compounded by uneven economic development. In another variation 
on this theme, European powers have attempted to foster secession in 
countries in the hope of getting or retaining access to mineral-rich areas; 
thus Belgium encouraged the secession of Katanga from the Congo in 
order to protect the interests of its mining companies.54 Many mining 
companies, such as Rio Tinto, had interests in several different colonial 
territories, and their strategies for advancing and protecting those interests 
were international in character. A global history could be written then, 
of the relations between colonial governments and the private mining 
companies with which they were intimately connected – it is telling, after 
all, that BHP, one of the concessionaires of Bougainville, was famously 
known as ‘The Big Australian’.55
52  See, eg, Russell McGregor, ‘Wards, Words and Citizens: AP Elkin and Paul Hasluck on 
Assimilation’ (1999) 69(4) Oceania 243, doi.org/10.1002/j.1834-4461.1999.tb00372.x, detailing 
the interactions of Paul Hasluck and the Aboriginal community in the 1960s.
53  For further information on the Ogoni people in Nigeria, see, eg, Steven Cayford, ‘The Ogoni 
Uprising: Oil, Human Rights, and a Democratic Alternative in Nigeria’ (1996) Africa Today 183.
54  ‘Congo in Crisis: The Rise and Fall of Katangan Secession’, Association for Diplomatic Studies and 
Training (Web Page, 8 September 2015) <http://adst.org/2015/09/congo-in-crisis-the-rise-and-fall-
of-katangan-secession/>.
55  Even the Sydney Morning Herald occasionally still refers to BHP as the ‘Big Australian’, see, eg, 
Clin Kruger, ‘BHP Reject South32 Beats the “Big Australian” on Share Price and CEO Pay’, The Sydney 




Furthermore, the manner in which the governments attempted to protect 
the companies against the threat of self-determination is a complex and 
compelling theme. The independence of PNG would not necessarily have 
helped local communities. Here, ironically and tragically, the postcolonial 
state of independent PNG continued in some respects to reproduce 
the role of the colonial state, because it was indifferent to the needs of 
the local communities and because it needed the expertise and capital 
offered by the mining companies. As far as these local communities were 
concerned, the postcolonial state, invariably obsessed by the imperatives of 
‘development’, was no better, and perhaps much worse, than the colonial 
state. It is important to note that, right from the outset, local communities 
in Bougainville protested against the mining.56 Scholars of nationalism 
have elaborated on this crucial problem confronting multiethnic states 
where one ethnic group took control over the formidable apparatus of 
the state.
Extensive litigation has followed over the years. Residents of Bougainville 
unsuccessfully sued Rio Tinto in the US under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 
alleging it had committed crimes against humanity, war crimes and racial 
discrimination.57
Conclusion
Self-determination was the revolutionary doctrine that was the 
foundation of the anti-colonial movement. Initially articulated by former 
US President Woodrow Wilson, and intended by him to apply only to 
what he regarded as the suppressed nations of Europe, self-determination 
became a central feature of the United Nations era. It is mentioned in the 
UN Charter, and is the subject of several foundational General Assembly 
Resolutions. Nauru and PNG, however, suggest some of the unfortunate 
legacies of self-determination, and raise crucial questions about the 
limitations of self-determination. In the case of Nauru, self-determination 
56  Anthony J Regan and Helga-Maria Griffin (eds), Bougainville Before the Conflict (ANU E Press, 
2005) 131–2, doi.org/10.22459/BBC.08.2015.
57  See Sarei v Rio Tinto plc, 671 F 3d 736 (9th Cir, 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 133 
1995, 185 L Ed 2d 863 (2013); see also Jonathan Stempel, ‘Rio Tinto Wins End to Human Rights 
Abuse Lawsuit in US’, Reuters (online, 29  June 2013) <http://www.reuters.com/article/riotinto-
abuse-lawsuit-idUSL2N0F41AD20130628>. The Sarei decision followed the US Supreme Court 
decision in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 569 US 108 (2013) which decisively limited the 
application of the Alien Tort Claims Act in in the US.
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ultimately took the form of returning a territory scarred by mining to its 
people: a people who had been denied a meaningful education or any 
significant engagement in running their own affairs. No steps had been 
taken, further, to develop an economy based on anything other than 
mining. At independence, Nauru was one of the richest nations in the 
world per capita. However, in the absence of any sort of preparation for 
self-government, noting again here that the Trusteeship System envisaged 
and required such training, the combination of wealth and inexperience 
in the management of political and international affairs has proven to 
be disastrous. No rehabilitation of phosphate lands had commenced 
as yet. Nauru has been prone to making extremely expensive financial 
mistakes, and is now suffering an ongoing crisis. Indeed, new forms of 
dependency between Australia and Nauru have emerged. The payment 
it receives from Australia by serving as a detention centre is now crucial 
to its economy.58 What this means, however, is that Nauru has become 
complicit in the many human rights violations that have taken place in 
those centres. It is surely tragic that Nauru, itself a victim in many respects 
of colonial abuse, has now itself allied with its former colonial power to 
inflict such violations on asylum seekers, people who have presented 
no threat to Nauru itself. The hard-won sovereignty of Nauru has now 
been deployed in the interests of Australia to enable it to further a highly 
questionable policy, one that has been severely criticised by many human 
rights organisations and the United Nations itself.59
In PNG, where Australia made concerted efforts as the administering 
power to further education and facilitate self-governance, self-
determination confronted a different set of difficulties. Developing 
countries had recognised that political self-determination would be 
gravely limited if it was not accompanied by economic self-determination. 
As such, developing states, seeking to make decolonisation an effective 
reality, combined their demands for political self-determination with 
a campaign for economic self-determination that involved asserting claims 
of ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’. Re-establishing control 
over their natural resources thus became a central concern for the new 
states, as for many, their nationalised resource industries were owned by 
58  ‘How Nauru Threw It All Away’, ABC News (online, 11 March 2014) <https://www.abc.net.au/
radionational/programs/rearvision/how-nauru-threw-it-all-away/5312714>.
59  Ravina Shamdasani, ‘Press Briefing Notes on Nauru, Yemen and Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 




corporations affiliated with the former colonial power. In the case of PNG, 
the Bougainville mine was viewed as crucial for the economic future, the 
sovereignty, of PNG. The nascent government of PNG, the Australian 
Administration and the experts of the World Bank were all unanimous 
that the mine would ensure the prosperity and development that was 
essential for the new state of PNG. The protests of the native peoples 
of Bougainville were disregarded or placated. Here, tragically, the mine 
that was the key to PNG’s wellbeing has instead become a threat to its 
very existence. Conflict has haunted the mining operation, and the people 
of Bougainville themselves are asserting their right of self-determination 
in precisely the manner feared by all the newly independent states, who 
were always concerned that their ethnically divided state could fall apart. 
In both Nauru and PNG, their abundant natural resources have proven to 
undermine rather than further self-determination, due to the potential for 
gross exploitation. The logic of their exploitation, different in each case, 
led to political fracture and disempowerment.
The ambiguities of self-determination revealed by these cases support 
arguments that the doctrine is incoherent and indeed, injurious. And yet, 
for many communities, self-determination offers a means, perhaps the 
only means, of achieving some degree of autonomy and empowerment. 
Thus it is hardly surprising, after Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders 
have long campaigned for self-determination, that this idea lies at the 
heart of the Uluru Statement.60 This is a development that Deborah 
herself pointed to more than 25 years ago. In her article she raised the 
issue of self-determination, not only in relation to distant Pacific islands, 
but to Australia itself, asking the question of whether self-determination 
could translate into ‘forms of power redistribution being experimented 
with in relation to indigenous peoples in Canada, New Zealand and to 
a lesser extent Australia’.61 Deborah was sensitive to injustice wherever she 
perceived it; her life was animated by her sense of fairness. We miss her 
incisive, uncompromising and compassionate voice.
60  See Referendum Council, ‘Uluru Statement from the Heart’ <https://www.referendumcouncil.
org.au/sites/default/files/2017-05/Uluru_Statement_From_The_Heart_0.PDF>; see further Natassia 
Chrysanthos, ‘Journey from the Heart: What is the Uluru Statement from the Heart?’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (online, 27 May 2019) <https://www.smh.com.au/national/what-is-the-uluru-statement-
from-the-heart-20190523-p51qlj.html> for an overview of the significance of the Statement and the 
Indigenous voice envisioned by the document, biographies of crucial advocates and leaders involved 
and an explanation of the creation stories forming the artwork around the Statement.
61  Cass, ‘Re-Thinking Self-Determination’ (n 8) 39.
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The allocation of sovereignty and sovereign rights is international law’s 
driving force. In lawmaking and dispute resolution, international law not 
only distributes resources, but shapes power, knowledge and ideas. This is 
an ongoing feature of treaty negotiations, both of multilateral packages, 
such as an agreement on marine biological diversity in the high seas,2 and 
of smaller, regional endeavours, such as a Pacific-based trade agreement.3 
It is also present in the resolution of disputes by international courts and 
tribunals, of which the South China Sea Award is a leading example.4 When 
pronouncements are made on which countries can access which markets 
or jurisdictional zones (and which tribunals can compulsorily hear claims 
arising from those rights), the implications can be revolutionary.
1  With thanks for helpful comments to Katharine Young, Camille Goodman and the participants at 
The Australian National University symposium, especially Hilary Charlesworth and Kim Rubenstein.
2  See, eg, negotiations for an anticipated binding instrument to protect marine biological diversity 
in areas outside national jurisdiction: International Legally Binding Instrument Under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological 
Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, GA Res 72/249, 72nd sess, Agenda Item 77, UN Doc 
A/RES/72/249 (adopted 24 December 2017); the fourth and final session of the Intergovernmental 
Conference has been postponed by decision 74/543 of 11 March 2020.
3  Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), signed by 
11 countries, 8 March 2018, [2018] ATS 23 (entered into force 30 December 2018).
4  In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under 
Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Philippines v China) (Award) 




In 1987, Deborah Cass foresaw a quiet revolution in the developments 
of  maritime zones5 within the recently concluded United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).6 Hers was an early 
intervention when UNCLOS was still yet to enter into force, but when 
countries around the world had already devoted nine years of their time 
and international advocacy in order to agree on a ‘package deal’ for 
the oceans. The UNCLOS negotiations – a third in a series of historic 
negotiations and known by the acronym UNCLOS III – took place during 
the late 1970s and 1980s, when decolonised developing countries sought 
to challenge historic arrangements which had allowed strong maritime 
powers to exploit the distant waters surrounding weaker states. Concepts 
such as ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’, ‘preferential 
rights’ and the ‘common heritage of mankind’ were debated. An exclusive 
economic zone, or EEZ, was the newly recognised zone beyond and 
adjacent to the territorial sea, extending 200 nautical miles from a coastal 
state. UNCLOS entrenched the sovereign rights of those coastal states to 
the resources of the zone, thus limiting the size and concept of traditional 
notions of freedom of fishing on the high seas.7
Deborah Cass’s analysis – her first legal publication in a series of 
engagements  with matters of international and constitutional law – 
heralded an ongoing intuition for issues of disciplinary significance. 
Fisheries is the international law problem par excellence: one of the earliest 
examples of interstate cooperation seemingly driven by material facts, 
such as migratory species crossing borders of states, but also infused with 
ephemeral concepts like justice and fairness. The earliest international 
law texts are devoted to it,8 and the ministries of foreign affairs of most 
states remain occupied with it.9 Understanding the patterns of behaviour, 
reasons for cooperation and precursors to normative development 
in fisheries allows one to make sense of international law’s subsequent 
response to concerns that only latterly have been conceived as global. 
5  Deborah Cass, ‘The Quiet Revolution: The Development of the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Implications for Foreign Fishing Access in the Pacific’ (1987) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 83.
6  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1833 UNTS 
396 (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘UNCLOS’).
7  UNCLOS (n 6) pt V (‘Exclusive Economic Zone’).
8  David Armitage, The Free Sea: With William Welwod’s Critique & Grotius’s Reply (Liberty Fund 
Inc, 2004), which includes Hugo Grotius’s Mare Liberum, first published 1609.
9  One could cite current examples from all regions, from the skirmishes between French and British 
scallop fishermen, the reluctance of distant water fishing nations to agree to conservation and 
management measures in the Pacific islands, and the ongoing fisheries disputes in the South China Sea.
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Indeed, I suspect I may share at least one affinity with Deborah Cass:10 
a professional conviction that some of the greatest social and legal problems 
of our time can be understood through the lens of fisheries. Even though 
I met her but a few times, I am confident that Deborah Cass would be in 
complete agreement with that conviction, and would similarly enjoy the 
incredulous reactions of others to it.
This chapter is structured in three parts. First, I draw attention to the high 
political and ideological stakes in UNCLOS’s recognition of maritime 
zones. Deborah Cass was interested in the geopolitics behind the changing 
economic relationships between the Pacific island states and the distant 
water fishing nations such as the Soviet Union and the US. The first part of 
this chapter reflects upon her arguments in the context of a very different 
environment from the Cold War–inspired era in which she wrote. In the 
second part, I move to some relevant provisions of UNCLOS relating 
to the EEZ, particularly art  56’s provision for rights, jurisdiction and 
duties of the coastal state in the EEZ. I engage with Deborah Cass’s 
hypothesis that art  56 provided for full discretion for coastal states in 
denying access to foreign fishing nations, comparing this analysis with 
later interpretations from international tribunals such as the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and ad hoc tribunals. I show that 
though her fishery study was extremely perceptive, it did not account for 
some emerging issues relating to unfettered coastal state discretion. These 
issues are examined in the third part of the chapter, which examines the 
need for coastal states to cooperate and give ‘due regard’ to others while 
practicing ‘due diligence’ with respect to the resources within the EEZ.
The High Stakes of the Maritime Zones
The geopolitical and ideological aspects of the newly formed EEZs have 
changed drastically since Deborah Cass’s writing, but the high stakes 
behind the allocation of jurisdictional zones in UNCLOS have not 
diminished. Indeed, with the ecological pressures on fishing now leading 
to recommendations to close the remaining areas outside of the EEZs 
10  Another might be a recently discovered intercultural appreciation for a hand-written family 




(the high seas) to extractive fishing as a precautionary measure,11 the stakes 
have risen even higher. Deborah Cass’s insights foreshadow the struggle 
for power and legitimacy that currently dominates the law of the sea, 
especially in the Pacific. Her reflections on the ability of foreign fishing 
nations to access the EEZs of coastal states in the Pacific combined 
technical analysis of state practice and custom as well as broader 
reflections on geopolitical and ideological implications. She went further 
than interpretation of the treaty text and delved into media interviews and 
ministerial statements, a method that provided excellent sources for her 
perspectives on contemporary ideas about ‘creeping jurisdiction’ and the 
global economic order. This part adopts a similar method to re-examine 
UNCLOS’s imposition of law amid changing patterns of sovereign power.
Curbing the Distant Water Fishing Nations
UNCLOS signalled a major change in fishing access, because the concept 
of the EEZ allowed smaller, less sophisticated states to deny access to their 
fishing zones to the larger and exploitative ‘distant water fishing nations’.12 
Those large maritime nations had been sailing the world for centuries to 
plunder living resources in faraway places. The two distant water fishing 
nations that possessed the largest fleets, the Soviet Union and Japan, sought 
a preservation of the status quo at UNCLOS III, with the granting of 
mere ‘preferential rights’ to the coastal states.13 Instead, the finalised EEZ 
regime was more closely aligned with the demands of Latin American 
and African states, who had been seeking greater control over coastal 
resources even before UNCLOS III, especially in the face of the growing 
11  U  Rashid Sumaila et al, ‘Fisheries Subsidies and Potential Catch Loss in SIDS Exclusive 
Economic Zones: Food Security Implications (2013) 18(4) Environmental and Development Economics 
427, doi.org/ 10.1017/s1355770x13000156; see also Cassandra M  Brooks et al, ‘Challenging the 
“Right to Fish” in a Fast-Changing Ocean’ (2014) 33 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 289.
12  Although this term dominates the secondary literature, UNCLOS refers instead to ‘States whose 
nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and 
identification of stocks’: arts 62, 69. Part V of UNCLOS also refers variously to ‘developed land-
locked States’, ‘geographically disadvantaged States’ and ‘developing States’. In negotiations, states 
had used various language, for example the Chinese representative referred to ‘[t]he super-Powers 
[that] had for years wantonly plundered the offshore resources of developing coastal States, thereby 
seriously damaging their interests’: Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 24th mtg, 
UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.24 (1 August 1974) [2]; Official Records of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume II (Summary Records of Meetings of the First, Second and Third 
Committees, Second Session) 187, <https://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/1973_los/vol2.shtml>, 
cited in South China Sea Award (n 4) para 251.
13  South China Sea Award (n 4) [248]–[254].
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technological capacity of the distant water fishing nations.14 It has been 
commented that ‘the evolution of the exclusive economic zone concept 
took place in the developing world’.15 By recognising sovereign rights 
of coastal states, UNCLOS shifted the resource base and opportunities of 
those coastal nations; now, 35 per cent of the oceans and 75–80 per cent 
of fish stock would be subject to EEZ jurisdiction.16
But Deborah Cass was not content to mark this as a simple shift in resource 
allocation. She argued that the ‘dramatic’ jurisdictional change ‘has brought 
with it the fear of a revolution of a more sweeping kind’.17 The emergence 
of the EEZ doctrine and its associated increase in economic autonomy 
was a sign for Deborah Cass of more fundamental transformations. The 
Pacific island state of Kiribati had just used its coastal jurisdiction to 
negotiate access rights for fishing nations to its EEZ: instead of allowing 
the US boats that had traditionally fished in the area to procure access 
for a fee, Kiribati sold the rights to the highest bidder, which happened 
to be the Soviets. Quoting a news report headed ‘Soviets Get New 
Pacific Toehold’, Deborah Cass argued that ‘fishing rights have suddenly 
become the battleground for global ideological conflict’.18 In references 
to Australian parliamentary debates and diplomatic correspondence, she 
showed that the link between fishing, economic changes and national 
security was being made in Australia and abroad. The Pacific states were 
seen by Australia’s Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs as 
‘inevitably open to exploitation or infiltration from outside’.19
Global Ideological Conflict
In tracing the shifts in fishing rights represented by UNCLOS’s EEZ 
regime to global ideological conflict during the last years of the Cold 
War, Deborah Cass demonstrated how international law is shaped by 
and generates power relations which, for some proponents, are used 
in ideological narratives. Her work was referenced in David Caron’s 
14  Ibid.
15  Satya Nandan, ‘The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Historic Perspective’ in Food and Agriculture 
Organization (ed), The Law and the Sea: Essays in Memory of Jean Carroz (Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 1987) <http://www.fao.org/docrep/s5280T/s5280t00.htm>.
16  MH Belsky, ‘Management of Large Marine Ecosystems: Developing a New Rule of Customary 
International Law’ (1985) 22 San Diego Law Review 733, 759, cited in Cass ‘The Quiet Revolution’ 
(n 5) 83.
17  Cass, ‘The Quiet Revolution’ (n 5) 83.
18  Ibid.
19  Ibid 101.
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examination of the US’s use of sanctions as an instrument of foreign 
policy, which considered historic denials of access for fishing privileges, 
including to the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and Poland in the early 
1980s, as well as a number of whaling nations.20
Similar issues were relevant to the negotiations of other parts of UNCLOS, 
particularly the negotiations over rights to the deep seabed, and the 
contestation over the concept of ‘common heritage of mankind’, which 
had been proposed by Maltese diplomat, Arvid Pardo, to the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1967, and which promised to ensure 
equitable sharing of projected seabed mining.21 By instituting a regime in 
which ‘the Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind’22 
(Part  XI), the Convention entrenched universal aspirations observed 
by Philip Allott to be ‘the new wine of communitarianism spilling over 
from the old bottle of legal formalism’.23 It was this allocation of rights 
within the deep seabed mining regime – and not UNCLOS’s provisions 
regarding highly migratory species, as Deborah Cass argued24 – that is 
said to have proved the most significant impediment to ratification of the 
UNCLOS by the US.25
Of course, given the trajectory of the Cold War, the framing of issues 
of access to fishing resources as a contestation between capitalism and 
communism did not last long. The Pacific islands built their bargaining 
power against distant water fishing nations within a number of regional 
cooperatives.26 Soon after the publication of Deborah Cass’s article, 
20  David D Caron, ‘International Sanctions, Ocean Management, and the Law of the Sea: A Study 
of Denial of Access to Fisheries’ (1989) 16 Ecology Law Quarterly 311.
21  Arvid Pardo, ‘Who Will Control the Seabed?’ (1968–1969) 47 Foreign Affairs 123; Arvid Pardo, 
‘Address to the American Society of International Law’ (1968) 62 ASIL Proceedings 216; Arvid Pardo, 
‘Sovereignty under the Sea’ (1968) 58 Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 341; see generally 
Surabhi Ranganathan, ‘Global Commons’ (2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 693.
22  UNCLOS (n 6) art 136.
23  Philip Allott, ‘Mare Nostrum: A New International Law of the Sea’ (1992) 86 American Journal 
of International Law 764, 785, doi.org/10.1017/s0002930000010927.
24  Cass, ‘The Quiet Revolution’ (n 5) 94.
25  John R Stevenson and Bernard H Oxman, ‘The Future of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea’ (1994) 88 American Journal of International Law 477, 477, doi.org/10.2307/2203716.
26  The Forum Fisheries Agency was first established in 1979: South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency 
Convention, opened for signature on 10 July 1979, 1579 UNTS 315 (entered into force 9 August 1979). 
Eight of the members of this Forum with adjoining exclusive economic zones formed a subregional group 
known as Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) in 1982: Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in 
the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest, opened for signature 11 February 1982 (entered into 
force 4  December 1982) <http://www.pnatuna.com/sites/default/files/Nauru%20Agreement_0.pdf>. 
The members of the PNA are the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu.
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US fishing boats returned to the region.27 The controversial issue of highly 
migratory species in the western and central Pacific Ocean was directly 
addressed by the establishment of a new commission.28 The imperative 
of coastal states and other states to cooperate within this commission 
was given impetus by the 1994 Fish Stocks Agreement, which the US was 
one of the first countries to ratify.29 Pacific states have sought a range 
of enforcement measures to assist in policing their areas and ensuring 
they receive a commercial return from the foreign states to which they 
have permitted access.30 Some have even closed their fishing zones due 
to environmental concerns,31 amid a more general awareness that agreed 
access rights to EEZs can be exploitative and unsustainable.32
These developments were not relevant solely to the law of the sea. Other 
treaty regimes recorded agreements and fostered expectations, some of 
which diverged from UNCLOS  III. For many developing countries, 
a legal interest in access to fishing zones was overshadowed by a legal 
interest in access to fishing markets: developing countries challenged 
the legal compatibility of attempts by developed countries to restrict 
27  Cass, ‘The Quiet Revolution’ (n 5) 102.
28  Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Central 
and Western Pacific Ocean, opened for signature 5 September 2000, 2275 UNTS 43 (entered into 
force 19  June 2004), <https://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc>, establishing the Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Current members of the Commission are Australia, China, Canada, 
Cook Islands, European Union, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, Indonesia, Japan, 
Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of 
America and Vanuatu.
29  United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 December 1995, 2167 UNTS 
88 (entered into force 11 December 2001) (‘Fish Stocks Agreement’). The US was the third state to 
ratify the Fish Stocks Agreement (on 24 August 1996). See further Tore Henriksen and Alf Håkon 
Hoel, ‘Determining Allocation: From Paper to Practice in the Distribution of Fishing Rights Between 
Countries Determining Allocation’ (2011) 42 Ocean Development & International Law 66, doi.org/ 
10.1080/00908320.2011.542106.
30  See generally Camille Goodman, ‘The Cooperative Use of Coastal State Jurisdiction with Respect 
to Highly Migratory Stocks: Insights from the Western and Central Pacific Region’ in Lawrence 
Martin, Constantinos Salonidis and Christina Hioureas (eds), Natural Resources and the Law of the 
Sea: Exploration, Allocation, Exploitation of Natural Resources in Areas under National Jurisdiction and 
Beyond (JurisNet, 2017) 215.
31  For a list of closed areas within the jurisdiction of countries of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries 
Agency, see ‘PIP Closed Areas’, Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) (Web Page, 23 November 
2016) <https://www.ffa.int/us_mtreaty_closed_areas>.
32  For one example on access agreements with the EU leading to adverse effects on the sustainability 
of Senegal’s coastal fisheries, see Emma Witbooi, ‘The Infusion of Sustainability into Bilateral Fisheries 




access to their markets on environmental grounds.33 Part XI on the deep 
seabed regime was renegotiated; the resulting new agreement of 199434 
was said to represent a ‘mutilated’ regime.35 Overcapacity of the entire 
fishing fleet was increasingly recognised as a problem for conservation 
and management. Alongside the subsidy programs of distant water 
fishing nations, who had built up their fleets in order to enhance their 
competitive advantages, coastal states began to allocate more resources 
to their fishing industries in order to better exploit their expanded EEZ 
rights.36 Subsidies of states to their fishing fleets became a focus for reform 
at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.37 Members agreed to 
seek to clarify disciplines on fisheries subsidies for both economic and 
ecological objectives.38 Meanwhile, for many developing countries the 
economic gains of an increased EEZ have been gouged by rampant illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.39 As well as threatening 
revenues of coastal states – estimated at over US$600 million annually for 
the Pacific island states alone40 – IUU fishing has caused social dislocation 
and environmental degradation.41 The allocation of resources to enhance 
capacity, which is planned by the state, driven by private capital or sourced 
from a combination of both, shows that jurisdictional zones under the 
law of the sea are not the only influence on practices of exploitation and 
overexploitation.
33  See also Margaret A  Young, Trading Fish, Saving Fish: The Interaction between Regimes in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2011), doi.org/10.1017/s2047102512000167.
34  Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention of 10 December 1982, 48th 
sess, Agenda Item 36, UN Doc A/RES/48/263 (entered into force 28 July 1966).
35  As Ranganathan has shown, the strong language came from RP Anand, an earlier contributor to 
Third World approaches to international law in his Studies in International Law and History: An Asian 
Perspective (Springer, 2004) 188, cited in Ranganathan (n 21) 712.
36  J Samuel Barkin and Elizabeth R DeSombre, Saving Global Fisheries: Reducing Fishing Capacity 
to Promote Sustainability (MIT Press, 2013) 106–7, doi.org/10.1162/glep_r_00233.
37  See Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (14 November 2001) para 
28.
38  Margaret A  Young, ‘Fragmentation or Interaction: The WTO, Fisheries Subsidies, and 
International Law’ (2009) 8 World Trade Review 477, doi.org/10.1017/s1474745609990140. 
For the latest draft working text for a new agreement, see WTO Doc TN/RL/W274R5 (Working 
Documents, 26 July 2018).
39  For estimates of global losses, see David J Agnew et al, ‘Estimating the Worldwide Extent of 
Illegal Fishing’ (2009) 4(2) PLoS ONE e4570, doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0004570.
40  The estimated annual value of IUU fish harvested or transhipped in the region is around 
US$616.11 million: Duncan Souter et al, Towards the Quantification of Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated (IUU) Fishing in the Pacific Islands Region (Report, MRAG Asia Pacific, February 2016) i.
41  The growth in illegal fishing is even thought to have spurred the European migration crisis: ‘Illicit 
Migration to Europe: Consequences of Illegal Fishing and Overfishing in West Africa’, The Global 




Emerging Powers and the South China Sea
Deborah Cass revealed much about how international law was seen to be 
facilitating political intrigue and legal wrangling. This has become most 
apparent since, in the context of the dispute over the South China Sea 
brought by the Philippines against China. The EEZ concept had itself 
spurred already existing expansionist tendencies within the South China 
Sea, the region comprising the western Pacific Ocean spanning an area of 
almost 3.5 million square kilometres to the south of China, to the west 
of the Philippines, to the east of Vietnam and to the north of Malaysia, 
Brunei, Singapore and Indonesia.42 At the end of the Cold War, these 
countries (as well as Taiwan) sought title to sovereignty over the islands in 
order to take advantage of the 200-nautical-mile zone and its security and 
economic benefits. Christopher Joyner wrote:
Were all claimants to declare exclusive economic zones or 
continental shelf delimitations seaward from points fixed by 
islands over which they now assert sovereignty, nearly the entire 
ocean and sea-bed in the South China Sea would be subjected 
to various degrees of national jurisdiction. An ocean region 
legally comprised of high seas and international sea-bed would be 
rendered into a semi-enclosed sea.43
The hope of Joyner was that China would agree to dispute settlement 
and that the claimant states would find solutions based on regional 
cooperation and joint resource development.
When Philippines sought arbitration against China pursuant to Part XV 
of UNCLOS in 2013, China neither accepted nor participated in the 
proceedings. The tribunal found that it had jurisdiction in 2015.44 China 
consistently rejected the Philippines’ recourse to arbitration,45 which 
42  South China Sea Award (n 4) [3].
43  Christopher C Joyner, ‘The Spratly Islands Dispute: Rethinking the Interplay of Law, Diplomacy, 
and Geo-politics in the South China Sea’ (1998) 13 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
193, 199, doi.org/10.1163/15718089820491980, footnotes omitted.
44  In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under 
Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Philippines v China) (Award 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 2013-19, 29 October 
2015) (‘Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility’).
45  South China Sea Award (n 4) [11].
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was conducted at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague.46 
The  tribunal gave its substantive findings in the absence of Chinese 
counsel or submissions, although it sought to ascertain China’s position 
via public statements and it noted that its responsibility was to satisfy 
itself ‘not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the 
claim is well founded in fact and law’.47
While the case most notoriously centred on disputes between the Philippines 
and China regarding the legal basis of maritime rights and entitlements in 
the South China Sea (and especially the status of certain geographic features 
artificially constructed by China), it also related to the lawfulness of certain 
actions taken by China within a part of the South China Sea that constituted 
the Philippines’ EEZ. As such, the tribunal made a number of findings 
relating to the interpretation of UNCLOS and art 56. The tribunal’s reasons 
are discussed in the following section but for the purposes of the present 
part it is sufficient to note that the rise in economic might of one maritime 
nation did not prevent the tribunal from ruling in favour of  the coastal 
state: the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its EEZ were upheld.
In addition to engaging in emerging sovereign claims, Deborah Cass may 
be said to have foretold current narratives of a clandestine takeover of 
sovereign control through access and investment arrangements, especially 
in the South Pacific. Almost three decades after her article documented 
reports of the Soviets getting a ‘new Pacific toehold’, a news report was 
headed ‘Kiribati Deal Shocks Fishing World’!48 The narrative was familiar, 
but the proponents had changed: Kiribati had decided against granting 
fishing rights to US boats and instead granted rights to a higher bidder: 
this time, China and Taiwan. An industry leader was quoted as saying, 
‘[w]ith this China is now taking over the South Pacific and there will be 
no sustainability: this will rip the guts out of the American tuna fleet’.49
46  The Tribunal found that there was a dispute within the terms of UNCLOS art 288, and that 
resolution of the dispute would not require an implicit determination of sovereignty (which would have 
been outside of the jurisdiction of UNCLOS). The Tribunal noted it was ‘fully conscious of the limits 
on the Claims submitted to it and, to the extent that it reaches the merits of any of the Philippines’ 
Submissions, intends to ensure that its decision neither advances nor detracts from either Party’s claims 
to land sovereignty in the South China Sea’: Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (n 44) [153].
47  South China Sea Award (n 4) [12]. In addition to the Philippines legal team, observers to the 
proceedings included Australia, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, the Kingdom 
of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: see para 15.





The sentiments have similarities with a commonly heard narrative of 
an Asian takeover of Australian assets. When a proposed investment by 
China and Chinese investors into Australia’s energy infrastructure was 
blocked by the Australian treasurer in 2016, the reason given was national 
security.50 The law of the sea emerged as a key concern. Alongside cyber 
hacking, some commentators linked the Australian decision to Chinese 
military actions in the South China Sea.51 Australia’s alliance with the US 
was a dominant theme, especially in the context of the US’s support for 
the Philippines’ initiation of the arbitration leading to the South China 
Sea Award.
In summary, Deborah Cass’s keen observations of changing sovereign 
power structures could be replicated today, notwithstanding the rotating 
roles of some of the main protagonists. The US and China are asserting 
their global status (and differences) via oceans policy, focusing on military, 
strategic and fishing concerns. While regional disputes over the South 
China Sea existed well before UNCLOS III, the recent practices of China 
in asserting its rights and power – including through land reclamations 
– have been documented by the arbitral tribunal constituted under 
UNCLOS Annex  VII. Meanwhile, Australia’s aid to the South Pacific 
faces competition from China, the US, Europe and Japan – and much 
of the aid from these latter countries is linked expressly or impliedly 
with fisheries. The retreat of Soviet fleets in the Pacific is now over, with 
a newly empowered Russia seeking influence in fisheries and security.52 
Even among drastic geopolitical change since the publication of Deborah 
Cass’s article in 1987, her insight of a quiet revolution over fishing rights 
(for her, in a bipolar Cold War environment) continues to apply in the 
multipolar expansions that are undergirded by global capitalism.
50  See former Australian treasurer Scott Morrison, ‘[The foreign investment review process] has not 
enabled us to identify suitable mitigations to protect against the national security issues in this case’: 
Paul Karp, ‘Scott Morrison Blocks Ausgrid Sale on National Security Grounds’, The Guardian (online, 
11  August 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/aug/11/scott-morrison-blocks-
ausgrid-sale-on-national-security-grounds>.
51  See Peter Jennings of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute cited in: ‘China Ramps Up Pressure 
over Blocked Ausgrid Bid’, SBS News (online, 18  August 2016) <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/
article/2016/08/18/china-ramps-pressure-over-blocked-ausgrid-bid>.
52  Olga Krasnyak, ‘Russia Vying for Power in the South Pacific’, The Vanuatu Independent (online, 




Article 56 and the Discretion 
of Coastal States
One of the preoccupations of Deborah Cass’s analysis was the relative 
power and discretion of the coastal states granted by the new EEZ 
provisions in Part V of UNCLOS. The legal provisions achieved a shift 
in economic and geopolitical interests by allocating sovereign rights and 
duties and setting out specific grounds for cooperation and the granting 
of access. At the time of Deborah Cass’s article, important questions were 
unanswered about the common intentions of the parties and the wording 
they adopted. Her arguments relating to these provisions have proved 
remarkably accurate, as this part demonstrates.
Interpreting Art 56
The legal provision at the heart of the newly entrenched EEZ regime is 
art  56 of UNCLOS, which sets out the rights, jurisdiction and duties 
of the coastal state in the EEZ. It provides:
Article 56
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its 
subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such 
as the production of energy from the water, currents 
and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of 
this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
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2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this 
Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State 
shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States 
and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of 
this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed 
and subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI.
The rights and duties of other states in the EEZ are set out in art 58; 
these are limited to freedoms of navigation and overflight and the laying 
of submarine cables and pipelines, ‘and other internationally lawful uses 
of the sea related to those freedoms, such as those associated with the 
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables’. In art  62, the states 
‘whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone’ are mentioned in 
the context of coastal states that lack the capacity to harvest the entire 
allowable catch within their EEZ. States aside from the coastal states may 
vie for access so as to fish for the surplus. In granting access, the coastal 
states are expected to take into account ‘the need to minimize economic 
dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone 
or which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of 
stocks’, in addition to the needs of developing countries, the overarching 
need to conserve living resources and other factors.53
The question that was occupying many commentators at the conclusion 
of UNCLOS III was whether this allocation of sovereign rights would lead 
coastal states to exclude all foreign fishing. The question of access to fishing 
zones had implications economically, politically and ideologically, as set 
out in the first part of this chapter. Daniel O’Connell, for example, was 
concerned that by granting sovereign rights to coastal states, UNCLOS 
marks the ‘triumph of individualism over collectivism’.54 Lawrence Juda 
was warning of the ‘creeping jurisdiction’ of the EEZ,55 an issue that 
continues to be a ‘siren song’.56
53  UNCLOS (n 6) arts 61–62.
54  Daniel P O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea, ed IA Shearer (Oxford University Press, 
1982) vol 1, 552, cited in Cass, ‘The Quiet Revolution’ (n 5) 96.
55  Lawrence Juda, ‘The Exclusive Economic Zone: Compatibility of National Claims and the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1986) 16 Ocean Development and International Law 44, doi.org/ 
10.1080/00908328609545784, cited in Cass, ‘The Quiet Revolution’ (n 5) 84.
56  See, eg, Bernard Oxman, ‘The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea’ (2006) 100 American 
Journal of International Law 830.
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Deborah Cass was rightly preoccupied by ambiguities in the text. 
She stated:
It is not at all clear what ‘due regard’ means in this context. Does 
it mean that the coastal state must take into account the interests 
of other states or is it just a mechanism to encourage discussion 
between the parties in the event of a conflict?57
She concluded, ‘[i]t is likely to be the latter, given the wide-ranging scope 
of coastal state authority defined by article 56’.58
This conclusion is the position reached by the recent arbitral tribunal in the 
South China Sea dispute. China had asserted jurisdiction over maritime 
areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the so-called ‘nine-dash 
line’, due in part to ‘historic rights’. The Philippines submitted that these 
claims were contrary to UNCLOS and without lawful effect (the case 
did not extend to sovereignty claims, which would have been outside of 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal). The tribunal accepted the Philippines’ 
arguments, concluding that UNCLOS superseded any historic rights 
or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed 
therein.59 The tribunal reasoned:60
As a matter of the text alone, the Tribunal considers that the 
Convention is clear in according sovereign rights to the living 
and non-living resources of the exclusive economic zone to the 
coastal State alone. The notion of sovereign rights over living and 
non-living resources is generally incompatible with another State 
having historic rights to the same resources, in particular if such 
historic rights are considered exclusive, as China’s claim to historic 
rights appears to be. Furthermore, the Tribunal considers that, as 
a matter of ordinary interpretation, the (a) express inclusion of 
an article setting out the rights of other States and (b) attention 
given to the rights of other States in the allocation of any excess 
catch preclude the possibility that the Convention intended for 
other States to have rights in the exclusive economic zone in excess 
of those specified.
57  Cass, ‘The Quiet Revolution’ (n 5) 88.
58  Ibid.
59  South China Sea Award (n 4) [278].
60  Ibid [243].
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The tribunal further found that China had breached art 56 with respect to 
the Philippines’ sovereign rights by promulgating a moratorium on fishing 
in the South China Sea (which it had done in 2012 without exception for 
the Philippines’ EEZ and without limiting the moratorium to Chinese 
flagged vessels).61 China was found to have breached art  58 by failing 
to prevent its nationals from unlawfully fishing in the EEZ.62 China 
was also found to have violated other UNCLOS provisions, including 
inter alia those related to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, and requirements to ‘protect and preserve rare or fragile 
ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered 
species and other forms of marine life’.63
The decision in the South China Sea Award came after an ITLOS decision 
which upheld certain contingent rights of coastal states in assuming 
regulatory competence over bunkering activities of foreign vessels 
operating near their EEZ.64 The decision, which related to the arrest by 
a coastal state of a vessel that was providing fuel for fishing vessels within 
the EEZ, included the following statement, in a passage that is consistent 
with Deborah Cass’s reading of art 56:
The term ‘sovereign rights’ in the view of the Tribunal encompasses 
all rights necessary for and connected with the exploration, 
exploitation, conservation and management of the natural 
resources, including the right to take the necessary enforcement 
measures.65
Institutional Aspects
Aside from interpreting the treaty text, there are other reasons for Deborah 
Cass’s conclusion of a wholesale power of coastal states in deciding on 
questions of access to their EEZs. At least part of her argument seems 
to be based on a nuanced appreciation of the institutional aspects of the 
law of the sea regime. Decisions on coastal state access are not part of 
the compulsory dispute settlement system that is otherwise a hallmark 
61  Ibid [716].
62  Ibid [757].
63  Ibid [992].
64  M/V ‘Virginia G’ (Panama/Guinea-Bissau) (Judgment) (2014) ITLOS Rep 4.
65  Ibid, para 211.
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of UNCLOS and its far-reaching Part  XV.66 The discretion of states 
to decide whether or not to give access to other states to their surplus 
fisheries is not open to conflict resolution, and Deborah Cass argues that 
this increases the likelihood that coastal states will have total discretion in 
access matters. I see this insight to be a precursor to her analysis, almost 
two decades later, of the way in which the compulsory dispute settlement 
system of the World Trade Organization has affected the substance of 
trade norms. Even in this early piece she recognises that international laws 
are shaped by their institutional context: here, in the EEZ regime, the lack 
of an enforceable provision means that the power is left to the discretion-
holding state; there, the compulsory dispute settlement of the WTO 
means that discretionary trade liberalisation rules have been interpreted to 
contain procedural and substantive obligations that are not written in the 
text. The special place occupied by the WTO Appellate Body, due partly 
to the ex ante consent to its jurisdiction by WTO members, means it was 
the perfect candidate for Deborah Cass’s masterful treatment in her book, 
The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization, which features 
in another chapter in this collection.67
Deborah Cass’s arguments contrast heavily with the reception that 
UNCLOS received from other quarters: for Philip Allott, for example, 
the revolution of UNCLOS was of quite a different kind. Allott celebrates 
the diminishing concepts of territorial exclusivity within the Convention, 
demonstrated primarily but not solely in the entrenchment of the ideal 
of ‘common heritage of mankind’ in Part XI.68 He compares changes in 
notions of exclusive political control over land territory (especially given 
international society’s direct interest in all that happens within state 
systems, manifested, for example, by human rights law) and predicts that 
‘[p]reconceptions of exclusive political control over naturally communal 
sea areas must tend to become anomalous to the same extent’.69 He also 
celebrates the requirement that disputes over access to EEZs should be 
resolved
66  UNCLOS (n 6) art 297(3). On limits to the compulsory dispute settlement system of UNCLOS, 
see generally Natalie Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).
67  Kerry Rittich, ‘Deborah Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: A Reading 
in Time’, this volume.
68  Allott, ‘Mare Nostrum’ (n 23) 785.
69  Ibid 768.
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on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of 
the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international 
community as a whole.70
For Allott, this clause was intended to construct a social process where 
contracting parties would be required to achieve, ‘in their future interactive 
social behaviour, equal treatment, equitable sharing, regard for legitimate 
interests … effective protection for the marine environment’, and so on.71 
Allott writes:
[E]very sea area, whatever its conceptual articulation in terms 
of property relations, is conceived in [UNCLOS] as being, not 
incidentally but inherently, an area of power and interest shared by 
two or more state systems. The exercise of the supposed property 
right is, in all cases, actually a process of decision making within 
procedural and substantive constraints.72
Deborah Cass is right that the lack of compulsory dispute settlement 
might eviscerate the processes that Allott saw so idealistically, and yet after 
30 years we have seen legal issues of the EEZ regime litigated by a number 
of parties at different tribunals, including via advisory opinions. While 
these have confirmed that coastal states have sole discretion on questions 
of access – as exemplified by the South China Sea arbitral award – they 
have also provided a stronger sense of the obligations to ‘give due regard 
to the needs of other states’. International law contains procedural duties 
of states to be ‘other-regarding’ in their decisions, as I argue below. Recent 
cases have also shown that the holders of discretion under the EEZ regime 
are not always the weaker party in traditional power relations, and that 
the risk of overexploitation of resources within the EEZ by the holders 
of sovereign rights – the coastal states – should not go unchecked.
70  UNCLOS (n 6) art 59.
71  Allott, ‘Mare Nostrum’ (n 23) 785.
72  Ibid 785.
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‘Due Regard’, ‘Due Diligence’, and the 
‘Duty to Cooperate’
Experience, new law, state practice and changing ideas in international law 
have led to a richer sense of rights and duties, in the context of fisheries and 
beyond. Although there has not been a direct challenge to the allocation 
of access according to the EEZ regime (in accordance with Deborah Cass’s 
expectations), there have been a number of disputes that have applied 
UNCLOS art  56 directly or indirectly. Moreover, decisions from the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), ITLOS and other tribunals serve to 
demonstrate the duties of coastal states, while new laws for straddling fish 
stocks73 and lawmaking for areas beyond national jurisdiction74 impose 
broader duties on all states. This part examines the jurisprudence and 
situates it within broader normative developments in international law.
The Duties of Coastal States
A challenge to the designation by a coastal state of a marine protected 
area (MPA) provides new perspectives on Deborah Cass’s thesis on 
unfettered coastal state discretions. In 2010, the UK, as part of its asserted 
sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory, established an MPA 
within the EEZ of the Chagos Archipelago. Mauritius, the long-suffering 
former colony and neighbour, had relied on access to the relevant EEZ for 
fishing and economic interests, and challenged the UK using the dispute 
settlement provisions of UNCLOS. An arbitral tribunal constituted under 
Annex VII of UNCLOS handed down its decision in 2015.75 Its claim was 
in part a claim about the substance of art 56: whether the UK should have 
had ‘due regard’ to the interests of Mauritius in deciding on the MPA.
73  See especially Fish Stocks Agreement (n 29) and accompanying text; see also Rosemary Rayfuse, 
‘The United Nations Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks as an Objective 
Regime: A Case of Wishful Thinking?’ (1999) 20 Australian Year Book of International Law 253.
74  Margaret A Young and Andrew Friedman, ‘Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction: Regimes 
and Their Interaction’ (2018) 112 AJIL Unbound 123, doi.org/10.1017/aju.2018.47.
75  Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom) (Award) (Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, Case No  2011-03,18 March 2015) (‘Chagos’), see further: <https://pca-cpa.org/en/
cases/11>. The members of the Tribunal were Ivan Shearer, Christopher Greenwood, Albert Hoffmann, 
James Kateka and Rüdiger Wolfrum.
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The UK sought to give a restrictive meaning to its obligations, 
submitting that ‘the meaning of “due regard” in art 56 does not mean to 
give effect to the rights of other States’.76 The UK also stated that its public 
consultations with Mauritius had satisfied the relevant obligations.
The tribunal declined to find ‘any universal rule of conduct’ in the 
obligation to give ‘due regard’, but drawing on the ordinary meaning 
of the terms found that the obligation required the UK to have ‘such 
regard for the rights of Mauritius as is called for by the circumstances and 
by the nature of those rights’.77 The degree of ‘due regard’ was high given 
the significant effect that the establishment of the MPA would have on 
Mauritius’s rights.78 After reviewing the UK’s efforts at consultation, the 
tribunal found that it did not have sufficient ‘due regard’,79 and concluded 
that the proclamation of the MPA was incompatible with UNCLOS.80
The joint dissenting and concurring opinion of Judges Wolfrum and 
Kateka give additional content to the standard required of ‘due regard’. 
The judges expressed doubts that the UK had not acted under an 
ulterior motive in establishing the MPA, and found that it violated the 
standard of good faith.81 Citing the Nuclear Tests Case,82 they emphasised 
that ‘[t]rust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation’.83 
The implications of the case are wide-ranging, both for the question of 
marine environmental protection,84 and for the ongoing quest by Mauritius 
to set right historic failures of the UK during the decolonisation process, 
which was considered by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion in 2019.85
76  Chagos (n 75) [458].
77  Ibid [519].
78  Ibid [521].
79  Ibid [524].
80  Ibid [536].
81  Chagos (n 75) [90] (Judges Wolfrum and Kateka).
82  Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 253, 269 [46].
83  Chagos (n 75) [90] (Judges Wolfrum and Kateka).
84  David Ong, ‘Implications of the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitral Tribunal Award for the 
Balance Between Natural Environmental Protection and Traditional Maritime Freedoms’ in Stephen 
Allen and Chris Monaghan (eds), Fifty Years of the British Indian Ocean Territory: Legal Perspectives 
(Sprinter, 2018) 263, doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78541-7_11.
85  Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 (Advisory 
Opinion) [2019] ICJ Rep 95. This opinion was delivered after the completion of the writing of the 
present chapter and is not considered further here.
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The content of coastal states’ duties was given separate consideration 
by ITLOS in one of its first advisory opinions.86 The request for an 
advisory opinion was brought by Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone, acting as the ‘Subregional 
Fisheries Commission’, to determine the context of legal responsibilities 
to take necessary measures to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. 
The  tribunal reviewed the emphasis given in UNCLOS to the coastal 
states’ management of natural resources (art  56(1)) and their role in 
determining the allowable catch (art 61), allocating any surplus (art 62) 
and enforcing domestic laws to meet their obligations. In the light of 
these ‘special rights and responsibilities given to the coastal states’, the 
primary duty to take measures with respect to IUU fishing was found to 
rest with coastal states.87
These primary responsibilities did not release other states from obligations, 
however.88 Flag states, or those that license or register the vessels fishing in 
the relevant zones, had to have duties ‘to take the necessary measures to 
ensure that their nationals and vessels flying their flag are not engaged 
in IUU fishing activities’.89 The tribunal noted:
[T]he obligation of a flag State  …  to ensure that vessels flying 
its flag are not involved in IUU fishing is also an obligation ‘of 
conduct’ … as an obligation ‘of conduct’ this is a ‘due diligence 
obligation’, not an obligation ‘of result’ … The flag State is under 
the ‘due diligence obligation’ to take all necessary measures to 
ensure compliance and to prevent IUU fishing by fishing vessels 
flying its flag.90
These comments were cited with approval in the South China Sea Award,91 
and were used to ground that tribunal’s conclusions that China had failed 
to exercise due diligence in preventing fishing by Chinese flagged vessels 
86  Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) 
(Advisory Opinion) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No  21, 2  April 2015) 
(‘SRFC request’), archived at <http://perma.cc/KY5V-EMXP>.
87  Ibid [106].
88  Ibid [108].
89  Ibid [124]. The tribunal noted that its findings were restricted to flag states that were not 
members of the relevant cooperative convention: [89].
90  Ibid [129]. For further exposition of the due diligence concept, see Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Argentina v Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep 425 [187] (‘Pulp Mills’); Responsibilities and Obligations of States 
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) (International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 17, 1 February 2011) 10 (‘Responsibilities and Obligations 
of States’).
91  South China Sea Award (n 4) [744].
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in various locations in the South China Sea, and thus failed to exhibit 
due regard for the Philippines’ sovereign rights with respect to fisheries in 
its EEZ. Accordingly, China was found to have breached its obligations 
under art 58(3) of the Convention.92
The tribunal in South China Sea also quoted the oft-cited passage from 
Mox Plant that ‘the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the 
prevention of pollution of the marine environment under Part XII of 
the Convention and general international law’.93 This was important for its 
finding that China had, through its toleration and protection of, and failure 
to prevent, Chinese fishing vessels engaging in harmful harvesting activities 
of endangered species, breached arts 192 and 194(5) of the Convention.94
A ‘duty to cooperate’ was also important for the reasoning of the ICJ 
in Whaling in the Antarctic, when Japan was found to have breached its 
obligations under the Whaling Convention.95 As is well known, the Court 
agreed with Australia that Japan failed to meet the appropriate standard of 
conduct required of parties to the Whaling Convention when undertaking 
scientific research into whaling. A key deficiency in Japan’s conduct was 
its failure to give due regard to decisions of the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC).
The Court’s articulation of a duty of states to cooperate with the IWC can 
be traced to the terms of the Whaling Convention96 itself, and the reporting 
and monitoring functions of the IWC. Judge ad hoc Charlesworth also 
observed that the concept of a duty of cooperation ‘is the foundation 
of legal regimes dealing (inter alia) with shared resources and with the 
environment’.97 As I have argued elsewhere,98 the ICJ judgment is heavy 
with consequences for the future conduct of states, and for the ability 
of tribunals to allow for evolution of the law in applying treaties. While 
the Court refused to take an overt ‘evolutionary’ interpretation of the 
Whaling Convention, it established a duty to give reasons when states 
92  Ibid [757].
93  MOX Plant (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures) (2001) ITLOS Rep 89, para 82.
94  South China Sea Award (n 4) [992].
95  Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand Intervening) (Judgment) (International 
Court of Justice, General List No 148, 31 March 2014) (‘Whaling in the Antarctic’).
96  International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, opened for signature 2 December 1946, 
161 UNTS 74 (entered into force 10 November 1948) art VIII.
97  Whaling in the Antarctic (n 95) [13] (Judge Charlesworth).
98  See generally Margaret A Young and Sebastián Rioseco Sullivan, ‘Evolution Through the Duty to 
Cooperate: Implications of the Whaling Case at the International Court of Justice’ (2015) 16 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 310.
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divert from established practices, even if those practices are not binding.99 
A reviewable obligation of states parties to ‘give due regard’ is likely to 
lead to a more responsive and adaptive system of law, and a different 
conception of sovereignty and responsibility.100
‘Due Regard’ in Public International Law and the 
Needs of Conservation
Quite aside from these recent cases, one could argue that the seeds for 
a fuller conception of an obligation to give ‘due regard’ were sown much 
earlier, predating UNCLOS III and the precise wording of art 56. In the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case of 1974 (between Iceland and Germany), 
the ICJ held that:
It is one of the advances in maritime international law, resulting 
from the intensification of fishing, that the former laissez-faire 
treatment of the living resources of the sea in the high seas has been 
replaced by a recognition of a duty to have due regard to the rights 
of other States and the needs of conservation for the benefit of all.101
In addition to this jurisprudence, we see an embrace of concepts such 
as duties of cooperation across a vast range of scholarship. Indeed, we 
are now familiar with the preoccupation of reason-giving and procedural 
obligations that scholars of global administrative law such as Benedict 
Kingsbury, Richard Stewart and Nico Krisch would advance.102 There are 
at least some similarities with the work of Elinor Ostrom, who found 
that the tragedy of the commons could be averted by cooperative systems 
rather than enclosure.103 Localised, cooperative accounts of monitoring 
99  Ibid 318. Even though Japan had voted against key resolutions of the IWC, it was required to 
‘give due regard’ to those resolutions, including in providing adequate justification for its scientific 
methodologies and practices.
100  Ibid.
101  Fisheries Jurisdiction (Germany v Iceland) (Judgment) [1973] ICJ Rep 49 [64]. Rather than dwell 
on this case, Deborah Cass prefers to rely on the earlier Fisheries Jurisdiction case between Iceland 
and the UK, which was important in recognising the concept of coastal states possessing ‘preferential 
rights’ in the fishing zones adjacent to their coasts; ‘Application Instituting Proceedings’, Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) [1972] ICJ Pleadings 1. She may have passed over the Court’s 
comments here due to their focus on the high seas.
102  Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B  Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15.
103  Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990), doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90400-9_93. See further Margaret 




and peer review also feature in the New Governance literature of 
Joanne Scott, among others.104 Reporting and review mechanisms have 
become established in new multilateral agreements, including the Paris 
Agreement, as well as human rights regimes. To return to fisheries, the 
poor conservation and management record of coastal states has led to 
direct calls for the institution of these types of mechanisms.105
Some would go even further; writing in 2013, Eyal Benvenisti provides 
a Rawlsian account of states as trustees of humanity.106 Benvenisti argues 
that international law contains obligations for states to ‘take other-regarding 
considerations seriously into account in formulating and implementing 
policies, even absent specific treaty obligations’.107 Benvenisti argues:
The sovereign as trustee must ensure meaningful opportunities to 
have the voices of affected stakeholders – both foreign governments 
and individuals – heard and considered, and must offer them 
reasons for its policy choices.108
These normative arguments have parallels, once again, in the fisheries 
context. The public trust doctrine has been argued as the appropriate legal 
concept to apply to the EEZ.109 Moreover, the duty to cooperate has been 
emphasised to apply to the fishing states who participate within regional 
fisheries management organisations as well as to new entrants seeking 
access to fishing areas,110 with distributional and ecological consequences 
that have not yet been satisfactorily resolved in fisheries.
104  Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and US (Hart 
Publishing, 2006).
105  Richard Barnes, ‘The Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Effective Framework for Domestic 
Fisheries Conservation’ in David Freestone, Richard Barnes and David M Ong (eds), The Law 
of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford University Press, 2006) 233, 259–60, doi.org/10.1093/
acprof:oso/9780199299614.003.0013.
106  Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to 
Foreign Stakeholders’ (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 295, 318, doi.org/10.5305/
amerjintelaw.107.2.0295.
107  Ibid 300.
108  Ibid 318.
109  Mary Turnipseed et al, ‘The Silver Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone: 
Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine’ 
(2009) 36 Ecology Law Quarterly 1.
110  Andrew Serdy, ‘Pacta Tertiis and Regional Fisheries Management Mechanisms: The IUU Fishing 
Concept as an Illegitimate Short-Cut to a Legitimate Goal’ (2018) 48 Ocean Development and 
International Law 345, doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2017.1349525.
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Deborah Cass was more reticent about the content of states’ duties to have 
regard to others in international law. While she recognised conservation 
imperatives, she also noted that many of the smaller developing states 
would not have capacity to determine issues such as the effect of their 
actions on ecosystems.111 She considered the obligation of coastal states 
to take into account the effects of fishing on associated and dependent 
species to be ‘probably not enforceable’.112 The final section of this chapter 
seeks to account for the scepticism she exhibited in the context of fisheries 
access, and demonstrates that the issues continue to be important for the 
future of the law of the sea.
Inbuilt Restrictions on Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources
Deborah Cass’s argument that coastal states have total discretion 
in deciding upon access to their fishing zones might be said to be 
underpinned by a regard for the developing states whose interests were 
so central to the advancement of the EEZ concept.113 She was advocating 
for justice and an equitable allocation that would enable those weaker 
states to finally have some control over their economic future under 
globalisation. Deborah Cass’s work at the time as research assistant to 
the Commission of Inquiry into the Rehabilitation of Nauru might 
have contributed to this perspective.114 Indeed, it is difficult not to have 
sympathy for the argument, especially when historically many of those 
states had ensured sustainable fishing within their region, as opposed to 
the rapacious attitudes of the distant water fishing nations. Yet Deborah 
Cass perhaps was too accommodating in her belief that the sovereign 
equality of states could serve to equalise an international legal order that, 
after years of war and colonialism, had given rise to this very system of 
developing countries. Third World approaches to international law would 
111  Cass, ‘The Quiet Revolution’ (n 5) 92, writing in the context of the coastal state’s determination 
of the maximum sustainable yield and its need to take into account associated and dependent species, 
see UNCLOS (n 6) art 61.
112  Cass, ‘The Quiet Revolution’ (n 5) 92.
113  See Nandan, ‘The Exclusive Economic Zone’ (n 15).
114  See Anthony Anghie in this volume: Tony Anghie, ‘Self-Determination and Beyond: Reflections 
on the Aftermath of the Nauru Case’.
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subsequently show a different side to these issues.115 Deborah Cass herself 
was perhaps aware of the need for caution in drawing conclusions about 
the Pacific nations, stating upfront that her analysis was not conclusive 
given the lack of primary material available. She observed that the island 
states ‘do not possess the kind of bureaucracies to which we are accustomed 
to produce the data required’.116
Thirty years after UNCLOS III, we now know that enclosure of the EEZ 
has not led to sustainability. The responsibility for this must rest with 
coastal states, alongside other states and actors. The idea that coastal states 
are the best stewards for their total allowable catch has not been supported 
by state practice since the EEZ concept was codified, with many domestic 
fisheries in a deplorable state.117 Many states are unable to monitor or 
police their areas of EEZ, leading to a burgeoning and organised criminal 
focus on illegal fishing. Fishing activities that follow agreed access rights 
within EEZs can be appallingly exploitative and unsustainable. In return 
for financial assistance, trade concessions and aid programs, the small 
coastal states surrounded by vast areas of the ocean have allowed vessels 
to wreak havoc on their resources: to cite just one set of examples, early 
access agreements with the EU led to adverse effects on the sustainability 
of Senegal’s coastal fisheries.118 In part, the collapse of many domestic 
fisheries lies with deficiencies within UNCLOS’s EEZ framework, and an 
absence of more direct and coherent obligations on coastal states.119
In her review of UNCLOS Part  V, Deborah Cass was perhaps too 
restrictive in her analysis of the content of coastal states’ obligations to 
give ‘due regard’. In addition to the obligation of the coastal state to ensure 
that the maintenance of living resources in the EEZ is not endangered 
by overexploitation,120 there are general environmental obligations 
with respect to pollution, rare and fragile ecosystems and the habitat of 
threatened species, both in the high seas and within the EEZ to which she 
may have referred, and which have progressed since the publication of her 
115  Ibid. See also in this volume, Kerry Rittich, ‘Deborah Cass, The Constitutionalization of the 
World Trade Organization: A Reading in Time’; Deborah Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream: Recent 
Critical Scholarship in International Law’ (1996) 65 Nordic Journal of International Law 341, doi.org/ 
10.1163/15718109620294924; see further below n 128.
116  Cass, ‘The Quiet Revolution’ (n 5) 85.
117  Barnes, ‘An Effective Framework’ (n 105) 233.
118  Witbooi, ‘The Infusion of Sustainability’ (n 32) 674.
119  Barnes, ‘An Effective Framework’ (n 105).
120  UNCLOS (n 6) art 61(2).
TRAvERSING THE DIvIDE
84
article.121 Tribunals have given increased attention to concepts such as the 
‘duty to cooperate’ and the need to undertake ‘due diligence’,122 and these 
concepts pertain not just to coastal states but to flag states and others. 
UNCLOS has evolved, aided especially by the proliferation of a range of 
instruments from within and outside the law of the sea that have helped 
to give content to emerging notions.123 This evolution in obligations, 
as well as rights, is essential if international law is to address modern 
environmental challenges, especially those like climate change that are 
both caused and manifested outside of bounded areas such as EEZs.124
It should be remembered, too, that it is often the powerful states who hold 
coastal rights, rather than the developing states – a fact that Deborah Cass 
also acknowledged.125 In the Chagos arbitration, the issue was not whether 
the holders of sovereign rights in the EEZ could enjoy discretion in selling 
off the resources, but whether the rich state could enjoy discretion in 
closing the zone. As discussed above, two of the judges were extremely 
concerned by the behaviour of the rights-holder in denying access: they 
saw in the UK’s conduct a continual disregard of Mauritius’s rights carried 
on from colonial times. In contrast, the South China Sea case involved 
questions about an emerging economic power: China, which had hitherto 
been on the side of the developing countries,126 and was now seeking 
unlawful access to the weaker state’s EEZ.
Perhaps instead of idealism about coastal states, Deborah Cass’s views 
are underpinned by a deep scepticism about the potential, and even 
appropriateness, of international law in giving content to duties and 
obligations. As we have heard in the context of international criminal 
law,127 one needs to ask what international society needs to be to host 
121  See especially UNCLOS (n 6) art 192, ‘States have the obligation to protect and preserve the 
marine environment’. See also South China Sea Award (n 4) [945].
122  See Pulp Mills (n 90) [187]; Responsibilities and Obligations of States (n 90) 10.
123  Alan Boyle, ‘Further Development of the Law of the Sea Convention: Mechanisms for Change’ 
(2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 54, doi.org/10.1093/iclq/lei018. See also Irina 
Buga, ‘Between Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea Convention: Subsequent Practice, Treaty 
Modification and Regime Interaction’ in Donald R Rothwell et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the 
Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2015) 46, doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198715481.003.0003.
124  For reflection on the territorially bounded notions of duties in the face of global warming, see 
Joanne Scott, ‘The Geographical Scope of the EU’s Climate Responsibilities’ (2015) 17 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 1, doi.org/10.1017/cel.2015.4.
125  Cass, ‘The Quiet Revolution’ (n 5) 90.
126  China’s position during the UNCLOS III negotiations ‘as one of the foremost defenders of the 
rights of developing States’ was remarked upon by the Tribunal in the South China Sea dispute, see 
South China Sea Award (n 4) [251].
127  See Gerry Simpson in this volume, ‘Concluding Remarks’.
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a form of law: for Simpson, retributive justice might not yet enjoy its 
needed social foundation, while for Deborah Cass, normative content to 
the duties with respect to the EEZs was not justified. It might be that 
Deborah Cass held greater confidence in the scope of domestic law to 
provide the necessary content to ethical, cultural, social or environmental 
obligations. Her critique of the notion of obligations of coastal states 
under international law may indeed have sustained her interest in domestic 
constitutional law and her academic pursuits demonstrated that the two 
disciplinary fields have never been anything but closely intertwined.
The answer to the question posed by Deborah Cass’s expansive 
interpretation of the rights of coastal states perhaps comes from Deborah 
Cass herself, writing 10  years after ‘Quiet Revolution’ was published. 
When engaging with a range of critical legal theories and methods in 
1996, she suggested some potential research projects that would ensure 
such theories and methods could be deployed usefully, to effect lasting 
transformation after international law’s repeated injustices. She posed as 
one example the examination of:
[W]hether there are inbuilt restrictions upon the application of 
[the] principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
and, if there are, whether these internal limits ought to be 
reassessed in the light of current understandings of equality and 
disadvantage.128
International law has demonstrated that it is possible to place restrictions 
over the principle of coastal states’ sovereign rights to their EEZ. The 
obligations of ‘due regard’ and ‘due diligence’ are examples of such 
restrictions. Arguably the Chagos arbitration has signalled a preparedness 
of international tribunals to take into account equality and disadvantage 
in developing these norms, at least in the joint dissenting and concurring 
opinion. Perhaps it is this set of issues that will require the next revolution.
Conclusion
This chapter has considered the revolutionary aspects of the entrenchment 
of an exclusive economic zone in the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. It shows that Deborah Cass’s insights about the high stakes 
128  Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream’ (n 115).
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of the maritime zones – which covered contested territory including the 
EEZ, the high seas and the deep seabed mining area – have continued 
relevance, even as some of the early defenders of the rights of developing 
states have now assumed the role of traditional maritime powers.
For Deborah Cass in 1987, the quiet revolution of UNCLOS lay in 
the empowerment of coastal island states against the exploitative and 
destructive tendencies of the distant water fishing nations and their 
constructed ideological battles. Over 30 years later, her political, legal 
and critical insights continue to push international lawyers, enriching our 
understanding, practice and tools for change. Her core argument – that 
the newly entrenched EEZ regime provided total discretion to coastal 
states with respect to which states would access the resources – has been 
vindicated. In the South China Sea Award, for example, China’s historic 
rights were found to have been extinguished by the creation of the EEZ 
regime in UNCLOS, meaning that the Philippines is free to decide upon 
issues of access and control with respect to its EEZ. Yet there are other 
issues that cannot be separated from the issue of the rights of coastal 
states: these relate to the duties of coastal states to give ‘due regard’ to the 
needs of others and to practice due diligence. This has become a major 
preoccupation, and tribunals have found in the law of the sea an evolving 
set of duties since the publication of Deborah Cass’s analysis.
The law of the sea is a precursor to much of the evolution and development 
of public international law. Deborah Cass’s preoccupation with the 
content and institutional structure of art 56’s requirement for states to 
give due regard to the interests of others demonstrates broader tensions in 
the substance, procedure and even idea of international law. Her interest 
in the position of developing states in the Pacific reminds us to be cautious 
about the institutional capacities and technical resources some states have 
in exercising their rights. Her work also suggests that the discharge of 
duties of coastal states needs to acknowledge historical inequality and 
disadvantage in order to be just. Cooperative arrangements rest on this 
substantive engagement as well as the procedural guarantees developed by 
treaties and jurisprudence. An awareness of the broader ideological and 
geopolitical aspects of these issues necessarily complicates a neat division 
between community and exclusivity in public international law.
PART 3




Introduction to International 
Law and the World Trade 
Organization
Rosanne Kennedy
Thanks to Kim and Hilary for organising this wonderful event and to the 
Cass family and Deborah’s friends for being here.
I am honoured to have been invited to participate in this memorial 
symposium for my friend and colleague Deborah Cass. I teach in literary 
studies and gender studies in the College of Arts and Social Sciences at 
The Australian National University (ANU).
I first met Deborah in 1992 when we were both newly arrived at ANU, and 
we quickly discovered that we had a shared interest in gender and feminist 
legal theory. I was excited to meet this vibrant, engaging and energetic 
new colleague. She invited me to speak to her legal theory class. I envied 
her sense of style, and although I don’t remember her doing so, she 
probably wanted to give me fashion advice! The next thing I knew she 
had won the Caltex award and was off to Harvard. When we met again 
a couple of years later, it was at the University Child Care Centre across 
the street from here, so it’s particularly nice to be meeting in this location 
today – which used to be the staff club before it had its reincarnation 
as the Crawford School. Hannah and my son Benjamin became good 
friends, and not long after Deborah had Rosa and I had Isobel, and they 
too became friends. Many of my and Deborah’s subsequent conversations 
took place in the hectic circumstances of the playground, birthday parties 
and picnics, although I do remember a lively night out at a Canberra 
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restaurant to celebrate Deborah’s 40th birthday. Our conversations dealt 
with the issues of everyday life: mothering, parenting, feminism, being 
a woman in the academy, among other intellectual topics.
When the family moved to London, we stayed in touch. I visited them 
in their London house and went walking with Deborah in the local 
park. She seemed to love the London life. One of my fondest memories 
of Deborah was when the family visited us for Christmas at the beach 
(Bermagui). The kids made a Christmas tree out of driftwood and 
decorations out of tinfoil and Hannah received a surf board! I have lovely 
pictures and funny stories from those years, but I’ll spare Hannah and 
Rosa the embarrassment. One thing that I remember with considerable 
nostalgia was the frequent conversations I had with Deborah and Gerry 
about literature. Somehow, despite the demands of careers, families and 
international travel, we found time to read. We often discussed novels and 
writers, and traded novels. That, as well as her own creative writing, was 
such an important part of Deborah’s life.
Speaking of books, my task today is to chair a session on Deborah 
Cass’s book, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: 
Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading 
System, which was published by Oxford University Press in 2005. It won 
the Certificate of Merit from the American Society for International 
Law. The book has been praised by eminent scholars as ‘that rare thing: 
An account which is sophisticated at both a theoretical and a doctrinal 
level’ and as setting ‘a benchmark for all future writing on this theme’. 
Described as ‘build[ing] important bridges between political philosophy 
and international law’ this book is central to today’s discussion of how 
Deborah Cass’s scholarship ‘traverses divides’.
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Deborah Cass, The 
Constitutionalization of the 
World Trade Organization: 
A Reading in Time
Kerry Rittich
Introduction
Any occasion to reflect on Deborah Cass’s The Constitutionalization of 
the World Trade Organization (CWTO),1 serves immediately as a call to 
internationalists to revisit the moment and the context in which it was 
conceived. How to characterise that moment? At the time, it felt like 
a  moment of not just substantial but of permanent, epochal change. 
The mid-1990s saw, in light of the birth of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the inauguration of a new system of multilateral trade relations, 
one that reposed an unusual degree of confidence in the possibility that 
legal rules, institutional forms and technocratic processes of adjudication 
might be used both to create a more fully integrated global market and 
to successfully regulate trade disputes within the international economic 
order. Other developments accompanying the birth of the WTO, however, 
were just as consequential to the new international order and, ultimately, 
to the context and manner in which the WTO operated, even if in ways 
not evident at its inception.




The mid-nineties was also the high-water mark of market fundamentalism. 
It was a moment of pervasive belief, at least among elites, in the primacy 
of the markets, one which saw a resurgent hope in market processes 
simpliciter as the source of welfare gains, as well as economic growth.2 
The  apparent supremacy of market ordering extended to the political 
realm, leading to a fusion of markets and democracy in the liberal 
imaginary, what Susan Marks has called the ‘end of ideology’ ideology 
that market-centred democracy represented the ‘end of history’.3
As market fundamentalism became established as normative across 
the international order and international institutions and economic 
technocrats began to give pride of place to the efficient facilitation of 
investment and transactions across borders in the order of concerns, they 
also consolidated a consensus view about good governance supporting that 
venture, successfully disseminating templates for domestic institutional 
and regulatory reform in its supposed image.4 The ascendance of market 
fundamentalism and its associated governance priorities and projects 
marked an important waypoint in the decline and disintegration of the 
embedded liberal compromise,5 the severance of two projects that had 
been imagined as indissoluble parts of the postwar economic order: 
liberalised trade at the global level, accompanied by protection against 
the destabilising social and political consequences that economic 
integration and restructuring inevitably entail at the national level, 
realised through some combination of domestic monetary, fiscal, social 
and industrial policies.6
2  Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Is There a Post Washington Consensus Consensus?’ in Narcís Serra and Joseph 
E Stiglitz (eds), The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance (Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 41, doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534081.003.0001.
3  Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of 
Ideology (Oxford University Press, 2000), doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264131.001.0001; 
Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’ (1989) 16 The National Interest 3; Francis Fukuyama, The End 
of History and the Last Man (Avon Books, 1992).
4  John Williamson, ‘Democracy and the “Washington Consensus”’ (1993) 21 World Development 
1329.
5  John G Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order’ (1982) 36 International Organization 379, doi.org/10.1017/s00208183 
00018993.
6  See Robert Howse, ‘From Politics to Technocracy … and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral 
Trading Regime’ (2002) 96 Am. Journal of International Law 94; A Lang, World Trade Law After 
Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2011), doi.org/10.2307/2686127.
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The mid-1990s was also a time of growing challenges to the autonomy 
and power of the state and, indeed, to the Westphalian international 
order itself. The sources of these challenges were varied, and they clustered 
at the infra- and transnational as well as the supranational level. Some 
disruptions emanated from the proliferation of new international regimes 
and tribunals, of which the WTO itself was a prime exemplar. The sheer 
variety and number of normative regimes along with the burgeoning 
institutions that had emerged to support them on the international plane 
provoked worries about legal ‘fragmentation’.7 They ensured, at minimum, 
that there would be competing perspectives and determinations on central 
international legal questions; at maximum, there would be unresolved 
conflict that seemed to threaten the authority of law itself. But challenges 
to the authority of the state, as well as to the international legal order, also 
came from new forms – and greater usage – of transnational law and non-
state norms promulgated by private parties.8 Indeed, the fragmentation 
and destabilisation of international law was itself linked to the emergence 
of ‘new governance’ – broadly speaking, alternatives to classic, top-down 
forms of governance and regulation promulgated by the state or through 
interstate agreement – to manage problems and processes of global and 
regional economic integration for which traditional state-based approaches 
were, it was often claimed, ill-suited or simply inadequate.9
Yet a third destabilising dimension or development also reared its head: 
the problem of empire, ensuing from the singular role the US was then in 
a position to play as the sole hegemonic power remaining after the end of 
the Cold War.10 That position enabled the US both to use international 
legal institutions as mechanisms to further its interests and projects, but 
equally to ignore international law when it suited its purposes.
7  For a discussion, see International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 
(13 April 2006) (‘the Koskenniemi Report’); Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime-
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 999.
8  Philip Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956); Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational 
Law’, in J Smits (ed), Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006).
9  Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US 
(Hart, 2006).
10  Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about 




If only because its birth was so deeply interconnected with these 
changes, the WTO seemed to provide a convenient, even inevitable, 
point of departure for the examination of myriad associated questions 
of governance. The Uruguay round negotiations out of which the WTO 
emerged had already pushed established boundaries on the settlement 
between the national and international, for example in debates about non-
tariff barriers to trade, intellectual property rights and trade in services. 
Thus, debates about the uses and efficacy of the WTO were immediately 
entangled in debates about where and how to conduct political debate 
over matters of policy as well as justice, transnational as well as domestic, 
and how to ensure democratic input and control over these matters in 
a dynamic international order in which many of the ordinary channels 
for democratic deliberation seemed blocked, destabilised, missing or 
simply unclear.
If at this point the WTO seemed the centre of global governance debates 
tout court, viewed in retrospect, the picture looks quite different. At a time 
when multilateralism is in decline and regionalism on the rise in trade 
relations, central organs of the WTO like the Appellate Body are in crisis, 
and trade negotiations are once again sites for the assertion of national 
interest and competing geopolitical projects, that moment seems less 
the dawn of a new ‘universal’ era organised through rules-based global 
commerce than the beginning of a highly differentiated world, one 
paradoxically furthered by a commitment to the universalising possibilities 
of market ordering itself. The sentiment of hopefulness that the WTO 
represented concerning the political possibilities of law appear now to be 
not only transitory but even aberrational.11 And whatever their putative 
relationship within liberal theory, the connections between democracy, 
liberalism and markets are now frayed, evident in the rising number of 
authoritarian leaders and regimes as well as the many strains on the most 
famously successful market integration project, the EU, emanating from 
states as disparate as Greece and Britain.
But as crucial as the broad international context indisputably was to 
the project, it seems important to flag the highly local one too. At the 
time CWTO began to take shape, its author was part of a cohort of 
graduate students at Harvard Law School, one that, at least by previous 
standards, was both unusually diverse in its composition and distinctly 
11  Lang, World Trade Law (n 6); see below n 21 R Wai, ‘Normal Trade Law’.
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heterodox and expansive in its approach to legal scholarship. Both in 
collective discussions and within their individual projects, these scholars 
were reflecting on the conceptual, legal and political conundrums which 
these interlinked developments on the international horizon threw up 
and puzzling through their implications for international law, justice and 
politics. Questions of development, South–North relations and histories 
of colonialism were all central to the inquiry, but so was consideration of 
received disciplinary traditions and institutional forms. Debates invariably 
engaged innovations in social and political theory that transcended the 
discipline of law as well. In short, within this community, it was common 
ground that a vastly expanded lens and a wide array of analytic tools were 
critical to assessing the trajectory and import of the emerging international 
legal order as well as to comprehending its past.
As the scholarly writing generated by those scholars’ documents, that 
community proved to be an immensely fertile laboratory for new – 
even revolutionary – forms of critical scholarship in the field.12 As her 
writing from this period attests, Deborah was a central interlocutor 
in the key intellectual debates,13 and their imprint remains visible 
throughout CWTO.
Setting the Stage: The International 
Context
What follows is an admittedly motivated reading of CWTO, one animated 
by a desire to surface its engagement and continuing connections 
with debates about law and development on the one hand and global 
governance and democracy on the other. There are three reasons that 
make it seem defensible to read CWTO in this way. The first is that the 
analysis itself overlaps so much with those scholarly debates that we 
could now safely place CWTO within these literatures. The second is that 
questions of development and global governance and their impact on the 
aspirations of democratic governance are where CWTO itself ends up; by 
the end of the analysis, we get very clear indications that these concerns 
12  Along with The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization, among the texts 
that emerged from that period were Antony Anghie’s Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International 
Law from Below (Cambridge University Press, 2003), doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494079.
13  Deborah Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream’ (1996) 65(3) Nordic Journal of International Law 341.
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are where the author’s heart lies, and where if it had been at all possible, 
her scholarly and analytic attention would next have gone. The third is, 
of course, that these questions lie at the heart of the political conundrums 
in which we now find ourselves.
The WTO and Global Economic Transformation
Like many other writings of its time, CWTO is suffused with the widely 
shared understanding that something big was afoot with the creation of 
the WTO. Put simply, everyone perceived that its emergence represented 
a signal change in the international order, something beyond simply the 
outcome of the latest round of negotiations that had formed the ordinary 
business of international trade law since the end of World War  II. 
Rather, the creation of the WTO represented a new settlement in the 
international economic order, one that went a long distance to displace 
trade relations based primarily on the political management of interstate 
conflict with those more closely tethered to the technocratic processes of 
dispute resolution that gave enhanced role to rules-based adjudication. 
In the process, the new trade regime opened up new avenues to alter the 
balance of power between the domestic and the international.
When CWTO was written, the WTO sat at the apex of the international 
economic order. The WTO had a number of features that made it seem 
both powerful and effective as an institution and as a regulatory regime, 
particularly in comparison to those elsewhere in the international order. 
These features, in turn, caused people to think that the WTO might serve 
as a prototype for future institutional development in the international 
arena; for some, the WTO could even be imagined as a vehicle for global 
governance writ large.14 The WTO housed the pre-eminent international 
dispute resolution tribunal, the new Appellate Body, that was empowered 
to judicially review the decisions of panels of first instance and thereby 
authoritatively pronounce on the conformity of policy decisions of 
national legislatures and executive bodies with global trade rules. At the 
same time, the institution of the new reverse-consensus rule concerning 
the adoption of panel decisions moved the management of trade disputes 
out of the realm of diplomacy and more decisively into the realm of 
technical, rules-based adjudication. These changes gave the panels and 
14  Marco Bronckers, ‘More Power to the WTO?’ (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic Law 
41, 44.
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bodies charged with adjudication enhanced power and importance. These 
features made the WTO seem not only like an effective institution for rule 
enforcement and thus a compelling model in other areas of international 
economic law: as the burgeoning literature on ‘trade linkage’ during this 
period of time confirms, they induced scholars and activists working in 
areas such as labour, the environment and human rights to devise ways 
to attach their normative and regulatory agendas to the WTO’s laws and 
enforcement mechanisms.15
All of these developments generated enthusiasm, but they provoked deep 
unease in equal measure. The subtitle of CWTO says it all: Legitimacy, 
Democracy and Community in the International Trading System is 
a  concise encapsulation of the concerns around which debates about 
trade law and global economic governance were beginning to congeal. 
As the controversies around the ‘mega-regional’ trade agreements such 
as the recently concluded Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific 
Partnership (CPTPP) and the proposed Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the EU confirm, 
it remains a remarkably well-targeted statement of the preoccupations 
around which they continue to revolve.16
We might style the large question that CWTO is grappling with as 
follows: how to analyse and assess the organisation of global economic 
and political order, once the settled understanding about the respective 
roles and competences of nation-states and international institutions has 
become disrupted; when the conventional disciplinary narrative within 
international law about the sovereign equality of states in the Westphalian 
order no longer persuades at either the descriptive or programmatic levels; 
and when it has become evident that ever-deeper market integration has 
become, by design and by default, both the engine reconstituting global 
political and economic relations and the very problem to be managed. 
Thus, we can think of CWTO as a point of entry into a broad range of 
issues – normative, institutional, political – connected to the governance 
of the international economic order writ large.
15  Robert Howse and Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for 
the World Trade Organization (International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 
2000), doi.org/10.1163/221160800x00037.
16  See for example, Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements and 
the Future of Public Law’ (Working Paper No 2/2016, Institute for International Law and Justice, 
New York University School of Law, 2016).
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CWTO is in constant conversation with the developments – legal, social 
and political – in the international order that were coterminous with 
the creation of the WTO and which helped cement its status as the 
pre-eminent international economic institution. One is the mainstream 
consensus about the benefits of trade liberalisation and extensive market 
integration; another is the changing normative landscape against which 
the WTO itself operates, from the move to ‘regulation’ to the embrace 
of a constellation of private as well as public mechanisms to address 
governance and policy concerns. At its heart, however, is a systematic 
engagement with the principal interlocutors on what are still broadly 
recognised as the ‘big questions’ of international economic law. These 
include: John Jackson, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Robert Howse and 
Armin von Bogdandy on the perils and possibilities of the emerging 
regional and multilateral trade and market integration projects;17 Joseph 
Weiler, Neil Walker and Guenter Frankenberg on the conundrums of 
constructing responsible and responsive political community beyond the 
nation-state;18 Dan Tarullo and Brian Langille on the ‘baseline’ problem 
that besets all efforts to establish the legal parameters of a free market;19 
and Robert Wai on the significance of private law and private ordering to 
the conduct of international economic transactions, something that trade 
law, as a branch of public law, leaves out of view.20
17  John H Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence (Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, 1998); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional 
Problems of International Economic Law (University Press, 1991); Robert Howse (ed), The World 
Trading System: Critical Perspectives on The World Economy (Routledge, 1998); Armin von Bogdandy, 
‘Law and Politics in the WTO – Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship’ in JA Frowein and 
R Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (Kluwer Law International, 2001) 
vol 5, 609, doi.org/10.1163/187574101x00169.
18  Joseph HH Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Neil Walker, 
‘The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key’ in Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), 
The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Hart Publishing, 2001) 31, doi.org/ 10.5040/ 
9781472562630.ch-002; Guenter Frankenberg, ‘The Return of the Contract: Problems and Pitfalls of 
European Constitutionalism’ (2000) 6 European Law Journal 257, doi.org/10.1111/ 1468-0386.00107.
19  Dan K Tarullo, ‘Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade’ (1987) 100 Harvard 
Law Review 546, doi.org/10.2307/1341113; Brian Langille, ‘General Reflections on the Relationship of 
Trade and Labor (Or: Fair Trade is Free Trade’s Destiny)’ in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert Hudec (eds), 
Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol 2: Legal Analysis (MIT Press, 1996) 231.
20  Robert Wai, ‘Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of 
Private International Law in an Era of Globalization’ (2002) 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 209.
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It is clear in retrospect that, as an institution, the WTO has had its own 
rise and fall narrative.21 International economic law no longer pivots 
exclusively around the WTO; even within trade law, the centre of gravity 
when it comes to political negotiation and institutional innovation 
has shifted from multilateral trade to bilateral and regional trade and 
investment regimes. Yet in all these new arenas, there are the immense 
unresolved struggles about how to both conceptualise and manage the 
legal, institutional and normative concerns that have been central to the 
WTO since its inception. Fortunately for us, it is these very matters that 
lie at the heart of CWTO.
The WTO and Constitutionalism
It is worth emphasising that CWTO is as much a study of constitutionalism 
as it is an analysis of trade law or international economic law. There are 
good reasons to think about the WTO – and other projects of global 
legal transformation – through the lens of constitutionalism. Even those 
attempting to come to grips with the governing structures of networks 
and social systems now employ constitutionalism as a heuristic.22 In short, 
constitutional norms, values and discourse have been embraced to assess 
the workings of private power and the manner in which non-state entities 
as well as states effectively ‘rule’.
One compelling reason for this expanded use is that constitutionalism is the 
framework which liberal theory and polities conventionally use to design 
and evaluate basic matters of the allocation of power and competences. 
Within the ambit of constitutionalism fall the distribution of powers as 
between different governing entities, the state and its citizens, as well 
as the institutions and processes by which disputes about these powers are 
disposed of. But constitutionalism, of course, serves wider normative 
and discursive functions concerning matters of political, economic and 
social organisation and coexistence. Constitutionalism is the language in 
which legal and political scholars conventionally conduct debates about 
foundational questions of representation, participation and democracy. 
Constitutionalism and constitutional rights are, of course, also part of the 
popular vernacular, a mechanism for voicing concerns about the exercise 
and legitimacy of power, both private and public.
21  R Wai, ‘Normal Trade Law’, draft on file with the author; Lang, World Trade Law (n 6).
22  See, eg, Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization 
(Oxford University Press, 2012).
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As it turns out, controversies about all of these issues surround the 
WTO. Constitutional norms and values were widely used in the early 
years to celebrate the WTO; as Deborah Cass noted, constitutional 
challenges to the basic structure of the WTO were few, due to what 
she rightly identifies as ‘the pervasive consensus about the benefits of 
trade liberalization’.23 Indeed, many scholars cited the institutional 
features most familiar from liberal constitutional orders as conclusive 
evidence of the new trade regime’s superiority over the old. Yet over time, 
constitutionalism’s value as a means of challenging, even impugning, 
these very institutional features has become more evident. Deborah Cass’s 
signal contribution was to recognise early on that the rise of the discourse 
of constitutionalism in respect of the WTO was related to the challenges 
that the WTO posed to international law and to the international order, 
particularly in respect of norms of democratic choice and participation. 
Thus, she perceived that constitutionalism could be used not merely in 
its most familiar mode or guise, as a means to defend and advance the 
WTO, but productively, as a heuristic to reveal much about what might 
be normatively problematic – even pathological – about its governance 
structures. Above all, constitutionalism provided a means to critically 
consider perhaps the most significant aspect of the WTO: the immensely 
expanded scope it seems to provide both to international technocrats and 
to private actors to challenge domestic rules and policy decisions, and the 
troubling constraints on democracy that thereby ensue.24
The WTO, Ideas and Knowledge Practices
CWTO is perhaps most fundamentally a work about the role and power 
of ideas and ideational frameworks in the governance of international 
economic relations. It seems important to stress how novel and important 
a contribution it made for this reason alone. At the time that CWTO was 
being written, scholars were producing myriad doctrinal and institutional 
analyses of the new WTO; for international economic lawyers during the 
1990s, engaging in that enterprise was arguably the only game in town. 
Any review of the relevant journals during that time will disclose article 
after article parsing the new rules of the regime, examining the scope of 
the powers of the new Appellate Body, and/or taking sides in the decisions 
it was beginning to render.
23  Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (n 1) 79.
24  For a sophisticated analysis of the multiple factors and forces that lie behind the widened scope 
of the trade regime, see Lang, World Trade Law (n 6).
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Deborah Cass, however, was one of the first people to seriously consider 
that the idea of the WTO – how it was conceived as an institution, how 
it imagined the community of states and other actors engaged in trade 
relations, and the ethos and values that organised these relations and 
informed the operation of the regime as a whole – was an independently 
significant field of inquiry. It is the deep and systematic inquiry of CWTO 
into the structures of thought organising the new trade regime, as well as the 
beliefs and claims about constitutionalism, liberal values and human rights 
to which the institution quickly became attached, that ultimately make it of 
such enduring value. For in the intervening period, it has become abundantly 
clear that when it comes to international economic law, institutions rule 
the world. It is in the realm of ideas, and the knowledge practices through 
which people and institutions give life and substance to those ideas, that 
the big battles are fought, large transformations are affected, and significant 
stakes, political as well as economic, for particular parties disposed.25
Deborah Cass was unusually alert to the fact that the emergence of the 
discourse of constitutionalism in and around the WTO was bound up in 
a host of aspirations intimately connected to a broader project of global 
economic and political transformation. As she noted, constitutionalism 
served as a form of wish fulfilment, a means of marking fundamental change 
in the global order, of separating the past from the present, and creating 
new legal obligations even – perhaps especially – where it was far from clear 
what intentions and circumstances warranted.26 In short, the discourse of 
constitutionalism was itself doing a huge amount of transformative work, 
work that promised – or threatened – to take international trade law well 
beyond where trade negotiations had themselves taken it, even given the 
momentous results of the Uruguay round.
The Strategy
How to tackle such a mammoth task? Here is how the author takes up 
the challenge.
After a brief outline of the origins of the constitutionalisation debate 
surrounding the WTO, CWTO proceeds directly to a ‘received account’ 
of constitutionalism itself. This account first distils and then arrays the 
25  Lang, World Trade Law (n 6); David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise 
Shape Global Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 2016).
26  Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (n 1) 69.
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essential elements of constitutionalism as a mode of conceptualising legal, 
political and institutional relations, with the aim of providing a means to 
assess the status and transformation of the fundamental relations of the 
trade regime. The function of this account, the author emphasises, is less 
to crystallise a conception of constitutionalism in any essential or absolute 
sense, than to provide a set of yardsticks with which to measure various 
claims and accounts of constitutionalism as they are applied to the WTO.
To this end, Deborah Cass identifies six elements or features of 
constitutionalism, unfolding an idea about to how think about each of 
them. She then moves on to link debates about the constitutionalisation of 
the WTO to developments within international economic law scholarship.
The six identified elements of constitutionalism are constraints on social, 
political and economic behaviour; Grundnorm change; community; 
deliberation; realignment of relationships; and legitimacy. I will only 
note in passing the immense command of constitutional theory and 
scholarship that the construction of this compelling ‘received account’ 
required, as well as the significance of that mastery to the project at hand. 
Only someone with deep knowledge of public law norms, institutions 
and doctrines at the domestic level could have detected so many gaps and 
slippages in the efforts to transpose constitutional norms and heuristics 
onto the international plane in the first place. And only a person so 
situated could have fully explored and displayed the manner in which 
that transposition then enabled an immense and divergent range of claims 
and aspirations to be projected onto the WTO.
Deborah Cass has a specific argument about how that scholarship, in her 
words, ‘fueled the promotion of the constitutionalization of the WTO’.27 
The first step is the discipline’s preoccupation with and characterisation of 
the WTO as an institution as such, as opposed to a mere treaty or set of rules. 
The second, highly consequential step, is the elision between institution 
and constitution. As against this characterisation, Deborah Cass insists 
on a distinction. Even if we are prepared to characterise the WTO as an 
institution, in the absence of the attributes of constitutionalism already 
outlined, an institution, she points out, cannot ‘simply metamorphose’ 
into a higher order institution or constitution.28 For the apparent success 
of this conflation or metamorphosis, the belief and acceptance within the 
27  Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (n 1) 62.
28  Ibid 60.
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discipline in ‘the WTO as a thing in itself, a regime, a concept which is 
more than the sum of its parts’,29 has everything to do with the conferral 
of enhanced legitimacy and authority on the WTO. As she notes, this is 
a highly problematic move: it immediately imports a set of powerful ideas 
into the trade regime, some of which are fundamentally alien to it. One is 
the belief that non-discrimination rights concerning market access, long 
a part of multilateral trade law, are human rights, rights moreover that 
domestic courts can apply and that ‘citizens can rely on … to challenge 
state action’.30 Constitutionalism can also serve what she describes as 
a ‘door-closing’ function, insulating the WTO from critique to which it 
would otherwise be subject and thereby reifying its particular institutional 
features.31 International economic law scholarship operating in the mode 
of constitutionalism also fosters an easy linkage between the WTO and 
developments that might otherwise only be contingently associated with 
neoliberal globalisation. That risk or possibility is, in her assessment, 
especially live, given the detachment of disciplinary debates within 
international economic law from earlier calls for a New International 
Economic Order. Although there are still dissident voices, the critical 
tradition within international economic law is, in her estimation, ‘small 
in number and low in profile’.32 The community of international legal 
scholars, then, has a lot to answer for.
CWTO then proceeds to examine three basic variants of constitutionalism 
associated with the WTO, analysing them through the claims of the 
scholars and personages with whom they are most prominently identified. 
It is worth noting that all of these variants circulate as central pillars of the 
mainstream support and defence of the WTO, and all are in some sense 
interrelated. The three variants are institutional managerialism; rights-
based approaches; and judicial norm determination.
This constitutional typology proves to be immensely successful, and the 
analysis of these variants is really the heart of the book. As a heuristic, 
it not only allows us to examine in a systematic way what otherwise might 
appear to be a quite chaotic set of issues, themes, trends and arguments: 
it also permits us to grasp the distinct social and political visions that 
29  Ibid 101.
30  Ibid 69.
31  Ibid.
32  Ibid 81.
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animate different claims, and to do so, moreover, in a way that helps 
reveal precisely how and why those visions might also be such a cause of 
worry for the WTO’s critics.
Institutional Managerialism
Institutional managerialism, identified foremost with the work of John 
Jackson, involves not just the juridification of trade disputes and the 
move to the management of trade by rules as opposed to diplomacy: 
it also enabled the WTO to manifest as an institution, ‘a thing in 
itself ’, something more than the sum of its parts. This, in turn, made 
the project of trade law seem vested with unity and coherence; it also 
provoked an association between the WTO and democracy. After the 
appearance of Jackson’s The World Trade Organization: Constitution and 
Jurisprudence, ‘the symbiotic relationship between institutionalism and 
constitutionalism was cemented once and for all’,33 despite the fact that 
it had never been ‘through the process of democratic authorization by 
a defined constitutional community’.34
How did this chain of associations unfold or ‘work’, and with what 
consequences? The superiority of rules-based trade relations over trade 
diplomacy was a bedrock assumption at the creation of the WTO.35 But 
as the term ‘managerialism’ is intended to suggest, the adoption of a more 
stringently rules-based regime brought with it governance by technocratic 
expertise, a process that empowered trade bureaucrats at the expense of 
other regime actors in a variety of ways. What was less obvious, at least 
until the new regime really got going, was how much rule application 
informed principally by the value of progressive liberalisation of trade 
might become a way to tilt other values, those associated with democracy 
and the rule of law in particular, off their axis at the same time.
As many trade scholars have noted, trade law has always operated through 
and against a background consensus on the proper domain and reach 
of the regime itself.36 The optimism, expressed by Jackson and others, 
that a practical, pragmatic spirit, along with a few small tweaks to the 
system, could satisfactorily address any new challenges and conflicts 
33  Ibid 101.
34  Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (n 1) 106.
35  Ibid 115; Lang, World Trade Law (n 6).
36  Lang, World Trade Law (n 6).
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about this fundamental issue generated by the new regime, soon proved 
unwarranted. For it turns out that there was no logical end point to the 
claims touching on domestic law and policy that might be advanced in 
the name of liberalised trade; absent explicit mechanisms of politics and 
diplomacy, there was also no easy way to limit to the regime’s capacity 
to penetrate domestic legal systems in novel and capacious ways. This 
tendency was to be powerfully – indeed deliberately – reinforced by the 
next pillar of trade constitutionalism.
Rights‑Based Approaches
Rights-based approaches are prescriptive calls for a radical transformation 
of the trade regime. Based on a combination of strategic and normative 
rationales37 and more openly values-based than institutional managerialism, 
the constitutional innovation of rights-based approaches is to represent the 
WTO as ‘a system of protection for individual economic rights beyond 
national borders’.38 Beginning life as a means ‘to facilitate the direct effect 
of WTO law into national legal systems’ and going further through the 
door that had already been opened under the North America Free Trade 
Agreement’s Chapter  11 provisions, rights-based approaches rest the 
legitimacy of the WTO on the extent to which it allows the voice and 
interests of private actors a direct role in the instigation and management 
of trade disputes.
Rights-based approaches are what Deborah Cass calls frankly ideological, 
even ‘messianic’ approaches to the world economic order. Here, we 
encounter not (just) a world of order and agreement among states, but 
a vision of a transnational community of rights-bearing citizen-consumers 
marching into a future of trans-border economic deals, all under the 
banner of private rights. Like institutional managerialism, the recognition 
of private rights, too, facilitates the use of WTO as a constraint on the 
reach and interpretation of domestic law by, for example, providing 
a basis on which to subject national legislation to judicial review based on 
WTO agreements.39
37  Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (n 1) 162.
38  Ibid 146.
39  Ibid 148.
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The resuscitation and advancement of a private right to trade,40 cast not 
just in the language of rights but in the language of human rights is, in 
the author’s assessment, a powerful legitimating move. This is surely 
correct: once transmuted into the language of human rights, rights-
based approaches become an effective mode of self-legitimation as well as 
a source of enhanced authority for the WTO.41 Replacing open political 
contestation over competing aims and values with claims rooted in 
fundamental moral and ethical precepts, rights-based approaches enable 
their proponents to bootstrap the status of a radical reconceptualisation of 
trade law, one that would fundamentally alter its reception into national 
legal systems and give private actors privileged status in international law 
to boot, 42 by linking it – normatively and semantically – with Kantian 
liberal political theory and highly individualist ideas about human 
freedom and human dignity.
Setting aside entirely the fact that the claimed ‘right to trade’ can charitably 
be described as obscure (no reference to any such right can be located in 
any human rights treaty, for example), it turns out that moralising about 
free trade is a bad idea for other reasons. For one, hanging the case for 
free trade on individual moral rights has proved to be an effective way 
to delink free trade from the broader welfare goals on which the postwar 
multilateral trade regime found much of its original justification. For 
another, it provides a means to insulate trade rules from any accounting 
of consequences or trade-offs with other rights. It forms no part of the 
rights-based approach, for example, that losses to some are not just an 
unintended side effect of liberalised trade; they are how the gains of trade 
are realised.43 For both reasons, absolutist approaches to private rights 
undercut the normative and analytic basis on which states might try to 
temper the destabilising effects of liberalised trade on their populations.
It was surely correct on Deborah Cass’s part to mark the significance 
of rights-based approaches to trade; indeed, it now looks prescient. 
Although inchoate and still aspirational when she wrote, efforts to give 
enhanced status to private rights at the level of process and substance 
have become only more muscular and well-developed in the international 
40  The right to trade had long been invoked in international law; see, eg, Hugo Grotius, The Rights 
of War and Peace, tr AC Campbell (M Walter Dunne, 1901) <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/grotius-
the-rights-of-war-and-peace-1901-ed>.
41  Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (n 1) 151.
42  Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (n 1) 153.
43  Howse, ‘From Politics to Technocracy’ (n 6).
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economic order in the intervening time. For example, private investor-
state dispute resolution provisions have been a key feature – and major 
source of contention – of many of the trade and investment regimes now 
under negotiation, in particular the ‘mega-regional’ trade and investment 
treaties like the TTIP and the CPTPP that have taken centre stage as 
multilateral negotiations have stalled or been abandoned.
The standardisation of private rights to trade and transact is arguably 
even more central to other initiatives in the international economic order, 
especially those designed to set normative benchmarks for economic rules 
and institutions. For example, the extent to which states grant adequate, 
or enhanced, protection for private rights serves as a key metric of many 
of the regulatory reform programs that the World Bank, including its 
flagship Doing Business, project.44 The same objective arguably animates 
the OECD’s projects on regulatory quality and regulatory coherence, 
evident in the extent to which it, on the one hand, privileges the goals 
of efficiency and on the other, avoids discussion of welfare objectives.45 
Indeed, the chapter on regulatory coherence within the CPTPP is 
designed to further such goals, at the same time as it normalises the 
objective of reducing regulatory differences.46 In short, the broader world 
of international economic law is now suffused with the same constitution-
like vision of transnational private rights.
Judicial Norm Development
The third approach, judicial norm development, locates the engine of 
the regime’s constitutionalisation in the new institutional innovation, the 
WTO Appellate Body. Like reviewing courts in common law jurisdictions, 
the Appellate Body operates in constitutional mode by reflecting the 
governing norms of the institution, and through the accumulation of case 
law, by building those norms at the same time.47
In a layered, nuanced account, Deborah Cass takes the opportunity to 
point out the deficiencies of judicial norm generation within the WTO as 
measured by constitutional yardsticks, the obvious model and predecessor 
44  World Bank, ‘Doing Business 2020’, Doing Business (Web Page, 2020) <https://www.doing 
business.org/>.
45  See for example, OECD, Regulatory Policy and the Road to Sustainable Growth (OECD, 2010).
46  See Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada (Web Page, 9 November 2019) <https://www.
international.gc.ca/gac-amc/index.aspx?lang=eng>.
47  Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (n 1) 178.
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being Joseph Weiler on the role of the European Court of Justice on the 
transformation of the European Community.48 Following von Bogdandy, 
her emphasis is on the constitutional inadequacies that follow from the 
introduction of a system of judicial review that operates on its own, 
not counterbalanced by anything like an adequate political branch or 
legislature. As she describes, democratic values are compromised by the 
absence of a deliberative body, while the outsourcing of rule-making 
to standard-setting bodies risks subjecting those rules to capture by 
private actors. Moreover, the introduction of judicial review turns out 
to alter the relationships between the central actors in the trade regime 
in fundamental ways. Among the consequences is the erosion of the 
longstanding international law rule that the state is the ultimate arbiter 
of how international obligations are implemented. Appellate review, too, 
boosts the role of technocratic trade-biased decision-makers over political 
decision-makers, for example, by compelling states to advance a scientific 
rationale when assessing questions of risk and defending their legislative 
choices, even though such rationales are, on their own, an inadequate 
means of resolving the political and economic controversies that invariably 
underpin policy and regulatory decisions.
On Constitutionalism and the Trade Regime: 
Costs and Benefits
The cumulative effect of these different constitutional lenses is both 
impressive and so revealing as to be transformative. By the time the 
analysis is finished, we have in full view a deep conundrum: although 
the  language of constitutionalism is everywhere to be found in respect 
of  the WTO, on almost any angle the regime seems constitutionally 
deficient. All three approaches to the defence and explication of the WTO, 
it turns out, come up short when measured against normal expectations 
about constitutional orders, whether it concerns matters of form, content 
or process.
Above all, through the discourse of constitutionalism, CWTO suggests 
the immense stakes of trade regimes that threaten to slip the expectations, 
and even the grasp, of their creators.
48  See, eg, Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (n 18).
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To recapitulate, CWTO makes clear the risky, unstable settlement between 
the domestic and the international when it comes to foundational 
decisions about social and economic priorities that the new regime has 
imported and inaugurated. Here, the crucial issue is the constraints on 
policy space faced by states when it comes to implementing any rule or 
decision that might have an effect on the allocation of risk or the costs and 
benefits of trade. This is now arguably the central theoretical and political 
question for trade negotiations as a whole. In so doing, CWTO also 
foregrounds the shifting balance of power between the domains of politics 
and technocracy, and the declining role of diplomacy in favour of expertise 
in the trade regime. CWTO marks the rising status of the individual or 
corporate actor vis-a-vis nation-states within the trade regime enabled 
by the mechanism of private rights, now transposed into ‘human rights’, 
and the deep challenge to democratic values posed by that ascendancy. 
As a consequence of the previous three moves, CWTO also highlights 
the uncertain and imperilled status of non-economic or social concerns – 
here, read distributive equity and social justice – in the current trade law 
calculus. Finally, CWTO focuses our attention on the vexed problems of 
constructing institutions and rules for representation and deliberation in 
a post-Westphalian world, where whether at the descriptive or normative 
level, states are manifestly no longer the only actors in town.49
CWTO makes equally clear the mechanisms and vectors of this 
transformational change. Here, we need to return to the role of ideas 
and recall the leitmotif running throughout CWTO, the independent 
significance of using constitutionalism as the frame in which to reflect on 
and measure such concerns. Throughout, the author draws our attention 
to the discursive function of constitutionalism, the fact that in applying 
the language of constitutionalism to the WTO, we have already made 
a significant move to import a host of legitimating assumptions and 
operations into the regime. Here she notes the ‘door-closing’ function of 
constitutionalism: its capacity to reify features that we might well have 
reason to question, but also its opposite – the possibility that constitutional 
discourse will facilitate the extension of the WTO into so many areas in 
which its authority is both uncertain and contentious. In describing the 
easy slippage from the apparent ‘fact’ of a new trade institution to the 
claim that that institution has, or should be endowed with, enhanced 




status, Deborah Cass displays a remarkably good ear for the false note: for 
example, the way that constitutionalism both constructs and fuels a false 
antinomy between the individual and an all-powerful state, paradoxically 
in an era when private actors and entities have unprecedented reach 
and power.
The Constitutionalisation of the WTO: 
Signposting the future
CWTO is relentlessly analytic and taxonomic; it is also exhaustively – 
and at moments exhaustingly – even-handed in its treatment of the 
merits of different constitutional arguments. Yet an undercurrent of 
normative energy and disquiet threads its way throughout the analysis 
nonetheless; by the last chapter, that undercurrent finally bubbles up in 
full view. If Deborah Cass has not changed her mind about the value of 
the constitutional inquiry tout court, then by the end she is very clear 
about two interconnected problems.
The first problem concerns the limits of transposing the discourse of 
constitutionalism from the nation-state to the international sphere. 
Deborah Cass’s systematic inquiry into the WTO throws into sharp relief 
the inadequacies that attend the projection of norms, assumptions and 
practices of domestic constitutionalism onto the international level. Here, 
we might read her as a critic, engaging in the exercise of foregrounding 
the background. As the exercise in reversal reveals, a host of institutions 
and practices associated with the nation-state operating in normal, liberal 
mode turn out to be crucial to the defence – and even the intelligibility – 
of constitutional norms, although many form no part of the conversation 
about constitutionalism and the WTO. If some or many of those practices 
and institutions are absent, weak or distorted, then constitutionalism will 
both mean and do very different things than we ordinarily understand it 
to mean and do. This is, of course, precisely what she has demonstrated 
with respect to the various models of constitutional engagement with 
the WTO.
The second problem concerns not just the limits but the pathologies of 
such exercises in projection, as it becomes clear that dominant ideas of 
constitutionalism so often work to further those aspects of the WTO 
that are most problematic. Here, Deborah Cass identifies problems with 
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constitutionalism at both the descriptive and the normative levels. Not only 
are existing models for analysing the WTO ‘deeply unsatisfying’, but in 
her view, ‘the ascendancy of these particular models of constitutionalism 
is related to (these) perceived deformities of democracy, sovereignty and 
economic and political organization in the international order’.50 These 
are tough words. If modes of political and institutional analysis developed 
within and premised upon the nation-state are not easily transposed 
into the supranational register, if the use of constitutionalism in the 
international sphere can even perform a sort of reverse alchemy, turning 
the gold of cherished political values into leaden constraints against 
democratically responsive modes of governance, then what comes next?
The final, quite short but powerful, indicative chapter gives us a pretty good 
idea of where she, and we, might go. For CWTO ends with a normative/
reconstructive project; Deborah being always unhappy with intellectual 
ventures that stopped short of reform, ‘what is to be done’ being very 
much part of her orientation both as a scholar and as a human being.
In an earlier venture, ‘Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical 
Scholarship in International Law’, Deborah Cass took stock of a loosely 
consolidating, though still nascent, critical engagement with ‘mainstream’ 
international law. While crediting critical scholars with crucially important 
insights into the discipline, she also took them to task for failing to 
adequately take those insights forward. Here’s how she saw the promise, 
and limits, of critical scholarship:
as pedagogical tools, the Newstream writings are invaluable 
because they offer plausible explanations of international 
lawmaking, interpretation and application, at a point in time in 
which traditional understandings about law have been questioned 
by (post)modern insights into cultural fragmentation, the making 
of history and the role of language in law.51
Yet ‘while these Newstream challenges could be transformative tools of 
changing law their potential is largely unrealized’;52 ‘[n]ewstream critiques 
frequently seem to pull back from the brink of affecting real change in 
international dialogue’.53 For example, while analyses of the culture 
of international law are
50  Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (n 1) 245.
51  Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream’ (n 13) 343.
52  Ibid 345.
53  Ibid 378.
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partially persuasive, they  …  leave unanswered the question of 
how international law can be loosened from the particular cultural 
moorings it has acquired over time and which are now represented 
in Mainstream literature.54
It was already clear long before CWTO, then, that deeply probing and 
sceptical inquiry into the conceptual scaffolding of mainstream legal 
scholarship, however necessary, could only ever, in Deborah’s view, be 
part of the enterprise; no adequate account of the trade regime would 
stop there. To avoid these deficiencies, Deborah Cass has a quite specific 
suggestion: that constitutionalism debates in the WTO should be 
refocused on the ends of democracy and development. This should be 
done by effecting a merger of a transformationalist mindset with respect 
to constitutionalism with many of the anti-constitutional critiques already 
in circulation. We have a very good foretaste of the character of this 
imagined merger, moreover, having encountered many of these critiques 
in the course of her analysis of the mainstream constitutional models.
Such a merger would require going well beyond the received accounts of 
constitutionalism that have been in play so far. For their effect, as the reader 
can now fully appreciate, has been to inhibit rather than advance the very 
thinking about the WTO and its place within international economic 
law that, now as then, is so evidently necessary.55 Surfacing not only the 
question of constitutional forms but also the substantive aims or goals of 
constitutionalism, this merger would compel us to revisit foundational 
questions about the distribution of powers among public and private actors 
and the hierarchy of goals and values in the international order, questions 
that the debate over constitutionalism has paradoxically foreclosed.
Having performed what is in effect a monumental constitutional 
ground-clearing exercise, Deborah Cass was poised to delve deeply and 
directly into these foundational normative and political controversies. 
The contemporary reader of CWTO might well want to hear much more 
on precisely these points, if only because they have become the central 
questions about the international economic law in the intervening time. 
Yet even as it stops at precisely this point, CWTO remains a brilliant and 
far-sighted analysis, one infused with highly attuned political intuition 
that shines continued light on the path on which we now find ourselves.
54  Ibid 350.









Deborah and her finger puppets, circa 1964.
Source: Photo provided by Dan Cass .
Deborah Cass was my sister and I want to share some of what I know about 
her. I think it is easy to connect her personal story with her scholarship 
or politics, because she was such a clear, integrated person. Everyone has 
contradictions; many people have commented to me that Deborah was so 
much herself: teaching law, cooking dinner, meditating while in intensive 




I am not the only one who wishes Deborah was beside us. In her 
introduction to this volume, her dear friend and mentor Hilary 
Charlesworth writes, ‘it is wonderful to have her writings as a continuing 
source of inspiration and consolation’. Hilary writes of ‘Deborah’s firm, 
clear voice, her appreciation of language, her seriousness, her curiosity, her 
sensitivity and her wry humour’.1
If you had ever lost an argument with Deborah you would be surprised to 
know she was shy once. Our parents, Shirley and Moss, made her a theatre 
to help build her confidence. Dad constructed a wooden stage. Mum 
sewed a curtain on it and fashioned a troupe of finger puppets. The photo 
in this chapter shows Deborah, circa 1964, acting out a little play, literally 
trying on different characters, to find her own voice. Her ability to listen 
to the stories of the world and tell better ones is a clue to her power.
Stories and Change
Deborah reinvented herself many times in her life: hippie child of the 
1960s, a stint in Melbourne’s outer suburbs in the late 1970s, student 
politician at the University of Melbourne in the 1980s, rising scholar in 
the 1990s, aspiring author and thorough seeker of health and spiritual 
truth, from her cancer diagnosis in 2003 until her death in 2013.
Deborah’s love of stories blossomed when she learned to read. I inherited 
some of her childhood favourites, paperback editions of The Chronicles of 
Narnia by CS Lewis and some of the Moomintroll series by Finnish artist 
and writer Tove Jansson. As a teenager Deborah read and reread the Greek 
myths and held them close to her through her life. When she spoke of one 
of the myths, her eyes brightened with wonder.
She built a strong story of self but never lost her tenderness. For as long as 
I can remember, she would sometimes grab my head in both hands and 
say, ‘I used to change your nappies!’, then shake her head, with a theatrical 
frown, ‘How is that possible?’ When she was in year seven she walked 
home from school at lunchtimes to see baby me. If I find life hard now, 
I imagine talking to her and I feel comforted.
1  See in this volume, Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Traversing the Divides: Remembering Deborah Cass’.
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Deborah came of age in Melbourne and Canberra in the heady days of 
1970s. At the end of the 1960s Deborah and our sister Naomi joined the 
world’s oldest socialist-Zionist youth movement, Hashomer Hatzair, or 
Hushy. As in so many things, I followed them, a decade later. We all went 
on the camps with other children of left-wing Jews, sung Israeli songs 
and danced and debated peace in the Middle East and other political and 
even philosophical issues around the campfire. Hushy was the place I first 
heard about postmodernism, in about 1985, when one of our university-
age leaders read us some of Italo Calvino’s If on a Winters Night a Traveller.
I don’t think I have ever experienced such a loving and ethical community 
as Hushy, and I know it was a big part of Deborah’s life. Her daughter 
Rosa spent her own gap year in Israel, on a program with the progressive 
Zionist group, Netzer.
My parents sent Deborah and our oldest sister, Naomi – who she was very 
close to – to an experimental high school, Brinsley Road Community 
School, in Camberwell. Deborah soaked up the counterculture and she 
never became cynical about its aspirations for a peaceful, ecological, dare 
we say it, ‘paradigm shift’. She made friendships that lasted her whole 
life, such as filmmakers Sharon Connolly and Trevor Graham. At the end 
of the second term of her final school year she dropped out.
Deborah grew her beautiful hair down to the waist. Deborah and Naomi 
ran barefoot around the sand dunes at Somers where our parents had 
a diminutive beach house, built from a shipping container. Deborah, or 
‘Dood’ as we called her, loved the music of her time, from Pink Floyd’s 
spaced-out Ummagumma, to those nice Jewish boys Simon & Garfunkel.
She never forgave my parents for refusing to let her go to Sunbury Rock 
Festival, Australia’s answer to Woodstock, when she was about 14. In more 
recent years she went to see Leonard Cohen multiple times and could be 
heard yelling over the stage barriers, ‘I love you, Lennie!’
After Brinsley Road, Deborah reinvented herself around a conventional 
life. She left home and moved to Melbourne’s outer eastern suburbs with 
a man who worked in TV. She taught herself to bake – including her famed 
pavlova and sachertorte – and sold cakes to a shop. They played doubles 
tennis and bet on horses. They had a personal computer and she drove 
a sports car with a sun roof. I was so proud! She read novels and learned 
to touch-type and supported herself working as a medical secretary.
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When she finally decided to change again, it was because of a conversation. 
A wise friend of the family told her that she didn’t need a destination, 
rather a path. He told her that she should study, because learning is like 
a bus: you just get on and it takes you to new places.
When Deborah finally returned to do her final year of school, her 
ambition and her exam results steered her to law at the University of 
Melbourne. She never looked back. She graduated with honours, won 
five prizes including the scholarship that paid for her to do her Master of 
Laws (LLM) at Harvard University, and then topped it off with Harvard’s 
prestigious legal doctorate, the Doctor of Juridical Science, or SJD.
Deborah threw herself into campus life, studying arts/law at the University 
of Melbourne. She lived in a share house on Rathdowne Street in North 
Carlton, and walked or cycled the dozen blocks to campus. She dyed her 
hair pink. One Monday morning I told my incredulous friends at the 
boys’ school I went to that on the weekend I had been at my sister’s party 
and saw two women passionately kissing each other.
Deborah was a successful political organiser. She came to university life 
as a very adult radical; a builder, not a smasher, articulate and confident. 
She helped form the Labour Club which displaced the ALP Club in 
elections to the student council. She won the role as editor of Farrago, 
the University of Melbourne student newspaper, with Tania Patston and 
James Button, two of her close, lifelong friends.
She took me to see Talking Heads. I followed her to a protest at a joint US–
Australian military base in the northern Melbourne suburb of Watsonia 
where her comrades were all dressed as spies, in trench coats and dashing 
hats and silly glasses.
Deborah never did finish the arts degree, or make a career in politics, 
but both these sides of her are integral to understanding who she was. 
For  her, the law was always a practical endeavour, to make the world 
better. She loved stories and was masterful at making them, and this talent 




If the law was the great love of Deborah’s hard-working intellect, then 
her first love was literature. She loved debating books, including with her 
friends who were successful authors.
After falling ill in 2003 Deborah retired from the law, to get healthy and 
care for her darling daughters. After her first operation, she took to writing 
fiction. This was a surreptitious enterprise at first, but later she spoke of it 
to friends and studied writing at RMIT (formerly the Royal Melbourne 
Institute of Technology). She had some short stories published and started 
on her novel.
When Deborah died, it was our mother who came up with the idea of 
commemorating her through a literary prize. By Shirley’s design, the 
Deborah Cass Prize for Writing goes to early-career authors, who have 
a migrant background (a writer is eligible if they or one of their parents 
migrated to Australia). It is optimistic and a tribute to our grandparents, 
European Jews who migrated to Australia early last century, as a safe haven 
from anti-Semitism.
The Prize is also a tribute to her loving friendships. Her two coeditors 
from Farrago, James Button and Tania Patston, manage the judging and 
fundraising and with other friends and family, raised the funds to establish 
the Prize in 2015. Of the three esteemed, inaugural judges, two were close 
friends she made at uni: Christos Tsiolkas and Tony Ayers. (Alice Pung 
was the third inaugural judge, and like Tony and Christos, has drawn on 
the migrant experience in her work.)
A translator whose family migrated from Tuscany, Moreno Giovannoni, 
won the first Prize in 2015 and his beautiful book, The Fireflies of Autumn, 
was published in July 2018, by Black Inc.
The Prize is for literature, but in an era of resurgent nationalism, it has 
a broader impact, because literature is an antidote to bigotry. David 
Kidd and Emanuele Castano at the New School for Social Research have 
presented experimental evidence that literary fiction improves ‘theory of 
mind’. The theory of mind is our brain’s ability to detect the emotional 
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states of others, understand these emotions and represent their intentions 
and beliefs in our own minds. It is a scientific model of what is generally 
known as empathy.2
Deborah had great empathy and knew the power of stories. For her, there 
had to be a point to an argument, even on an obscure topic. Deborah was 
driven to find the world meaningful and just.
Slow Politics
Deborah steered away from student politics and towards the law, and 
brought her values with her. She was patient and practical. She believed 
in intellectual achievement and was very proud of hers, but she was not 
a snob. She knew that change has to happen through democracy.
I think that her years in suburbia had a big impact on Deborah. In between 
Brinsley Road and her return study, she worked as a sales representative 
for JM Dent & Sons. Dent published the Everyman Library of classics 
and Everyman Encyclopaedia, using modern printing press technologies to 
make books cheap enough to be read by a broad audience.
One of the great things about America, until relatively recently, was 
a respect for learning and a desire for rationality.3 Middle-class and 
working-class readers educated themselves. America had a multiplicity of 
middlebrow magazines that were fierce cheerleaders for nature, rationality, 
science and technology: National Geographic, Reader’s Digest, Popular 
Science, Discovery, Popular Mechanics.
Even when Deborah moved to highbrow Harvard and then the London 
School of Economics, she expressed no disdain for her past in the 
suburbs. She knew that middlebrow readers are still intelligent readers 
who should be taken seriously; indeed, that our democracy depends on it. 
She loved mastering complexity but knew change comes from big ideas, 
expressed simply.
2  David Kidd and Emanuele Castano, ‘Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of Mind’ 
[2013] (342) Science 377, doi.org/10.1126/science.1239918.




Deborah’s big idea was ‘trading democracy’. This meant that rather than 
trying to maximise the freeness of trade, or protesting for its fairness, 
we painstakingly build the institutions to enable its democratisation. 
Her big work in this area was The Constitutionalization of the World Trade 
Organization (CWTO), which was originally her SJD thesis at Harvard.
Deborah gave copies of her book to all her family, including our paternal 
grandfather, Ben Cass, who was 103 at the time. Papa was only just easing 
up on his long-held habit of reading The Economist every week, marking 
the important points in all the key articles and sometimes posting them 
to Deborah and his other grandchildren, according to their areas of 
professional interest. Deborah wasn’t the first person in the family to see 
the highlighting pen as a civilisational triumph.
In Kerry Rittich’s chapter on CWTO she writes that Deborah was ‘always 
unhappy with intellectual ventures that stopped short of reform, “what is 
to be done” being very much part of her orientation both as a scholar and 
as a human being’.4
Unfortunately, we know almost nothing about Deborah’s vision 
for a synthesis of trade liberalisation and international economic 
democratisation. Rittich says that Deborah’s book was a ‘constitutional 
ground-clearing exercise’.5 It mastered the field, schematising previous 
schools of thought but only teasing us with the merest outline of her 
alternative.
For those who want to explore the possibilities Deborah was uncovering, 
Rittich offers thoughts from an earlier essay that Deborah wrote, in which 
she looked at the debate between the accepted, or ‘Mainstream’, view in 
international law and the ‘Newstream’ critique. As Hilary Charlesworth 
also notes, Rittich says Deborah was critical of the conservativism 
of orthodoxy but also the inability of the rebels to effect real change.
I think this is a key point about her philosophy. She had the courage to 
make the radical critique but the modesty to know it had to make an 
impact on the world as it is.
4  See in this volume, Kerry Rittich, ‘Deborah Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade 
Organization: A Reading in Time’ 15.
5  Ibid 16.
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Deborah’s politics was always practical as well as intellectual. While she 
was at the University of Melbourne, a judge ruled that a sex worker who 
had been raped had suffered less because of her profession, so Deborah 
organised a protest and condemned the judgment on the evening 
TV news. Before she went back to study in the 1980s, Deborah won 
a  considerable sum in the lottery and donated a significant amount to 
the African National Congress to support its struggle against apartheid in 
South Africa.
In our family we often discussed politics, sometimes a little too 
monotonously. Our father, Moss, had been a Cabinet Minister in a short-
lived but energetically reforming left-wing Australian Government.6 
Deborah had a rare confidence in the political process.
Deborah saw the law as deeply political and a vehicle for change. 
She agreed with Jenny Morgan, one of her closest friends and a colleague 
in the law, who writes that Deborah’s work demonstrates that ‘law cannot 
be read without politics, history and, I would say, feminism’.7
I admired Deborah’s patience and rigour. I remember when she deferred 
from her studies to be a research assistant to counsel at the Nauru 
Commission of Inquiry into the Rehabilitation of Phosphate Lands 
in Nauru.
The tiny island of Nauru, in the western Pacific, had been covered 
with deposits of calcium phosphate, as pure and valuable as any in the 
world. This  industrial-grade fertiliser was in the faeces of sea birds over 
at least 80,000 and perhaps as long as 300,000 years.8 While Nauru 
was  administered by Australia, the phosphate was taken for Western 
industrial agriculture and was vital to the economic development of 
Australia and New Zealand.
Although Deborah had the commission’s most junior legal role, she left 
a big mark. Tony Anghie recalls that she had the ‘massive task of scouring 
the archives in various places including London, Geneva, New York, 
New Zealand, Melbourne and Fiji’. He writes:
6  Moss Cass, Vivien Encel and Anthony O’Donnell, Moss Cass and the Greening of the Australian 
Labor Party (Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2017).
7  See in this volume, Jenny Morgan, ‘Introduction to “Constitutional Work”’.
8  SJ Gale, ‘The Mined-out Phosphate Lands of Nauru, Equatorial Western Pacific’ (2016) 63(3) 
Australian Journal of Earth Sciences 334, doi.org/10.1080/08120099.2016.1206621.
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We relied completely on the several filing cabinets full of documents 
that Deborah had so carefully compiled and catalogued … It is 
a testament to the thoroughness and precision of Deborah’s work 
that the case that was later argued in the International Court of 
Justice was based on the foundations that she had laid … Deborah 
had provided all that was needed.9
This diligence was a matter of her character. She wanted to change the 
world and knew, as Max Weber wrote, that ‘[p]olitics is a strong and slow 
boring of hard boards’.10
The Healthy Self
If politics is a struggle against chaos, then so too is having a body. Cancer 
brought chaos to Deborah’s body and her family. She had multiple 
operations over a decade, in London and then at Melbourne’s excellent 
Peter MacCallum Cancer Centre. I think that two of her important sources 
of strength during this period were her diligence and her storytelling.
When Deborah realised that the cancer was truly serious and ongoing, she 
moved her family back to Melbourne. I moved soon after from Sydney 
and so for several years our family of origin lived in the same city. The 
closeness forged with Deborah over those years and the experience of 
getting to really know Gerry, Hannah and Rosa is a highlight of my life.
Deborah responded to mortality and suffering with courage and focus. 
She became an expert, bringing a notebook to all her medical meetings. 
She worked hard at being as healthy as possible. She redirected her brilliant 
mind from the law to the big philosophical questions about life and death. 
Again, she reinvented herself, telling herself the story that would open up 
new horizons.
She truly did defy the odds. At one meeting with her team in 2012 
they said Deborah was doing so well that she was, statistically speaking, 
‘off the graph’. She had survived years longer than any of the surgeons or 
oncologists had predicted. Even then, in her last year, they were optimistic 
about what she could achieve, in her remarkable way.
9  See in this volume, Tony Anghie, ‘Self-Determination and Beyond: Reflections on the Aftermath 
of the Nauru Case’.




Every day she was able, Deborah went for a long walk. She made her own 
fresh juices. She bought a vast range of healthy foods and supplements. 
She read about Buddhism, meditation, spirituality, cognitive science, 
conventional medicine and alternative therapies. She continued to enjoy 
poetry, novels, and the papers, including the London Review of Books and 
Melbourne’s Age.
At one point in the latter years, Deborah was readmitted to hospital. I was 
the one spending time by her bed that week. (Naomi, our sister, often 
slept in the hospital room and tended to Deborah there and when she 
was at home, with incredible dedication.) On this particular occasion 
I entered Deborah’s hospital room to find her bed empty.
After gathering courage, I went to the nurses’ station to ask what had 
happened. There was silence until a young nurse said Deborah had raised 
her weak and pained body and was walking around the ward, leaning on 
the infusion pump. The nurse said, ‘she’s like the Terminator’.
Like many people, I had always avoided thinking about death, before 
Deborah fell ill. A good friend recommended I read Elisabeth Kübler-
Ross (1926–2004), the Swiss-American psychologist who founded the 
clinical study of how Western people face mortality. On Death and Dying, 
published in 1969 (Simon & Schuster), proposes that we are unable 
to really comprehend our own death. She observed we try to ‘bargain’ 
with fate. We think that if we are morally worthy, then God will heal 
us. Or, for the atheists, we think that if we work hard (at meditation or 
positive thinking or consuming healthy foods and supplements), then our 
bodies will heal us.
In her last couple of years, I used to go around every second weekend to 
help her make a vast volume of freshly squeezed vegetable and fruit juice, 
which she believed was holding the cancer at bay. These were lovely times, 
when we would talk for hours about everything under the sun. We often 
went for a coffee – a dandelion brew for her – to Me & Julio, the café 
on her street in North Fitzroy, opposite the school yard. One day she 
suddenly faced me and said, ‘It’s not fair that I am going to die and you 
are going to still be here’. We cried and I held her tight.
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Gerry and their girls were amazingly strong through these years. Gerry 
supported Deborah and her choices, even when her path took her to 
realms they could not share. The girls and Gerry gave all their love to her. 
Their home was a happy one, full of all the normal joys and dramas that 
come with two children growing up.
Over that last difficult and amazing decade, Deborah worked hard to tell 
the best story she could about herself, the cancer and the meaning of her 
life. I think that the creativity of the storyteller in her sustained her life for 
so many years longer than the doctors gave her. In her early life she fell in 
love with stories and the power they have to remake us. She never gave up 
on that little Deborah inside.
She studied Buddhism and practiced meditation, at times for several hours 
a day. She went on retreats. When she died in 2013, Sogyal Rinpoche sent 
an email to followers around the world asking them to meditate for her.
Deborah also turned to Judaism. She found a teacher to instruct her in the 
foundations of the Kabbalah and spoke of it with close friends like Kim 
Rubenstein in Canberra and Jon Turner QC in London.
This part of her journey was an unusual one for our family. Our parents 
had brought us up as atheists, or at least rationalist and agnostic. 
As  children we went to the synagogue together for the big days in the 
religious calendar: Rosh Hashana (New Year) and Yom Kippur (the Day 
of Atonement). This was more for connection to a shared culture and 
history than connection to God.
The one body of the Jewish canon which we all could recite was the 
comedy. Shirley, our mum, has a particularly wicked sense of the absurd. 
During times of difficulty – or indeed any time – she would lob a grenade 
of bitter-sweet pathos and blow up any solemnity. I can see Deborah 
holding her sides, crying with laughter.
We loved the films of the Marx Brothers and Woody Allen, and the family 
record and cassette collections included Tom Lehrer and Lenny Bruce.
The family favourite was the 1965 classic, ‘You Don’t Have to Be Jewish’. 
One sketch we all loved was the supposed reading of the will of a Samuel 
B Cohen, of Long Island, New York.
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The sketch consists of Cohen’s executor reciting the will, to squeals of 
admiration and sotto voce commentary. There is one million dollars to ‘my 
beautiful boy Sheldon’ and the same amount to ‘my beautiful daughter’, 
‘who has been a little too particular or she’d be married already’. Cohen’s 
wife gets two million and ‘the Picasso from the back of the store’. To his 
brother-in-law Louis, ‘who lived with us all his life’ and ‘who never had to 
do a day’s work’ and ‘always smoked the best cigars; mine’ and ‘who all his 
life said I’d never remember him in my will; hello Louis!’
I loved walking and talking with Deborah. Wherever she lived in that big 
last decade, she took long walks, swinging her arms vigorously and holding 
herself erect. She was convinced that this gave vitality to her immune 
system. She experienced the clarity it brought to her mind. In Melbourne 
and at her Somers beach house she brought along trusty Angus, her little 
Scottish Highland Terrier.
I shared Deborah’s fascination with neuroscience. We loved Norman 
Doige’s bestseller, The Brain that Changes Itself (Penguin, 2007), and I gave 
her Daniel J Siegel’s Mindsight (Random House, 2010). The promise of 
this new generation of neuroscientists is the idea that we can use our 
thoughts to change our brains.
This appealed very much to Deborah’s sense that we can use the power 
of the stories we tell to shape ourselves and our societies, as moral agents. 
Neuroplasticity provides a scientific approach to practice of meditation 
and an empirical account of its positive impacts. If we can use the software 
of our thoughts to repeatedly think in more mentally healthy ways, then 
our brain will, over time, rewire into more mentally healthy hardware.
Daniel Siegel is a clinical neuroscientist who has expanded this vision of 
neuroplasticity into the social realm. He theorises that wellbeing is a function 
of three factors: brain, mind and relationships. If our relationships carry 
some of the content of our mind, then they influence our brains.
On our walks together, Deborah discussed her hope that a unified theory 
of brain and self was emerging. She enjoyed thinking that science and 
spirituality could find a deep connection through concepts of mind.
Deborah did not need to read neuroscience to know how to love and 
be loved. Even when sick, she was often busy with friendships: writing 
aerograms, making cakes, talking through problems. She used to advise, 
‘I water my friends better than you do’.
127
TRAvERSING DIvIDES
Deborah wanted to know everything. She also wanted to be in the thrall of 
becoming, of mystery. I love the story of her playing with finger puppets 
on her little stage as a girl, but her strength was a mysterious force, rising 
from her unconscious.
On 25  June 2014, Natalia Schiffrin, Philippe Sands QC and other of 
Deborah’s London friends put on a beautiful memorial for her at Burgh 
House, near Hampstead Heath. Maria Aristodemou spoke rather intensely 
about the exhilarating and sometimes confronting sense of being in the 
moment with Deborah.
Maria said that Deborah had something she wanted for herself: an honesty 
that was fundamental. Deborah was, in psychoanalytic terms, the ‘Ego’ 
that Maria wanted to become, ‘the ethical subject for whom there’s no 
distance between the “saying” and “the said” … [who can] speak their 
desire without fear and without lying’.11
As you might hope, I think there is a valuable political lesson for us in 
Deborah’s personal struggle. The biggest challenge facing the world is 
global warming and it is something that I have worked on, and cried 
about, since 1991. When people ask me, ‘is there any hope left?’, I now 
reply that it is not the most useful question.
After doing my part to help Deborah struggle for health, I learned that 
hope is not the point. Her struggle made our lives bigger, because we lived 
it fully with her. She may have hoped for a cure and bargained for the 
impossible, but she got up each day and lived meaningfully.
We live in a real world of objectively knowable truths, but we relate to 
them through the stories we tell and the courage we have to face things 
as they are.
I recall Deborah’s friendships, mindfulness, singing to Leonard Cohen, 
long walks with Angus the terrier, afternoons listening to radio broadcasts 
of summer test cricket, weekends at her Somers beach haven, fearless and 
tender cultivation of her daughters and love of her husband, and they all 
remind me how to live well. She knew her story would have the ending 
she did not want, but she kept telling better stories about herself and the 
world, each day.





On the 7th of June, 2012, Hannah, Rosa and I attended the launch of 
the then-latest edition of the fiction magazine, Etchings, held in Readings 
bookstore in St Kilda, just opposite the site where the famous Jewish café 
Scheherazade had stood. Deborah’s grandfather, Benjamin Cass, had been 
a regular at Scheherazade for 20 years (more or less until his death at 104, 
almost twice the age Deborah was when she died).
Four writers were there to read from recently published work. Two women 
recited passages from their own worthy memoirs and were followed by 
a booming man recounting some hugely unerotic ‘erotic adventures’. He 
clearly imagined himself to be the star speaker that evening. Right up until 
the point when Deborah began reading. She read – with such charm, poise 
and authority – a passage from her short story, ‘Her Beauty as a Sword’ 
(about her grandmother, Eva Shulman).1 The room was captivated.
It was the last time Deborah spoke in public, and the story was the last 
work she published.
But Deborah and her work have had such powerful afterlives. I still 
see references to her Nordic Journal essay, ‘Navigating the Newstream’ 
(a brilliantly clever title, if I may say so), her superb tour d’horizon 
of the Newstream movement in international law.2 Meanwhile the 
constitutionalisation of trade law book is a standard reference (discussed 
recently at an American Society event) and her other work pops up very 
1  Deborah Cass, ‘Her Beauty as a Sword’ (2011) 10 Etchings 5–12.
2  Deborah Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law’ 
(1996) 65 Nordic Journal of International Law 341, doi.org/10.1163/15718109620294924.
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frequently. Cait Storr was kind enough to reference Deborah recently in 
Tbilisi when she spoke about Nauru. My students continue to quote her. 
They probably have no idea that I was married to her for 20 years.
Deborah left so much behind: friends (she had the best friends, as 
Catriona Drew once told me), ideas, ways of seeing and being, cousins, 
nieces, nephews, a brother, a sister, a mother, a father, a husband and two 
daughters. And now, this book can be added to Deborah’s afterlife.
So, I could not be more grateful to Kim and Hilary (two of Deborah’s dear 
friends and hugely admired colleagues), for organising the conference 
from which this book arises, and to Deborah’s friends and colleagues 
(and brother, Dan). They write so beautifully about her public life and 
her private world or both; Catherine Hawkins describes talking feminist 
politics over the back fence in Narrabundah with Deborah, and Dan’s 
piece is a fluent and moving tribute to the various private and public 
Deborahs we knew and didn’t know.
Deborah told me, shortly after I met her, that she had published 
her undergraduate essay in public international law. We were both 
international law tyros at this point so I felt vaguely disturbed by this 
news. At that point, I had published nothing (unless we count a poem 
about John Lennon in the 1980 edition of Thor, the Thurso High School 
Magazine). Worse still, she was merely a tutor whereas I had ascended 
to the heady heights of ‘lecturer in law (continuing)’ at Melbourne 
University. After professing a total lack of interest in this news, I searched 
out her essay immediately. It had an irredeemably boring title (something 
like ‘The Quiet Revolution: International Law and Fishing on the High 
Seas’) but, disappointingly, it was, like Margaret Young’s return to that 
subject in these pages, rather good.3
A few months later, still in the midst of a faltering campaign to win her 
heart, I took her to Jimmy Watson’s Wine Bar in Carlton where she 
dropped another bombshell: her essay on self-determination (celebrated 
here in Tony Anghie’s affectionate tribute to her work on Nauru) had 
been accepted by The Syracuse Journal of International Law.4 I muttered 
something about not having a clue where Syracuse was but I knew then 
3  Deborah Cass, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The Exclusive Economic Zone and Foreign Fishing Access 
in the Pacific’ (1987) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 83.
4  Deborah Z Cass, ‘Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International 
Law Theories’ (1992) 18 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 31.
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that the die was cast. Deborah was on the move, and quickly. I hastily 
knocked off an essay on some recent international law case and then, in 
imitation of Deborah, I rehashed my Master’s thesis on self-determination 
and persuaded the Stanford Journal of International Law to publish it.
It was a breathless and prolix retread of Deborah’s elegant dissection of the 
same subject.
By the time it was published, Deborah had published our first daughter, 
Hannah, and the battle was over.
Deborah always seemed to be one step ahead, not just of me, but 
of nearly everyone. Feminist constitutional law (with Kim), the revival of 
trusteeship as an international legal doctrine, the turn to histories of the 
discipline, the emergence of trade law, the constitutionalisation of trade 
law: Deborah was there first or a close second.
But the book on trade law was, really, what Kerry Rittich calls a ‘ground-
clearing exercise’.5 Further books would follow: on trade and democracy, 
on campaign finance, a critical study of Nauru and trusteeship. There 
would be a magnum opus on international law and redistribution, then 
a (first) novel called A History of Boyfriends. Each of them ‘fresh and 
forthright and full of luminous, funny phrases’, in the words Susan Marks 
used to describe Deborah’s writing.
But none of this happened. Life got in the way. Then death.
Or maybe it did happen (some of it at least) but was carried out by others 
in their own distinctive and distinguished way. When I read these essays 
I feel Deborah’s spirit and intelligence in the pages. When Tony Anghie 
speaks of Nauru and Australia’s various imperialisms, Deborah’s archival 
research and thinking is so very evident (not least in Tony’s generous 
acknowledgments).
Margaret Young’s conviction, expressed in her wide-ranging retrospective, 
that fisheries law is a way into understanding not just important aspects 
of the law of the sea but also what she calls the ‘allocation of sovereignties’ 
at the heart of international law, is a conviction that Margaret is right to 
say would be shared by Deborah.
5  See in this volume, Kerry Rittich, ‘Deborah Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade 
Organization: A Reading in Time’.
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Deborah did not collaborate often in her academic career but the fruits 
of a rare and important collective effort are discussed by Kim Rubenstein 
in her essay on representations of women in Australian constitutional life 
and politics. Here, Kim returns to an essay she and Deborah published 
in the Adelaide Law Review in 1995.6 I think what Deborah appreciated 
most about this prescient essay was its potential to inspire change beyond 
the academy. It is to Kim’s enormous credit that the article has had such 
a powerful afterlife in Australian constitutional thought and that Kim 
and others are prepared to use the essay and recent English jurisprudence 
(Cope7) as a departure point for thinking of job-sharing (a subject to 
which Deborah’s illness made her highly attuned) as a constitutional 
issue. One of Deborah’s great friends from her Harvard days and beyond, 
Kerry Rittich, has offered here a wonderfully creative reading of Deborah’s 
prize-winning book on The Constitutionalization of the World Trade 
Organization. As she puts it:
Deborah  …  was one of the first people to seriously consider 
the idea that the idea of the WTO – how it was conceived as an 
institution, how it imagined the community of states and other 
actors engaged in trade relations, and the ethos and values that 
organised these relations and informed the operation of the regime 
as a whole – was an independently significant field of inquiry.8
How we wish that such work could have been continued by Deborah; 
how grateful we are that this work is being pursued with such rigour and 
imagination by those close to her.
Deborah’s friends have done her an enormous service in these pages. When 
this book is launched; when we pick it up and read these sparkling essays, 
we will experience both Deborah’s powerful presence, and her absence.
6  Deborah Cass and Kim Rubenstein, ‘Representations of Women: Towards a Feminist Analysis 
of the Australian Constitutional System’ (1995) 17 Adelaide Law Review 3.
7  R (Cope) v Returning Officer for the Basingstoke Parliamentary Constituency [2015] EWHC 3958 
(Admin).
8  See in this volume, Kerry Rittich, ‘Deborah Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade 
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Women’s Legal, CASA House and Women’s Domestic Violence Crisis 
Service. She worked for many years with VicHealth on their violence 
against women agenda. Jenny’s research interests are in the areas of 
violence against women, homicide, feminist legal theory, reproductive 
rights and law reform. Jenny is perhaps most well-known for her book, 
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